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| Afghanistan |
| U.S. Afghanistan Base: Death Trap From The Beginning |
| 2009-10-07 |
| Salt-shakers on standby, but this looks bad... Oct. 6, 2009— The remote base in northern Afghanistan where eight U.S. soldiers were killed this weekend in a deadly battle was well-known inside the military as extremely vulnerable to attack since the day it opened in 2006, according to U.S. soldiers and government officials familiar with the area. When a reporter visited the base a few months after it opened, soldiers stationed in Kamdesh complained the base's location low in a valley made most missions in the area difficult. "We're primarily sitting ducks," said one soldier at the time. Known as Camp Keating, the outpost was "not meant for engagements," said one senior State Department official assigned to Afghanistan, and brings "a sad and terrible conclusion" to a three-year effort to secure roads and connect the Nuristan province to the central government in Kabul. Shouldn't bases in contested areas be 'meant for engagements?' For some reason, this smacks of State Department mischief. The boulder strewn road that led into the valley was referred to by U.S. soldiers stationed there as "Ambush Alley." In addition to the eight dead Americans, at least two Afghan Army officers were killed, with as many as a dozen Afghan National Policemen missing, according to military and Afghan officials. The base, located less than 10 miles from the Pakistan border and nestled in the Hindu Kush mountains, was attacked almost every day for the first two months it was opened, hit by a constant stream of rocket-propelled grenades and small arms fire. By the third or fourth month of the base's existence, resupply had been limited to nighttime helicopter flights because the daytime left helicopters and road convoys too exposed to insurgent attacks. That remained true through the weekend. This sounds TOO MUCH like Khe Sahn... The base had several near-misses with enemy fire over the years. In 2006, all daytime helicopter flights landing at the valley floor were cancelled when an American Blackhawk was nearly hit with an incoming rocket as it was taking off. After the incident, helicopters were banned from landing anywhere but an observation post some three hours' walk above the base on a nearby ridgeline. Even then, helicopters filled with troops or equipment were rushed during offloading, as pilots were keen to take off before drawing hostile fire. And like many other remote and rural parts of Afghanistan, the local population had begun souring on the American presence after airstrikes had hit civilians in the neighboring villages. Sigh... foreign troops will ALWAYS sour the local population. The question is whether they bring valuable changes to the area, like SECURITY for the locals. Cash and goodies help too, but security is the most important 'export' we have. It also makes our troops safer too. Rest at the link. |
| Posted by:Free Radical |
| #13 Anyone who's lived in several military communities could testify of the love/hate relationship even in their own neighborhood, As an aside, not only military but any large intrusion of foreigners. We saw the same thing in the suburbs of Brussels, where a neighbor, herself a German national married to a Belgian, refused to socialize with us on the grounds that she had tired of befriending expats only to have them leave after a few years for an assignment elsewhere and never come back. |
| Posted by: trailing wife 2009-10-07 22:28 |
| #12 I saw the video this a.m. - one of the soldiers said they were there to be closer to the local populace...I'd imagine they could relocate to a better tactical position and still be close to the locals. Of course, I'm not on the ground there and wasn't on the OPT that set that camp where it's at. |
| Posted by: Broadhead6 2009-10-07 13:59 |
| #11 When you have a place like this, you need to protect it. That means having some outliers on the high ground, capable of defending themselves and the base below. We have far too many people making military decisions that have never read Clausewitz, or learned the lessons of WWII, Korea, Vietnam, or even Iraq. As a result, people die. |
| Posted by: Old Patriot 2009-10-07 13:17 |
