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| India-Pakistan | |
| Pak military will not fight terror | |
| 2007-09-27 | |
| By Irfan Husain Here are some Bannu is around 100 kilometres from Islamabad, in the settled areas of the NWFP. Swat used to be one of our biggest tourist attractions in the days foreigners could come to Pakistan on vacation. We used to talk about the creeping Talibanisation of Pakistan over the last decade. Clearly, it is now moving at a much faster pace. One factor that has hastened its encroachment across the country is the presence of clerical-led governments in the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. By enacting retrogressive laws, and imposing stone-age rules, politicians in these provinces have encouraged extremists to bully citizens into accepting their primitive, Talibanesque lifestyle. And as large swathes of the country are pushed back to the dark ages, the state remains a silent spectator. As we saw in the Lal Masjid drama, this government is prepared to use endless patience while dealing with Islamic extremism. But when a centrist politician like Nawaz Sharif challenges MusharrafÂ’s authority, all the massive coercive power of the state is deployed to thwart him.
Another reason for the softly-softly approach is that over the years, a symbiotic relationship has developed between the Army and Islamic militants. As far back as 1971, when the Army helped set up Al-Badr and Al-Shams in East Pakistan to fight the freedom fighters of the Mukti Bahini, GHQ has recognised the value of militant groups that could fight as adjuncts to regular units. This lesson came in handy when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, and the ISI, together with the CIA and the Saudis, supported a confusing array of jihadi outfits to combat the Soviets. Using jihad as a rallying cry, thousands of Muslim volunteers from around the world were summoned to join the cause. And Zia, as the dictator of Pakistan, played godfather to local and foreign Islamic militants. In fact, he is the architect of much of the shambles we see around us today. A decade later, after the Soviet pullout, we had dozens of heavily armed jihadi groups sitting around in the NWFP and Baluchistan with no war to fight. Conveniently, the Kashmir insurrection broke out in 1989, and soon, volunteers from outfits like the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba were pouring across the Line of Control to fight Indian troops. Although they were largely financed by religious groups in Pakistan, their training was organised by serving and retired intelligence agency veterans of the Afghan war. Often, they crossed the LoC under covering artillery fire provided by the Army. Inevitably, all this state-supported armed militancy had a domestic fallout. Since ZiaÂ’s decade of devastation, fanatical militants have enjoyed state patronage and legitimacy. As Zahid Husain writes in his book Frontline Pakistan: "The continuing state patronage of Islamic militancy in return produced an escalation in domestic sectarian conflict. The two were closely intertwined. PakistanÂ’s elected civilian governments in the 1990s had to bear the brunt of sectarian violence and the resultant insecurity and alienation. Both the Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif governments took steps to combat sectarianism but, given the militaryÂ’s backing for regional jihad, those efforts failed. The jihad connection made the sectarian militants more strident, and with easy access to sophisticated weapons, they turned more violent." Clearly, then, the nexus between the Army and militant groups has been deadly for us as well as for the region. And although Musharraf has stated his intention of severing the ArmyÂ’s old ties to these groups, the fact is that they are still flourishing. Battle-hardened in Afghanistan and Kashmir, they are more than a match for the Army, as events in Waziristan and elsewhere have shown. The most recent illustration of their prowess is the ease with which they have captured hundreds of our soldiers, without having to fire a shot. In fact, this is as much of a comment on our ArmyÂ’s morale as it is on the abilities of the militant groups. It would appear that soldiers are finding it difficult to fire on their own countrymen, and would rather surrender than fight what is seen as "AmericaÂ’s war." Given the fact the Army is the only institution in the country capable of fighting the jihadis, but is reluctant to do so for the reasons discussed above, what options do we have? Do we succumb to the forces of darkness, or can we somehow find the resolve and the means to draw the line? MusharrafÂ’s political compulsions make it difficult for him to crack down on militants, despite his brave words. He is hamstrung by the presence of the MMA in the governments of the NWFP and Baluchistan. He is reaping what he sowed: in the 2002 elections, he made it possible for the religious parties to win so many seats for the first time in our history. With the provincial authorities dragging their feet, he cannot use the full strength at his disposal, even if he wanted to. And as we have noted, there is a continuing relationship between individuals in the intelligence agencies and the Army and the militants. Without political will, we cannot win this struggle. The battle can still be fought and won, but time is running out for Pakistan. | |
| Posted by:john frum |
| #2 "Pak military will not fight terror" They're too busy instigating and supporting it. |
| Posted by: Barbara Skolaut 2007-09-27 18:40 |
| #1 Pak military will not fight terror I'm shocked, shocked I tell you! The charade is over. Pakistan will do nothing of substance to reverse its role as Terror Central™. It is time to end this farce and begin a campaign of decimation in the frontier provinces bordering Afghanistan. They are nothing but a rat's nest of terrorist education centers and need to be catastrophically dismantled post haste. The Taliban's recent "capture" of a few hundred Pakistani regulars should end all doubt as to whose side the military really is on. |
| Posted by: Zenster 2007-09-27 03:16 |