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| China-Japan-Koreas | |
| India Suddenly Notices China | |
| 2007-12-22 | |
On a visit on December 2 to the Sino-Indian border, Union defence minister A.K. Antony gave voice to a concern that has been getting reiterated for long by his country's military. "It's an eye-opener," said a shocked Antony, as he toured forward posts in Nathu La. "There is no comparison between the two sides. Infrastructure on the Chinese side is far superior. They have gone far in developing their infrastructure," he told journalists who had flown in with him on the trip.
Prepared by the military along with the Integrated Defence Headquarters in consultation with various institutes of the Indian army, the document gives a fair idea of how military India's posture needs to be shaped to take on the new Chinese challenge. A significant departure from earlier assessments has been made vis-a-vis China's military capabilities and its ability to mobilise troops. So far, Indian military planners were of the view that it would take the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) at least "two seasons" (three to four months) to fully mobilise for a war against India. While this would mean a "high-intensity conflict" that could involve strategic weapons, the conventional wisdom was that India had the edge in terms of manpower on the border. But moving away from the "two seasons" build-up theory, the new doctrine concludes that the Chinese could mobilise in just thirty days. This capability is the result of decades of meticulous planning and strategic perception of the Chinese leadership. It built roads and a strategic railway across the Tibetan plateau. The 1,140-km Qinghai-Tibet line, considered the highest railway in the world at 16,640 ft, has come as a wake-up call for military planners in Delhi. The Qinghai-Tibet link with its capacity to carry over 900 troops—that's a battalion strength—in each train has reshaped the way the Indian military looks at Chinese capabilities. India's planners have always based their estimate of the mobilisation time required by China on the Taiwan factor. China has all along concentrated the bulk of its forces against Taiwan and kept itself in readiness for any "superpower intervention" — that is by the US. Should there be any large-scale operation against India, it would have to divert its troops from Taiwan. The improved infrastructure — roads and the railway line — have rendered earlier Indian estimates outdated. The Chinese can deploy its troops faster than ever before. Says Brigadier Arun Sahgal (retd), a long-time China-watcher and presently deputy director of research at Delhi's United Services Institution: "As per our estimates, the PLA has over 40 divisions, out of which seven are armoured divisions. Of these, we expect China will be in a position to deploy 20 to 22 divisions against India in quick time." In addition, China has been building up its rapid reaction forces along with its airborne corps. "The greater strategic mobility capability of the Chinese in terms of rapid reaction forces as well as build-up of special forces is what we have to look at very closely," says Sahgal. The Chinese military has traditionally divided its military into seven designated military regions (MRs), of which two are of concern for India. The Chengdu MR, which primarily faces Arunachal Pradesh, the sensitive Siliguri corridor, Nepal and Bhutan, has nearly 1,800,000 troops on the borders. In the west, the Lanzhou MR faces India's Jammu and Kashmir, and controls Aksai Chin, under Chinese occupation since 1962. This region has nearly 2,200,000 troops. Both MRs have been strengthened by the modernisation drive of the Chinese military and have added rapid reaction forces as well as specialised units known as the Quantou and Kuaisu units which can launch deep attacks into enemy territory. Points out Srikant Kondapalli, a professor of China studies at jnu's School of International Studies: "So far India has managed to retain a conventional troop superiority that ranges from 5:1 in certain sectors to as high as a 10:1 ratio." He is quick to point out that this "conventional superiority" is mostly on paper and can be quickly nullified by quick troop mobilisation and with China's missile strength. "The Chinese artillery has a considerable strategic as well as tactical arsenal. However, China does have a "No First Use' policy, and in the event of hostilities, it is likely to replace its nuclear warheads with conventional warheads. Either way, this could prove to be to our disadvantage," he feels. However, with the coming of the new doctrine, Kondapalli feels that the Indian military has taken a significant step. "A decade ago, the Indian military's doctrine was built around deterring Pakistan and merely dissuading China. With the new doctrine, it has taken a significant step towards deterring China. The success of the Agni-III missile programme has added to this new