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| China-Japan-Koreas |
| The Plan That Moved Pyongyang |
| 2007-02-20 |
| By Philip Zelikow In 2006, the headlines from North Korea were depressing. Pyongyang was headed down the path of escalation: missile tests in July, testing a nuclear weapon in October. Now, 2007 has opened with encouraging news -- a breakthrough in Beijing. In effect, the agreement announced last week was answering the bomb test with a successful test of diplomacy. But this deal makes more sense if we understand the broader strategy, set in motion some time ago, that is starting to play out. In 2005, the United States energized its flagging North Korea efforts on two tracks. One was diplomatic, the other defensive. The diplomatic strategy was never just about North Korea. The Korean Peninsula has repeatedly been a battleground for the great powers in Northeast Asia. The United States, particularly Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and her deputy, Robert Zoellick, saw a way to break this mold: China, Japan and Russia were flexing new diplomatic muscle. The North Korean problem could be an opportunity to unite potential rivals in common effort, an enterprise without precedent in Northeast Asia. The defensive approach responded to North Korea's outlaw strategy for economic survival. Protecting the integrity of the international financial system was just one of the ways to show the North's leaders that trafficking in contraband was not a sustainable solution to their problems. By late 2005, both policies had been set in motion. In September, Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill and his counterparts from South Korea, North Korea, China, Japan and Russia had negotiated a joint framework for comprehensive diplomatic action. Meanwhile, enforcement actions that had been pending against North Korea's partners in money laundering, such as Macau's Banco Delta Asia, were rolled out. Then the Bush administration paused. It had been preparing to follow up with new diplomatic initiatives, but the administration was uncertain and divided about how much further to go until North Korea moved. As for the North Koreans, they were indeed hit hard as members of the international financial community became increasingly reluctant to handle their suspect transactions. Furious, they boycotted the six-party talks and tried to advertise their own strength, a course that culminated in the nuclear test last October. After that test, Rice leaned hard on the regional diplomatic relationships she had nurtured. First -- and fast -- came U.N. Security Council Resolution 1718, the most potent action against North Korea that the United Nations had taken since 1953, when the Korean War was suspended. Having shown the North that it had underestimated regional solidarity, the United States next moved to change the dynamic, to break the cycle of escalation. That month, Chinese President Hu Jintao and President Bush came to a strategic understanding about North Korea. They agreed that diplomacy needed to be given another chance. But the diplomacy couldn't just be a gloss, busywork that only gave the appearance of action. To turn this strategic understanding into policy, Rice developed a two-stage strategy. First the six parties would move quickly to offset the nuclear test with unprecedented commitments from the North Koreans to stop and reverse their nuclear development and to bring back the system of monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Some called this an "early harvest" -- testing whether the ground could yield anything fruitful. If it did, then in the second stage the six parties would follow up. But rather than returning to the old, painful pattern of piecemeal nuclear bribery, the diplomacy would have to move simultaneously on multiple fronts: scrapping the nuclear program, building normal economic cooperation, tackling the normalization of relations and -- perhaps most engaging -- getting at the unresolved issues of the Korean War. Thus, later in October, Rice shuttled across Northeast Asia to reassure allies and win support for this diplomatic design, especially in Beijing. Pressure had its place. So did diplomatic ingenuity. One Chinese official said to Rice, "It is better to play with two hands." And talking with the North Koreans would not be a problem, Rice concluded, if doing so did not undermine the vital regional foundation and if the North Koreans actually had something to say. Last week's deal, skillfully negotiated by Rice and Hill with their counterparts, delivers a plan for the "early harvest." A "good, initial step" was Rice's careful phrase. The broader context in which the agreement was reached helps explain what she meant. The United States and its negotiating partners have successfully carried out a diplomatic test. The next two months will show whether the design remains valid. Rice has agreed to a six-party meeting of foreign ministers, including the North Koreans. We will see whether the Bush administration and its counterparts can launch the second stage, when the desired outcomes to be produced from this diplomacy may finally come into view. The writer is a history professor at the University of Virginia. From 2005 until 2007 he was counselor of the State Department. |
| Posted by:ryuge |
| #3 This stuff is just wishful thinking. The NORKS are being backed into a corner. They are becoming a liability, even to the ChiComs, who are in there for the natural resources and to keep Korea from unifying. Chicoms have been playing both ends against the middle with their little dawg. The quicker the Nork regime ends, the quicker the North Korean people can be rescued from their plight. The NORKS are on the ropes and we give them a hand, thus enabling this inhuman dictatorship to survive. Give them millions of barrels of oil and we cannot have the authority to shut down and dismantle their reactors and missile installations. What a friggin deal. |
| Posted by: Alaska Paul 2007-02-20 14:32 |
| #2 The North Koreans will break their word, as always. This is just the high point in the cycle. Evidently, Banco Delta really put a crimp in their plans. |
| Posted by: gromky 2007-02-20 07:19 |
| #1 Hmmmmm. Not buying this, for now. And by that I don't mean I'm in the waiting mode that Zelikow alleges is the current US position, either. My understanding of the "deal" is that it does not include the rather aggressive design required for success against the Norks - i.e., an UP-FRONT, witnessed and completely verified root-and-branch dismantlement of all their nukyler work and infrastructure and even supervision of their personnel by a very very very intrusive ongoing and open-ended monitoring program. But they'd never agree to this, you say? Well, OK - the point is to achieve our objective, not to put "diplomatic" points on the board. Even prior to their little test back in October, I'd say that the extreme conditions laid out above were the only acceptable basis for a "deal". A security guarantee would even be acceptable in trade for the ultr-intrusive monitored dismantlement/demobilization regime. I believe Bolton has criticized the deal as trading near-term benefits for longer-term Nork obligations. I'd stick with my assertion that the real and only issue is whether a complete and essentially inescapable dismantlement regime is in place - anything less may well not be worth the trouble (i.e., will leave us in no better condition - recall that we're not particularly concerned about some sort of diversified, flexible, "conventional" Nork militarized nuclear capability as we are about WMD transfer to non-state actors - so anything short of a complete and verified dissolution of the Nork nuke program will not address our central problem). |
| Posted by: Verlaine 2007-02-20 00:41 |