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| Terror Networks |
| tribal areas and S-18 surface to air missiles among other issues |
| 2007-10-20 |
| Thus far, American policy toward Pakistan has amounted to unconditional support for Musharraf, coupled with occasional air strikes against high-level al Qaeda targets in the tribal areas. Emblematic of the latter is an October 30, 2006, strike against a madrassa in a Bajaur village that allegedly served as an al Qaeda training camp. While Zawahiri may have been the strike's target, the madrassa was affiliated with another key al Qaeda confederate, Faqir Mohammed, who had contracted a strategic marriage with a woman from the local Mamoond tribe. A U.S. Predator strike destroyed the school, but it hardly slowed down Mohammed, who gave an interview with NBC at the scene of the wreckage and later spoke at the funeral for the victims. Nor is any satisfactory alternative military strategy on offer. One senior American military intelligence officer said it would take a sustained air campaign to deprive al Qaeda of its safe haven in the FATA. "We're talking about a Serbia-style prolonged campaign," he said. NATO's air campaign against Serbia's military lasted from March 24 through June 11, 1999, and comprised over 38,000 missions involving approximately 1,000 aircraft and a barrage of Tomahawk missiles. Such a campaign in Pakistan's tribal areas, the officer said, would "heavily degrade" but not eliminate al Qaeda. "Their camps won't be actively producing terrorists," he said, "but they'll survive the air campaign." Furthermore, a campaign on that scale might result in the toppling of Musharraf--who, in the vivid phrase of retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Thomas McInerney, is already "dancing on razor blades." . . . What about covert action? American Special Operations forces are already engaging in actions coordinated with the air strikes. The most notable achievement in this regard occurred in southern Afghanistan, where NATO and Afghan forces killed Mullah Dadullah Lang, the Taliban's top military commander, back in May. There are barriers, though, to expanding the Special Operations forces' role. The topography makes it difficult to insert and remove forces without being detected. Within the military, there is a real desire to avoid another Operation Eagle Claw--the ill-fated attempt to rescue hostages held at the U.S. embassy in Tehran during President Carter's term. Unfortunately, the potential for things going awry is high if Special Operations missions are increased. Special Operations forces act in small teams and are lightly armed, so could be overwhelmed by larger contingents of al Qaeda and Taliban fighters. Enemy forces in Pakistan are better armed and trained than the Somali forces in the Black Hawk Down incident, and they have SA-18 surface-to-air missiles capable of downing American helicopters. AQ has SA-18s? |
| Posted by:3dc |
| #1 There are 3,000,000 heroin addicts in Pakistan. That problem is worsening with the Karzai clown posse's indulgence of Pashto re-constitution of Afghanistan from an opium producer to a heroin manufacturer. As soon as we admit that all we are doing in that cess pool is killing Taliban, giving land to the Afghan goofs, allowing the goofs to give it back to the Talibs, ad nauseum, then we can at long last wage a real war on terror. Pashtos and Waziris have never been so wealthy. Our indulgence has given them sufficient wealth to challenge the Pakistan government. Make Central Asia a Condi-free-zone, and then we can have a real war. I am getting sick to my stomach whenever I hear of some alleged advance to "freedom." That is not happening, regardless of how many Taliban we kill, and how much land we hold pending karzai squanderage. |
| Posted by: McZoid 2007-10-20 18:08 |