Although the phenomenon of suicide bombing is considered 'unbeatable' across the globe, law enforcers of various countries are adopting new ways and taking precautionary measures to decrease the possibility of suicide bombings. Similarly, law enforcement agencies across the world do not only keep changing their security arrangements, but also monitor and amend them, sometimes on an hourly basis, in case they get any intelligence report about any future attacks. What our law enforcement agencies are doing in Pakistan is not only 'amusing and amazing' among law enforcement agencies of other countries, but it sometimes attracts ridicule and disrespect.
Perhaps the hierarchies concerned are intentionally overlooking the aforementioned points for several years now. Even one of the most horrible acts of terrorism, the attack at the Data Darbar, failed to change the status quo and only managed to turn the masses' fear into aggression. The recent attack on Data Darbar not only exposed the poor strategies and security measures adopted by the Lahore police, but also raised several questions about the level of irresponsibility among our law enforcers.
All the authorities concerned have admitted that law enforcement agencies had been provided reports of possible attacks in Lahore, especially on shrines. Even the Interior Ministry had informed the provincial authorities about an expected attack.
In this scenario, the question arises why the provincial hierarchy did not take any precautionary step in the light of these reports? Why did the Lahore police hierarchy not do anything additional to avoid such a horrible incident?
The provincial hierarchy answered these questions a few days after the attack in the form of the transfer of some cops, due to which everyone has assumed that these cops were responsible for this attack. Professor Nazir Ahmed, the deputy secretary Majlis-e-Amal Auqaf, has raised a question as to who had ordered that the door of the darbar be opened, which had remained closed for several months. No one has answered this question yet.
Similarly, another question is why the walkthrough gates, installed at the entrance of the Data Darbar, were switched off on the day of the attack. This question too remains unanswered.
There are several other examples where law enforcement agencies had received intelligence reports about expected terror attacks, but did nothing to try and prevent them.
Even with regards to the attack on the building of the Police Emergency 15, law enforcement agencies in the provincial capital had intelligence reports about the attack, but did not take any measures to try and stop it.
Interestingly, the report about a possible attack on shrines was published in a section of the media one day before the incident.
Similarly, on January 22, 2009, the Crime Investigation Department (CID) Punjab had accurately warned the Punjab government about a plan to target the Sri Lankan cricket team during its visit to Pakistan. The CID, while referring to a source, said the terrorist attack would be carried out by the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), specifically at the time when the Sri Lankan team would be traveling between the hotel in which they were staying and the stadium. At that time, Inspector General of Police Malik Muhammad Iqbal had also shared this information with the authorities concerned.
Interestingly, even after the aforementioned report, the Lahore police did not take any special measures for securing the Sri Lankan cricket team.
Amazingly, all these incidents have so far failed to convince the Lahore police that it needs to change its ways of fighting terrorism and that it should pay some importance to the intelligence reports it receives before these attacks actually take place, a fact made obvious in the aftermath of the attack on the Data Darbar.
The provincial hierarchy has once again adopted its previous strategy of changing faces to calm down the public. In 2007, immediately after the killing of Additional Advocate General Arif Bhinder, the hierarchy transferred several officers and officials of the Lahore police department, including the then CCPO. Similarly, after the attack on the Sri Lankan team, the hierarchy transferred several senior cops, which is the set pattern as it was again seen after the Data Darbar attack.
This raises several questions including whether the high ups were trying to convey the message that cops had done something fishy due to which they were being punished? If yes, then why did the high-ups take such a lenient attitude and chose to only transfer them? All such questions are answerable if our rulers, our destiny makers, wish to answer them.