| #10 I'm no military genius, but... The rules of engagement generally prevent U.S. forces from searching or attacking Afghan mosques. These don't seem to be good ROEs. We had the same problem in Iraq until we developed a force of Iraqis who did go into the mosques and put an end to weapons stockpiling. As insurgents fired from three or four different locations above the base, they also maneuvered and over took one of the observation posts on higher ground, taking out a post meant to protect Camp Keating from enemy fire. Not occupying the high ground seems like a no-no and asking for trouble. Not occupying an outpost except in force doesn't seem to be a good idea. Having close air support, more troops at the ready, and artilliary seems like a must. Underestimating our enemy's capability seems like a problem. Not having good local intel seems like a problem. |
| Posted by: JohnQC 2009-10-07 13:13 |
| #9 The tactical inadequacies of this place were reported long ago on the 'burg. |
| Posted by: KBK 2009-10-07 12:19 |
| #8 Old Patriot addressed my related question(how can you safely operate a base where you don't control the high ground within attack range, especially in a 'weather-challenged' environment like A'stan?) Monday (http://www.rantburg.com/poparticle.php? ID=280340&D=2009-10-05&SO=&HC=1) "You quit playing games and start fighting a war. That means napalming the ridges when the 'insurgents' attack. That means using WP and flachette rounds to respond to attacks on areas you can't reach with rifle fire. That means ensuring you always have a couple of recoilless rifles assigned to one of these outposts that can "dust" ridgetops from within your compound. That means telling the "World Court" to go hang. You DON'T fight a war making your servicemembers wear boxing gloves and keep one foot in a gallon pail all the time. Of course, our "political leadership" is too "civilized" to do that, so we'll probably lose - just as we did in Vietnam. control the high ground within attack range, especially in a 'weather-challenged' environment like A'stan?" |
| Posted by: Glenmore 2009-10-07 11:13 |
| #7 Bernard Fall. "Hell in A Very Small Place". Dien Bien Phu was surrounded by higher ground. Viet Minh horsed artillery up there, somehow, along with enough ammo. SURprise. If you want to deny a route, get into a watching position as high as you can get and call in fires. |
| Posted by: Richard Aubrey 2009-10-07 10:42 |
| #6 Whoops, just read Anonymoose's comments. Still, if the base is vulnerable, fortify it until it isn't. Perhaps it would have helped to have another base nearby that could have made the lives of any insurgents who tried to position themselves to attack the base miserable. |
| Posted by: gorb 2009-10-07 10:26 |
| #5 And the broken process (and those who took advantage of it) that somehow enabled this farce should also be made public and fixed. These are American lives here. This kind of $hit is off-limits. Eight Americans died, a bunch of Afghans died, and however many were wounded. And the folks who caused these problems are probably more concerned with what they will be wearing to the office halloween party, if they are even aware of what they did. |
| Posted by: gorb 2009-10-07 10:22 |
| #4 Too true, Besoeker. I wonder why we haven't swamped the area with multiple mountaintop ranger stations? Sure seems like an enemy collection point, which is a rare and beneficial feature in irregular warfare. If nothing else, couldn't we flood the airspace with UAVs and let the joystick crowd have at it? |
| Posted by: Halliburton - Mysterious Conspiracy Division 2009-10-07 10:22 |
| #3 High ground good, low ground bad. Always has been. Always will be. |
| Posted by: Besoeker in Duitsland 2009-10-07 09:59 |
| #2 Judging from the pictures of Camp Keating, its purpose is not force projection, but area denial of an enemy supply route. While the valley they were located in could be traversed in an hour on foot, if forced up onto the steep hillsides surrounding it, even with a light load, it would still take a day or two. It would be very difficult to cross under any means with a heavy load. This strongly inhibited enemy operations, which is shown by their willingness to commit a major element to attacking that base. |
| Posted by: Anonymoose 2009-10-07 09:21 |
| #1 .. Anyone who's lived in several military communities could testify of the love/hate relationship even in their own neighborhood, be it peacetime or war. It's embedded in the culture. Just check any news report about a "soldier from..." committing a crime, but you never hear about a "employee from..." committing a crime from the same area. |
| Posted by: Procopius2k 2009-10-07 09:19 |