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| Afghanistan |
| Majority of Afghan insurgents not Taliban |
| 2008-07-24 |
| The vast majority of Afghan insurgents are not necessarily the Taliban, but those who feel spurred to fighting by broken promises, lack of a stable government, blood feuds and economic considerations, according to a new book 'Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare', released here by the Centre for Naval Analysis (CAN), a local defence-related research establishment. According to Daniel Marston, who contributed the book's chapter on Afghanistan, the Pashtun insurgents have been members of a group recently displaced from a position of political power and dominance within its own society. The main focus of the Taliban is more political and economic than ideological, Marston writes, adding all three insurgent groups in the period from 2001 to 2007 relied upon the vast Pashtun belt of the Pakistani FATA for troops, supplies and support. Pakistan played an important role in the insurgency campaign, despite its governmental stance of support for US and coalition forces, he argues and says the reality of the Pashtun belt is its long history of resistance to government control and its close relationships with Pashtun tribes on the Afghan side of the border. The Pashtun areas of Pakistan provided safe havens for insurgent troops, and considerable scope for cross-border traffic and smuggling activities, he continues Pakistan sent thousands of troops into the region to wage a campaign against "Taliban" forces and heavy but inconclusive fighting ensued, he says, adding the campaign was a drain on the Pakistan Army's resources and was highly unpopular with the Pakistani public. The 2006 peace deal reached by Pakistan with tribal leaders eased the political situation within Pakistan but greatly disappointed Pakistan's coalition allies as it allowed the Taliban to retain considerable advantage, with sanctuaries over the border, providing volunteers, money and intelligence, he writes. Marston concludes that carrying out a successful counterinsurgency campaign takes a substantial amount of money, and even more importantly, a substantial amount of political will, which may include the undertaking that such a campaign could last for decades, and that casualties are inevitable in providing security and holding cleared areas. "For all -- military participants on the ground and civilians following through news reports -- this means looking at the situation from the perspective of the local community, and remembering that a Western upbringing and perspective is not a great help, and is frequently an active detriment, to understanding the world in which the average Afghan lives. Greater comprehension paves the way for the implementation of a true counterinsurgency strategy, one that links up all the disparate groups from within the coalition, and includes not only the Afghan government but also the community, including the community fuelling the insurgency. It is critical to remember that today's so-called enemy is likely to be part of tomorrow's solution. This has always been true, throughout the history of counterinsurgency," Marston writes. |
| Posted by:Fred |
| #14 I think the drug problem needs to be divided into hardcore and softcore drugs. Softcore like Pot should be legalized. That would take a lot of the drug users out of the pool and make it easier to concentrate on the harder more addictive drugs. Even then we should have a three-strikes type rule for users. First two strikes and you get probation and/or counseling, mandatory detox and other annoyances rather than prison. |
| Posted by: rjschwarz 2008-07-24 19:49 |
| #13 Besides drug-users vote for Obama. *snicker* JFM, you forgot your /sarcasm thingy. Perhaps we could use those legendary suitcase nukes on them? That way we wouldn't have to let those bloody journalists natter on about their godhead Obama, whose inevitable parade to the White House would clearly ave been... interrupted. |
| Posted by: trailing wife 2008-07-24 15:05 |
| #12 The other, typically unspoken, issue is that more than 25% of the Pak army is Pashtun, particularly NCO's in the combat arms. If the Pak army really tried to control the Pashtun belt in FATA and NWFP it would face a revolt from thier relatives in uniform. |
| Posted by: BlackCat 2008-07-24 13:00 |
| #11 The war on Drugs (War on personal choice) -> High prices for drugs -> High profits for criminals. Shoot drug-users and prices drop like rock => low profits for criminals and Taliban get no funding. Besides drug-users vote for Obama. You can also desintoxicate them. |
| Posted by: JFM 2008-07-24 12:15 |
| #10 The war on Drugs (War on personal choice) -> High prices for drugs -> High profits for criminals. Treat high drug users like the mentally ill, safely separate them from society for both parties benefit until they share the same reality. |
| Posted by: Bright Pebbles 2008-07-24 10:48 |
| #9 Treasonous toad. Notice how his book gets its exposure with a Washington date-line in a Pakistani news outfit. I suppose it's good news in a economic fashion - if we're outsourcing our phone support to India, al-Queda can outsource its propaganda production to the District of Columbia. |
| Posted by: Mitch H. 2008-07-24 10:02 |
| #8 Majority of Afghan insurgents not Taliban Bet thay ain't Afghans either. |
| Posted by: tu3031 2008-07-24 09:45 |
| #7 the Pashtun insurgents have been members of a group recently displaced from a position of political power and dominance within its own society. And what was the name of this recently deposed group that these fellows belong to? |
| Posted by: ed 2008-07-24 09:22 |
| #6 Oppsi |
| Posted by: g(r)omgoru 2008-07-24 07:48 |
| #5 The vast majority of Afghan insurgents are not necessarily the Taliban They are just doing what comes natural. |
| Posted by: g(r)omgoru 2008-07-24 07:48 |
| #4 The vast majority of Afghan insurgents are not necessarily the Taliban They are just doing what comes natural. |
| Posted by: g(r)omgoru 2008-07-24 07:48 |
| #3 Labelling all opposition to the current Afghan government as Taliban is counter productive to say the least. The winning strategy in Iraq was turning the tribals against AQ. It's the only one I can see working in Afghanistan. Which is not to say I think it will work. But it has a better chance than any other strategy I've heard. |
| Posted by: phil_b 2008-07-24 03:15 |
| #2 Again, the media ignores the fact that Taliban gets at least $150,000,000 per year from the Heroin industry alone. And that is in addition to millions donated from Saudis and Pakistanis. Last I heard, Taleban pays $300 per month for terrorists. No drug money = no Taleban |
| Posted by: McZoid 2008-07-24 01:42 |
| #1 As per WAFF.com > MI5 > seems many of the Talibs are RADICALIZED YOUNG GERMAN TURKS whom traveled from Germany thru TURKEY to PAKLAND??? ARTICLE - GERMANY HAS TO RETHINK ITS NATIONAL SENSE OF SAFETY AND SECURITY FROM ISLAMIST THREAT. *TOPIX > US: IRAN MISSLE CAN HIT BRITAIN, MOST OF EUROPE. |
| Posted by: JosephMendiola 2008-07-24 00:47 |