The rapid and unexpected decline of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq was officially recognized this week, when Maj. Gen. John Kelly, commanding the Marine Expeditionary Force, turned operational control of Anbar Province over to the Iraqi army and police. Anbar, a vast expanse of desert the size of North Carolina, had been the stronghold of the Sunni insurgency. For years, foreign fighters loyal to al-Qaida had sneaked across Iraq's northwestern border with Syria, into Anbar and down a "rat line" of safe houses in Haditha, Ramadi and Hit.
From Fallujah, the arch terrorist Zarqawi dispatched suicide bombers to murder hundreds of Shiites in Baghdad. So fearsome were the al-Qaida leaders in Iraq that by 2005 they had taken control or intimidated Sunni resistance cells 10 times their size.
Through mid-2006, Anbar accounted for about 40% of American casualties and was the scene of the fiercest fighting in Iraq--the two battles for the city of Fallujah and two years of street fighting in Ramadi, the provincial capital.
In 2006, Marine reports acknowledged that al-Qaida controlled the million Sunnis in Anbar, while in Baghdad, to the east, other al-Qaida gangs and Shiite death squads were fighting in every neighborhood. In short, the U.S. was losing. It was believed that Anbar would be the last province to be pacified, if it ever was.
That conventional wisdom overlooked the anger toward al-Qaida stirring among the Sunni tribes that had had their women seized in marriages of convenience, their smuggling rings forced to pay tribute and their sheiks killed whenever they objected. A remarkable mid-level sheik named Abu Risa Sattar called together some tribesmen and declared a "Sunni Awakening"--the tribes would come over to the American side and drive out al-Qaida.
The reason al-Qaida had survived for so long in proximity to the Marine grunts in Anbar was that its members had posed as civilians. The war would have been over in a week if al-Qaida and other insurgent groups wore uniforms.
Once the tribes pointed out who was associated with al-Qaida, the war turned with astonishing swiftness in Anbar. One sheik posted over a hundred names inside a mosque, demanding that those named publicly renounce al-Qaida. Inside a week, most had done so, while the bodies of others showed up on back streets.
The strategy in Anbar, that of American partnerships with tribes on a local level, was eventually replicated in the capital. Al-Qaida had fled from Anbar before Gen. David Petraeus took command in Baghdad in February 2007.
Petraeus then ordered the American soldiers in and around the capital to leave their large bases and live in outposts in the neighborhoods among the people, with daily foot patrols similar to those conducted by the Marines in Anbar.
As the spirit of the Awakening swept out of Anbar, Petraeus encouraged his battalion commanders to hire Sunni neighborhood watch groups. Eventually called Sons of Iraq, these groups also turned against al-Qaida. In essence, the Sunni resistance that had fought the Americans morphed into the Sons of Iraq.
In turn, the Americans have insisted that at least a portion of Sons of Iraq be allowed to join the police or the army, and that Sunni provinces like Anbar receive a fair share of oil revenues.
Anbar is exclusively Sunni, far removed in distance and intrigue from Baghdad. Prime Minister Maliki acceded to Marine pressure and allowed the Sons of Iraq to be integrated into the security forces. On the political front, the Awakening movement in Anbar is confident its candidates will sweep out of office its Sunni opposition, the unpopular Iraqi Islamic Party.
As Anbar becomes a distinct symbol of progress, the U.S. Marines are pulling back. They are no longer needed militarily. As Marines, they want to move on to Afghanistan, because that's where the fight is. Overall, military progress in Iraq has been remarkable.
The problem is on the political front. Maliki and many in the Shiite-controlled ministries are deeply resentful and distrustful of the Sunnis. Sons of Iraq were accepted into the security forces in Anbar because the province is completely Sunni and isolated from Baghdad.
In other provinces and in Baghdad, the Maliki government has rebuffed American entreaties to accept the Sons of Iraq into the security forces. The test of the government is whether it will reach reasonable agreement with the Sunnis.
Bing West, a former assistant secretary of defense and combat Marine, has made 15 trips to Iraq. His new book, The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics and the Endgame in Iraq, has just been released by Random House.