posture significantly and the sooner we operationalise the missile, the better," he says. But while the Indian army has conventional superiority on paper, there are other worrying factors. Under the Calcutta-based Eastern Command, the army has three corps which are severely depleted of troops. Most fighting units have been moved to the Kashmir sector over the last 15 years. "In 1990," an army official told Outlook, "we had finalised the Dual Task and Relocation Plan for our fighting formations and decided that it would be relevant for only ten years. But it has been there for nearly two decades. This needs to change." This means that the Kalimpong-based 33 Corps, Tezpur-based 4 Corps and the Dimapur-based 3 Corps will have to increase their troop strengths. At present, most of 3 Corps is tied up in counter-insurgency operations, while the 27th Division is just returning to the 33 Corps. This division was moved out for Operation Parakram and has been in Jammu and Kashmir ever since. Similarly, the 8 Mountain Division that was moved out in early 1990 continues to be in Kargil as a part of the Leh-based 14 Corps. While these deployments have to be reconsidered, the new doctrine is a critical update on where the army must position its firepower and its troops. On the whole, it is now left to the ministry of defence to operationalise the doctrine and ensure that India's borders with China are adequately fortified. | |
| Posted by:Anonymoose |
| #17 Frank G: Only when considering the alternative, that is, tens of millions of men scavenging on the countryside and in the cities. What I have suggested is really an involuntary and ugly alternative to something that could be a lot worse. This many men are an army whether they realize it or not. And the Chinese have had several very bad experiences with the common man going on a rampage. It could turn into something like a cross between the Taiping Rebellion and the Cultural Revolution. The situation in China itself would force such actions, such as an economic collapse, not some Machiavellian scheming. This would be done because they would feel they had to do it. And if you put said millions in remote camps, it would be done in such a way that not only would they be unarmed, but if they did revolt, they would have to pass through many miles of regular army lines without food to get to any settlements. And I was being literal about 1 pound of boiled rice a day per man. Though that would be generous rations in this case. As far as keeping busy, the Chinese are also known for grandiose labor intensive projects. And in those circumstances, it would not be unrealistic to imagine many of those men put to work. Farming to feed themselves, if nothing else. The bottom line is that this would be done to prevent chaos on a national scale. If this means that most of these men must die, circumstances may force that as well. The same basic problem applies to India, as well as a possible solution. The big question is will they reach an understanding of sorts to solve their mutual problem? |
| Posted by: Anonymoose 2007-12-22 17:29 |
| #16 Any thoughts on how those seven armored divisions would fair in the mountains? |
| Posted by: Excalibur 2007-12-22 15:55 |
| #15 Moose, a couple points for conjecture: 1) Logistics for adequately feeding, housing, etc., for large garrisons in forbidding climates and geography would be difficult 2) Having a heavily armed underfed, underutilized, dissatisfied (see: sex and marriage opportunities) group of single men with no hope of improvement is also asking for them to turn on their masters (see: armed insurrection) |
| Posted by: Frank G 2007-12-22 15:32 |
| #14 john frum: If done immediately, it wouldn't work, but as with everything else, it is a process. The demographic imbalance these days means that there will be tens of millions of young men who are both unemployed and unmarried. This implies that they are on their own from the very beginning. That they do not have strong family bonds to support them. No family to object to their being drafted. In other words, they are homeless men without jobs. Nobody wants them. They have to steal and worse just to survive. From that point, recruitment is easy. They are offered a pittance wage and food, a uniform and a rifle, instead of starving to death. Maybe use just a little patriotism. Remember also that they are not trying to recruit them "to fight and die" in an ongoing war, just to "join the army". It could be pitched like a public works program. They would probably think they are joining the regular army, not just being sent to an enormous border garrisons full of draftees to do drill and ceremonies for hours every day. Part and parcel with this is that at NO point is it allowed to become a "media war". Journalists are not permitted anywhere near these isolated garrisons or near where any battles might happen. Any news at all will carefully controlled and made boring and empty. For the longest time there *won't* be any war to report, anyway. Because that is the bottom line, the real purpose to all of this. It is to get tens of millions of unemployed men off the streets. If they have *any* job, or even a family that supports them, they are not good candidates for this. The vast majority are already on their own. They are the army of men with no place left to go. |
