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| The True Face of Jehadis: Inside Pakistan's Network of Terror |
| 2006-08-25 |
BOOK REVIEW Deadly double game The True Face of Jehadis: Inside Pakistan's Network of Terror by Amir Mir Reviewed by Sreeram Chaulia Pakistan's status as the frontline state for worldwide jihad is central to its governmental institutions and their absolute command over society. The role of the establishment in injecting religious fanaticism and hatred is a classic case of ideological mobilization of society in the name of God. Journalist Amir Mir's new book uncovers the overt and covert roots of Pakistan's descent into intolerance and terrorism and its deadly impact on South Asia and beyond. In the Foreword, Khaled Ahmed of The Friday Times describes how the jihad in Kashmir had a deleterious effect on Pakistani society. Massive state-sponsored public indoctrination in favor of holy war against India produced "a society deeply influenced by the rhetoric of jihad". The denial mode and "fantasy for jihad" among ordinary Pakistanis today is the result of decades of brainwashing and deficit of objective information about terrorism. After the Afghan war, Kashmir's "liberation" became the sole agenda of thousands of Pakistani terrorists. By 1995, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) collaborated with the Jamaat-e-Islami to raise a Taliban-type force of young Pakistani students to fight Indian forces in Kashmir. Since September 11, 2001, Islamabad has been "struggling hard to control the jihadi monster it created". (p 6) With the state's active connivance, Pakistani support structures continue to breed more jihadis. The leaders of Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) "enjoy full freedom of movement and speech despite an official ban". (p 8) Terrorist training camps flourish with renewed vigor on both the Indian and Afghan borders of the country. The suicide bombers who tried to assassinate Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf in December 2003 belonged to JeM and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI). They colluded with Pakistani air force, army and military intelligence personnel, an indication that "jihadi tentacles have spread far and wide" and boomeranged on their own masters. (p 21) Since the soldiery hails from the ranks of the urban and rural poor, it is practically impossible for it not to be infected by the virus of Islamist bigotry being propagated by thousands of deeni madrassas (religious seminaries). Musharraf's half-hearted attempts to give the army a liberal outlook acceptable to the West barely ruffle the deeply ingrained zealotry that runs in its veins. Pro-jihad officers occupy the top echelons of the military, making a mockery of the so-called "purges" in favor of moderation. The murder of journalist Daniel Pearl in Karachi in 2002 was masterminded by Sheikh Omar Saeed, a double agent of the ISI and JeM who was previously involved in terrorist attacks on high-profile targets in India. Musharraf himself admitted that Pearl had been "over-intrusive" in his investigations. Saeed had foreknowledge of the September 11 terrorist strikes and immediately informed Lieutenant-General Ehsanul Haq, then ISI director and corps commander for Peshawar. Saeed's capture spurred ISI higher-ups to intervene and obstruct his interrogation findings from being made public. Holding him in an isolated cell "helps Musharraf keep a key witness out of American, British and Indian hands". (p 43) Since the end of 2003, JeM seems to have lost the favor of ISI because Washington is convinced of its links to al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Abdul Jabbar, the former right-hand man of JeM chief Maulana Masood Azhar, was released by security agencies in 2004 to set him up in open conflict with his mentor. LeT founder Hafiz Muhammad Saeed is now in the good books of the establishment since he is "agreeable to waging a controlled jihad in Indian Kashmir whenever asked to do so". (p 66) The government cooperates fully with LeT fundraising, public rallies, recruitment and training. The terror outfit's sprawling 80-hectare headquarters in Muridke has been transformed into a "mini-Islamic state" where uninterrupted jihad is planned. Hafiz Saeed's confidants are convinced that Musharraf will abandon neither terrorism nor the military option on Kashmir. The military regime is avoiding any action against LeT on the pretext that it has no links with Jamaat-ul-Dawa, the powerful political patron whose hand has been revealed in terror as far afield as Indonesia and Iraq. Mir notes that as LeT focuses on "global jihad outside Pakistan, it has a free hand to operate within the country". (p 72) HuM's al-Qaeda connections are second to none. The naib ameer (commander) of the group, Muhammad Imran, announced openly in a courtroom that it was a brainchild of the Pakistani rangers and intelligence agencies. When HuM supremo Maulana Fazlur Rahman was taken into custody in 2002, Pakistan refused to oblige US demands for a debriefing. As soon as international pressure eased off, he was set free. Unlike Qari Saifullah Akhtar's HuJI, Rahman is