| Submit your comments on this article |
| Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia |
| Fred Kagan: Situation Report, Russo-Georgian Conflict |
| 2008-08-12 |
| Excellent map at his site Update #7 (current as of 4:30 p.m., Tuesday, August 12, 2008) Analysis • Russia has announced a unilateral ceasefire because its operations have achieved their aims. • Medvedev and Sarkozy have drafted a document that encapsulates all of Russia’s demands in return for a ceasefire—but not a final settlement, which must still be negotiated. Sarkozy is discussing that deal with Saakashvili right now. • So the situation on the ground now legally is that there are two unilateral ceasefires, although the Georgians claim that Russian forces continue their attacks, and the Russian military has laid the predicate for those and further attacks in public statements today. The Russian military has also made plain that if a formal ceasefire agreement is not reached, then Russian forces will not withdraw from Ossetia or Abkhazia. • The Russian military has clearly stated that the objective of its operations was to reduce Georgia’s overall military capability so that Georgia could not again conduct an operation similar to the one it launched in South Ossetia, and for that reason has been attacking targets throughout Georgia. • Russian leaders repeatedly say that they will not deal with Saakashvili. • The Russian Attorney General has announced that Russian law permits the trial of Saakashvili for crimes under the Russian Federation Criminal Code. • The Russian Foreign Minister has called for an investigation of Georgian war crimes and the punishment of those ultimately responsible by international tribunals, and has said that Russian citizens victimized by Georgians will be bringing individual actions in appropriate European human rights courts. • The Russian aim is to force Saakashvili from power, preferably using international legal maneuvers (a la Milosevic), but possibly using Russian law instead or in addition. • The Russians are maintaining their excessive forces in South Ossetia, and continuing to control Georgia’s airspace and conduct periodic attacks in a flagrant effort to compel an immediate Georgian agreement to their armistice terms, conveyed by Sarkozy. • Russia will not permit South Ossetia and Abkhazia to return to Georgian control, and will move one way or the other to have their independence recognized, and probably soon. Overview con't at site |
| Posted by:Sherry |
| #3 I don't know what we could have done. I understand the desire to help the Georgians, but their proximity to Russia, the fact that they're otherwise surrounded by nasty neighbors, that the Black Sea access could be denied in a heartbeat by the Turks, and that air rights into Georgia are iffy, makes it unclear to me how we could help them directly. That said, in the months ahead I suspect we'll be doing a fair bit to rebuild their military and help their country economically. One more point: as the article by Robert Kaplan that I posted earlier makes clear, the region is a hornet's nest of different ethnic and linguistic groups. The Georgians would be smart to let the Ossetians (who speak a different language) and the Abkazians (ditto) go, and focus on building their own country. Trying to reincorporate these 'autonomous' regions into their country will be the death of them. |
| Posted by: Steve White 2008-08-12 20:34 |
| #2 Now they have an excuse to heavily fortify the South Black Sea oil area and their 2 satellites, and they tested their new regular army without internal political problems because they did it quick. We had no pressure points to press this time. It's not over yet but things could be worse at this moment. Next time they will have the upper hand in a Black Sea conflict. |
| Posted by: Jiggs Chiter5628 2008-08-12 19:13 |
| #1 Why do I feel like there was something more we could have done there? Nothing rational comes to mind, but it seems like we emboldened them towards russia and didn't back them up when it counted. |
| Posted by: bigjim-ky 2008-08-12 19:04 |