| Posted by: Anonymoose 2007-12-22 15:16 |
| #13 and we can't even get a little fence between the US and Mexico.... Congress? |
| Posted by: 3dc 2007-12-22 15:04 |
| #12 China is doomed. Note the guy in a military uniform with his hat on backwards! |
| Posted by: Mike N. 2007-12-22 13:55 |
| #11 Looks like maybe a 'Great Wall of India' is in order. Along with shaped charges, mines, trenches and anything else India can reasonably afford to defend with. |
| Posted by: Mike N. 2007-12-22 13:51 |
| #10 |
| Posted by: john frum 2007-12-22 13:51 |
#9  |
| Posted by: john frum 2007-12-22 13:46 |
#8 India-China border   |
| Posted by: john frum 2007-12-22 13:43 |
| #7 GANGTOK: The Kunming bonhomie notwithstanding, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China is undercutting Indian Army's efforts to strengthen its presence on the border. On November 23, a week before the visit of defence minister A K Antony and chief of army staff Gen Deepak Kapoor to Sikkim, PLA soldiers unloaded boulders in an effort to wreck the construction of a metalled road at Fingertips, a strategic spot near Gurudongmar in North Sikkim. The area is close to the Kangra La pass bordering south-west Tibet. Indian troops, however, swung into action the next morning, and removed the obstruction. The road construction — at an altitude of 18,500 feet — was completed on November 27. Chinese representatives, however, did not speak about the offensive at Fingertips during a meeting between army representatives from both sides on November 23. They also kept quiet on the bunker dispute at the trijunction of Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet. Significantly, prior to the Fingertips manoeuvre, Chinese troops had entered Indian territory and asked Indian Army personnel manning the border post there to stop construction of the road. |
| Posted by: john frum 2007-12-22 13:42 |
| #6 In 2007, mass casualties will not be tolerated by he Chinese and Indian populations. TV is everywhere and when a family has just one son, (even Indian muslim families are having less children), or even just one child, losing him in a pointless war will not be tolerated. Governments will fall. The Kargil war was the first Indian media war and the footage of funerals did not go down too well. Villagers were on TV asking why their sons were dying. |
| Posted by: john frum 2007-12-22 13:36 |
| #5 There are |
| Posted by: john frum 2007-12-22 13:32 |
| #4 Please note that this is already a numbers game, in so far as unit strength on both sides. Hearkening back to my "demographic war" theory, if one side, probably China, decided to imbalance the equation by sending enormous numbers of poorly trained, supplied and equipped draftees to the front, the other side would have little recourse but to do the same. But the *purpose* of doing this would not be military necessity, but the convenience of taking large numbers of "excess" men and "sending them away" to keep them out of the cities and from causing trouble. Men not wanted by their cities, villages, or even by their families. In other words, initially at least, the border would act as a minimum security prison or institution, reducing the expense of these men to just a pound of rice a day for each, instead of the huge cost of allowing them to tear down society in a quest for employment or mates that didn't exist for them. Tens of millions of men just sitting there on either side of the border, reinforcing their defensive positions. Ironically, if any conflict broke out, both sides would try to keep it a "smoldering" conflict, not letting it escalate, even if it was at a huge scale. World War I sized fights using just rifles and machine guns. Kashmir writ large. The conventional armies stay out of it for the most part, acting as a 2nd echelon to stop any enemy breakthroughs. The men themselves wouldn't matter as long as they didn't return home. The front would be a one way ticket where they would either live or die. Disease or war, wouldn't matter. |
| Posted by: Anonymoose 2007-12-22 13:24 |
| #3 The Chinese infrastructure buildup and #2's comment are not mutually exclusive. Actions/response by India WILL require money and will on the part of India's leadership. Sound Familiar? |
| Posted by: Throger Thains8048 2007-12-22 12:42 |
| #2 This story reads like a preparatory money beg to the Indian Congress. |
| Posted by: Almost Anonymous5839 2007-12-22 11:06 |
| #1 building and repairing a rail facility at those altitudes is a herculean effort, destroying it and avalanching rocks and snow atop it....not so much just saying |
| Posted by: Frank G 2007-12-22 11:04 |