still allowed to call the shots on jihadist foreign policy. Notwithstanding splits and desertions in HM, its leader Syed Salahuddin remains fully in control because of the ISI's backing. At present, he operates from Rawalpindi with "instructions to wait and see". (p 91) He has received clearances from Jamaat-e-Islami to assume a new role as a politician in Indian Kashmir. The Jamaat's own cadres and office bearers are aiding al-Qaeda's surviving members and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-e-Islami across Pakistan and Afghanistan. Tableeghi Jamaat, supposedly a preaching organization, is clandestinely assisting jihadist forces with the blessings of Pakistan's elite bureaucracy, military, scientists and intelligence agencies. HuM, LeT and HuJI recruit through Tableegh in the guise of spreading Islamic theology. US intelligence believes that Tableegh is the fountainhead of the Pakistan-based jihad infrastructure. Dawood Ibrahim, a billionaire gangster and Islamic extremist, lived with Pakistani government protection in Karachi for several years. Islamabad's claim that he is no longer around is discounted by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as "a face-saving exercise because it is in its interest not to give the don up". (p 109) Mir discloses that Ibrahim may have moved to Islamabad after the September 11 attacks. On the monster of sectarian violence, Mir comments that "fundamentalist Islam remains at the heart of the Musharraf establishment's strategy of national political mobilization and consolidation" (p 114) The former head of the anti-Shi'ite Sipah-e-Sahiba (SSP), Maulana Azim Tariq, maintained a cozy working relationship with the ISI for more than a decade before being mysteriously killed in 2003. The SSP not only ran amok against minorities in Pakistan but also sent thousands of jihadis to fight in Indian Kashmir. The Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a spinoff of the SSP with highly vicious killers, might be working as al-Qaeda's "Delta Force" in Karachi. The surprise rise of the religious right in the 2002 elections in Pakistan was attributable to the encouragement of the Musharraf regime. The Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) has a special relationship with the military by sustaining the latter's Afghan and Kashmir policies. The MMA provides Islamabad an alibi to argue that it cannot moderate its policies in Kashmir to the degree that Washington desires. The 10,000-odd deeni madrassas of Pakistan continue to churn out radical terrorists by the dozens every day. The government is unwilling to act against the madrassas for fear of unsettling its religious allies. The army sees in the large number of madrassa-trained jihadis a valuable asset for its proxy war against India. Mir asserts that "the Pakistani military dictator's priority has never been eradication of Islamic extremism". (p 147) Sectarianism and virulence are not limited to madrassas alone. Public schools in Pakistan instruct students on jihad and martyrdom to construct "a national chauvinistic mindset". (p 152) Jihadist journalism committed to pan-Islamic discourses receives state subsidies and jihadist publications thrive on government advertisements. Thanks to this propaganda barrage, al-Qaeda enjoys in Pakistan a virtually bottomless pool of ad hoc members, donors and harborers, particularly in Karachi. Many within the Pakistani security apparatus bear direct responsibility for the resurgence of the Taliban, which masses in the Waziristan, Chaman and Kurram Agency areas to cause mayhem across the Afghan border and then retreat to the safety of Pakistani territory. Mullah Omar himself is said to be hiding in the tribal areas close to Quetta. In April 2004, the Pakistani army made peace with Taliban commander Nek Mohammad in an amnesty agreement mediated by two MMA parliamentarians. Abdullah Mahsud, the most wanted commander of the Taliban in South Waziristan has a brother and four cousins in the Pakistani army. According to the US 9-11 Commission Report, Pakistan benefits from the Taliban-al-Qaeda relationship as Osama bin Laden's camps trained and equipped fighters for the insurgency in Kashmir. Mir remarks that the United States' "reluctance to act against Pakistan and make it pay a prohibitive price for helping jihadi terrorists encouraged the Musharraf regime to keep the jihadis alive and active". (p 186) Al-Qaeda's Abu Zubaydah, captured in 2002, claimed that the late head of the Pakistani air force, Mushaf Ali Mir, had prior knowledge of the September 11 terrorist plot. Mir had allegedly struck a deal with al-Qaeda in 1996 to supply arms and offer protection, a pledge that was renewed in 1998 in the presence of Saudi intelligence boss Prince Turki. Mir's plane crashed in 2003 without explanation and it is speculated that the US forces carrying out anti-Taliban operations had shot it down near Kohat because of his links with al-Qaeda. Investigations into the September 11 plot revealed that ISI's then-head, hardliner pro-Taliban Lieutenant-General Mahmood Ahmad, ordered Sheikh Omar Saeed to wire US$100,000 to Mohammad Atta, the chief hijacker. In October 2001, Musharraf