 The growing consensus among political observers is that the Waziristan peace deal, instead of showcasing President General MusharrafÂ’s commitment to eliminating the country of pro-Taliban elements, may, in fact, send the signal to Washington that his support of militants remains as strong as it did five years ago, when he was only one of three leaders to recognise AfghanistanÂ’s Taliban regime.
| It takes a highly convoluted logical process to escape that conclusion, doesn't it? |
| “Although the deal was aimed at ending cross-border insurgent attacks from Pakistan into Afghanistan, many predict that it will have the contrary effect by creating Taliban and Qaeda refuges...” |
Although the deal was aimed at ending cross-border insurgent attacks from Pakistan into Afghanistan, many predict that it will have the contrary effect by creating Taliban and Qaeda refuges. Leading Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid, author of “Taliban”, says that the deal “has set up a safe haven for Al Qaeda and the Taliban”.
| No! Reeeeeally? Who'da ever thunk that? |
This is a view shared by Samina Ahmed of the Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG), who describes the accord as having “ceded North Waziristan to the Talibs”.
| Yeah, if the government doesn't control the area and the Talibs are the ones who are controlling the area, it's pretty easy to come to that conclusion, isn't it? Shaukat Sultan's slip of the tongue the other day merely serves to reinforce it. |
Officially, Washington has so far rejected such claims, with President George W Bush saying in an interview on Thursday that he didnÂ’t see the deal as providing militant safe havens.
| He's being polite. Very polite. |
The American media, however, appears to have already begun sharpening its knives, ahead of General MusharrafÂ’s visit to the US later this month, by attacking IslamabadÂ’s track record on dealing with the Taliban. The New York Times on Thursday quoted Seth G Jones, a political scientist at the RAND Corporation, as saying that Pakistani agents had helped hide Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar, and tipped off fighters as to the movements of US-led forces.
| I'm sure no one here's ever suspected such a thing... Oh. Except for those occasions, I mean. |
Critics point out that it was only after the assassination attempts on his life that General Musharraf in early 2004 ordered an offensive in South Waziristan which later moved north, taking the fight into two of the most recalcitrant of the countryÂ’s seven tribal agencies. While Al Qaeda nests were found, the army also came into conflict with pro-Taliban tribesmen. Moreover, the army offensive served to stiffen tribal resistance against the government.
| Has anybody but me noticed that the Pak army has a much harder time with these goobers than does the fledgling Afghan army, barely out of its formational diapers? An old boy officers' corps and a cannon fodder enlisted base is bad enough, but motivating your military with daily doses of Olde Tyme Religion and then sending them to hunt down and kill holy men while backed by tribal lashkars is a sure recipe for disaster. |
| “... the army became bogged down on two fronts: fighting what many regarded as an American war and coming under fire for brutally quelling a nationalist revolt in Balochistan...” |
Thus the army became bogged down on two fronts: fighting what many regarded as an American war and coming under fire for brutally quelling a nationalist revolt in Balochistan. The army paid the price for this dual offensive. During the Waziristan campaigns, it lost 220 men, while more than 700 were wounded. Its tribal paramilitary forces also suffered large-scale desertions.
| Contrast casualty figures for Afghan army operations. |
Thus Rashid firmly believes, given this context, that the Waziristan peace deal “has been triggered most keenly by Musharraf in order to placate his constituency, which is the army”.
| Bingo. Fighting a real war is beyond their capacity, though they are good at scatching each other's backs. |
Critics point out that the primary beneficiaries of the deal are the militants in North Waziristan. Prisoners have been released, troops sent back to the barracks, checkpoints removed, weapons returned and money paid out. In addition, the decision to let the pro-Taliban Jamiat Ulema-e-Isam (JUIF) broker the accord has increased the party’s power and influence, with one diplomat describing the move as akin to “putting the fox in charge of the hen house’.
| Y'might say that, seeing as how the JUI's closely allied with them — to the extent that the Talibs raised the JUI's flag when they briefly took control of a couple Afghan towns. |
But what has the government got from the deal? Not much, according to critics, who point out there is no guarantee that militants, not necessarily the ones who signed the accord, would refrain from carrying out cross-border attacks against either Pakistani troops or those from across the border. Moreover, if the US were to launch missile attacks on suspected Al Qaeda targets hiding there, as it has done in the past, the entire area could become destabilised.
| As opposed to... what? What is it now? What has it ever been? |
Indeed, the frontier’s history is littered with broken peace deals. “None of them have been honoured. Why should we assume this time round it is going to be honoured?” said the ICG’s Ahmed. |