forced Ahmad into retirement after the FBI displayed credible evidence of his involvement in the terror attacks and knowledge that he was playing a "double game". So frustrated was the FBI with the calculated blockading of counter-terrorist operations by the ISI that it formed its own secret Spider Group of former Pakistani army and intelligence operatives to monitor fundamentalist activities through the length and breadth of Pakistan. For all of Musharraf's denials, his government "clearly seems guilty of exporting terror to different parts of the world". (p 257) British and Indian intelligence have nailed down proof of the ISI's jihadist mafia imprint in several terrorist attacks of the past two years. The "real problem is sympathy for Islamic extremism in Pakistan's military and intelligence establishments". (p 261) Banned Islamic charities such as Al-Rashid Trust, Al-Akhtar Trust and Ummah Tameer-e-Nau took full advantage of the October 2005 earthquake in Pakistani Kashmir and resumed their so-called welfare activities, with deadly consequences. Confident about their future as covers for jihadist funding and nuclear trading, they freely admit that "despite the US action, the Pakistani government has not imposed any restriction on our working". (p 275) Musharraf does not want to hack at his own feet and deny himself the force multipliers from jihadist ranks by genuinely ending their stranglehold over Pakistan's resources. The evidence compiled by Mir in this book throws light on the real reasons Musharraf manages to stay in power in spite of ostensibly reversing Pakistan's Taliban and Kashmir policies after September 11, 2001. But for his great "double game" of cooperation with the US and simultaneous obstructionism to help jihadis, a political typhoon would have long swept him out of the top seat. The True Face of Jehadis: Inside Pakistan's Network of Terror by Amir Mir. Roli Books, New Delhi, 2006. ISBN: 81-7436-430-7. Price: US$8.75, 310 pages. |
| Posted by:john |
| #6 The 10,000-odd deeni madrassas of Pakistan continue to churn out radical terrorists by the dozens every day. Nothing that 10,000 JDAMs can't fix. Mir had allegedly struck a deal with al-Qaeda in 1996 to supply arms and offer protection, a pledge that was renewed in 1998 in the presence of [then] Saudi intelligence boss Prince Turki. I hope you all remember Prince Turki, the (now) newly-appointed Saudi ambassador to the United States. Here's some background from a March 2003 edition of the Guardian that I post here from time to time: Turki is not what he seems. Behind him lies a murky tale of espionage, terrorism and torture. For, while Turki has many powerful friends among Britain's elite, he is no ordinary diplomat. Turki has now been served with legal papers by lawyers acting for relatives of the victims of 11 September. They accuse him of funding and supporting Osama bin Laden. The Observer can also reveal that Turki has now admitted for the first time that Saudi interrogators have tortured six British citizens arrested in Saudi Arabia and accused of carrying out a bombing campaign. The revelations throw a stark light on Turki's appointment late last year as Saudi Arabia's new ambassador to Britain. They also cast doubt on the suitability of Charles's relationship with senior Saudis. A year ago Charles had dinner with bin Laden's brother, Bakr bin Laden, and regularly hosted meetings for Turki's predecessor, Dr Ghazi Algosaibi, who was recalled after writing poems praising suicide bombers. [snip] Now, after papers were served on Turki several weeks ago, the Saudi ambassador will be at the heart of it. Legal papers in the case obtained by The Observer make it clear that the allegations are serious and lengthy. Many centre around Turki's role as head of the Saudi intelligence agency. He held the post for 25 years before being replaced in 2001 just before the attacks on New York. Turki admits to meeting bin Laden four or five times in the 1980s, when the Saudi-born terrorist was being supported by the West in Afghanistan. Turki also admits meeting Taliban leader Mullah Omar in 1998. He says he was seeking to extradite bin Laden at the request of the United States. However, the legal papers tell a different story. Based on sworn testimony from a Taliban intelligence chief called Mullah Kakshar, they allege that Turki had two meetings in 1998 with al-Qaeda. They say that Turki helped seal a deal whereby al-Qaeda would not attack Saudi targets. In return, Saudi Arabia would make no demands for extradition or the closure of bin Laden's network of training camps. Turki also promised financial assistance to Mullah Omar. A few weeks after the meetings, 400 new pick-up vehicles arrived in Kandahar, the papers say. Kakshar's statement also says that Turki arranged for donations to be made directly to al-Qaeda and bin Laden by a group of wealthy Saudi businessmen. 'Mullah Kakshar's sworn statement implicates Prince Turki as the facilitator of these money transfers in support of the Taliban, al-Qaeda and international terrorism,' the papers said. Turki's link to one of al-Qaeda's top money- launderers, Mohammed Zouaydi, who lived in Saudi Arabia from 1996 to 2001, is also exposed. Zouaydi acted as the accountant for the Faisal branch of the Saudi royal family that includes Turki. Zouaydi, who is now in jail in Spain, is also accused of being al-Qaeda's top European financier. He distributed more than $1 million to al- Qaeda units, including the Hamburg cell of Mohammed Atta which plotted the World Trade Centre attack. Finally the lawsuit alleges that Turki was 'instrumental' in setting up a meeting between bin Laden and senior Iraqi intelligence agent Faruq al-Hijazi in December 1998. At that meeting it is alleged that bin Laden agreed to avenge recent American bombings of Iraqi targets and in return Iraq offered him a safe haven and gave him blank Yemeni passports. Prince Turki is not America's friend. That he is allowed on American soil is a national disgrace. Like a bad penny, his name continues to turn up wherever international terrorism rears its ugly head. Pakistan's role is far more obvious and worthy of even greater retribution |
| Posted by: Zenster 2006-08-25 19:44 |
| #5 All run with ISI money. Without transfers from the Pak treasury they would not exist. From the Pakistani magazine "The Herald" - Cover story - "The Waiting Game" Inquiries made by the Herald reveal that although major jihadi organisations have various sources of funds, official funding traditionally made up the bulk of their financial inflows. Knowledgeable sources confide that until recently, small organisations such as the Tehrik-e-Mujahideen, al-Fatah, al-Jihad, al-Barq, Tehrik-e-Jihad, Islamic Front and Harkat Jihad Islami were receiving between 4,00,000 to 7,00, 000 Pakistani rupees a month whereas larger organisations such as HM, LT, JM, ABM and others received more money, ranging between two to three million Pakistani rupees. This was in addition to funds that paid for the logistics, communication equipment, weapons, explosives, food and trekking kits for the thousands of militants, guides and porters who infiltrated into India every year. According to insiders, the official funds were largely used by the recipient outfits to meet the expenses of offices, vehicles, camps and manpower. The cessation of these funds has jeopardised the entire infrastructure. The smaller organisations are the worst hit by this decision. “Even major groups such as the HM, LT and JM cannot sustain themselves without government support beyond a year,” says a Muzaffarabad-based observer. As regards operations inside Indian Kashmir, militant commanders say they have arms and ammunition in the region that may last for two years. “If our pipelines remain dry, the freedom movement in Kashmir will grind to a halt by 2008,” adds one Muzaffarabad-based commander. |
| Posted by: john 2006-08-25 19:03 |
| #4 I'm very confused about the pakistani terror outfits beyond their names Rule of thumb -- they're all violent, all Islamic, and all connected to the ISI. |
| Posted by: Robert Crawford 2006-08-25 18:13 |
| #3 Very interesting review (I had forgotten about the Spider group, and I'm very confused about the pakistani terror outfits beyond their names). I hope intelligence-savvy types here will take note and add this to their reading list. |
| Posted by: anonymous5089 2006-08-25 17:20 |
| #2 Amir Mir, the former editor of Weekly Independent and a reputed investigative journalist of Pakistan, started his career in 1988 with Tthe Frontier Post, Lahore. In his journalistic career spanning over 17 years, he has worked with scores of the quality newspaper organisations in Pakistan as well as abroad: The News, The Nation, The Friday Times, Newsline, Gulf News, Arab News, Straits Times, Inter Press Service, Indian Weekly Outlook and India Abroad. Having a MasterÂ’s degree in Political Science from the University of the Punjab, Lahore, Amir Mir is presently working with the Monthly Herald of the Dawn Group of Newspapers as Senior Assistant Editor. |
| Posted by: john 2006-08-25 17:04 |
| #1 Al-Qaeda's Abu Zubaydah, captured in 2002, claimed that the late head of the Pakistani air force, Mushaf Ali Mir, had prior knowledge of the September 11 terrorist plot. Mir had allegedly struck a deal with al-Qaeda in 1996 to supply arms and offer protection, a pledge that was renewed in 1998 in the presence of Saudi intelligence boss Prince Turki. Mir's plane crashed in 2003 without explanation and it is speculated that the US forces carrying out anti-Taliban operations had shot it down near Kohat because of his links with al-Qaeda. Investigations into the September 11 plot revealed that ISI's then-head, hardliner pro-Taliban Lieutenant-General Mahmood Ahmad, ordered Sheikh Omar Saeed to wire US$100,000 to Mohammad Atta, the chief hijacker. In October 2001, Musharraf forced Ahmad into retirement after the FBI displayed credible evidence of his involvement in the terror attacks and knowledge that he was playing a "double game". So frustrated was the FBI with the calculated blockading of counter-terrorist operations by the ISI that it formed its own secret Spider Group of former Pakistani army and intelligence operatives to monitor fundamentalist activities through the length and breadth of Pakistan. |
| Posted by: john 2006-08-25 17:00 |