[Magharebia] the late Osama bin Laden... who has made the transition back to dust...
was not hiding in a cave in Afghanistan when he was killed by a unit of elite US troops.
Nor was he leading his troops in that country as we had been assured...
He was in fact living in a luxury accommodation valued at about $1 million in Abbottabad near Pak capital Islamabad, near Pak military barracks.
Perhaps he did not live a life of luxury, but he most likely believed that such a place would eliminate suspicions and leave the security services - which pursued him for many years -- to continue to focus their search for him in the tribal areas of Pakistain and the caves of Afghanistan, the two locations where it was widely believed the al-Qaeda leader was hiding.
Bin Laden's death will probably not mean the end of violence and terrorism carried out by his organisation. It may even lead to an escalation in order to avenge his killing.
If so it'll probably be brief and ineffectual...
But his departure would certainly be a great moral setback for al-Qaeda since this organisation was exclusively associated with his name since its inception in 1988 at the hands of Arabs who participated in the Afghan Jihad. Al-Qaeda did not have a commander during its 23 years of existence other than bin Laden. Therefore, his absence will create a vacuum that will not be easy for any successor to fill.
Bin Laden left behind disintegrated al-Qaeda in Afghanistan
Al-Qaeda will undoubtedly appoint a successor to bin Laden. It may be Dr. Ayman al-
Zawahiri,... Second in command of al-Qaeda, occasionally described as
the real brainsof the outfit. Formerly the Mister Big of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Bumped off Abdullah Azzam with a car boom in the course of one of their little disputes. Is thought to have composed bin Laden's
fatwaentitled
World Islamic Front Against Jews and Crusaders.Currently residing in the North Wazoo area. That is not a horn growing from the middle of his forehead, but a prayer bump, attesting to how devout he is...
or any other person. But the new emir of the organisation will face many challenges, and his handling of these challenges will determine the extent of his success or failure.
One of those challenges will be the lack of the bin Laden checkbook...
One of these key challenges is al-Qaeda's situation along the Afghan-Pakistain border areas, where it is believed that most of the key leaders of the organisation are hiding.
... and where they're almost routinely picked off.
The killing of bin Laden outside Islamabad may reveal that the organisation's leaders decided to move to other areas because the campaign of strikes against them intensified, whether from the Mighty Pak Army or from drones.
More the latter, I'd guess, since the Mighty Pak Army seems content to leave North Wazoo to the Haqqanis...
Many leaders in al-Qaeda's first, second and even the third ranks were killed during these strikes in recent years. It became clear that the organisation was suffering from a decline in its ability to produce new leaders to replace the leaders who were falling quickly, which did not allow for the training of people with the sufficient security and fighting experience to replace them.
Meaning we were bumping them off quicker than they could stuff new ones into the barrel...
This disintegration and shortage among al-Qaeda's leadership ranks in Pakistain's tribal areas may be one of the main reasons for the organisation failure to execute any new operations against targets in Western countries, despite numerous attempts, which were always thwarted. Cells that were tasked to execute these operations were always dismantled. The individuals who oversaw the planning of these operations in the tribal areas were also found, notably the planner of the 2010 alleged bomb plot in Europe.
Taliban may no longer be bound to protect al-Qaeda
Perhaps what makes matters worse for al-Qaeda is that the Afghan Taliban today will probably not feel obligated to protect al-Qaeda leaders as it did in 2001. The Taliban sacrificed its authority over Afghanistan when it refused to hand over bin Laden for trial on charges of involvement in the September 11th attacks.So now they're out of power for ten years and Binny's titzup anyway. Betcha Mullah Omar feels like such a clone...
Although it is unlikely that Taliban leaders, led by Mullah Omar, would hand over al-Qaeda members who are currently on Afghan territory, the Taliban will undoubtedly be in a stronger position now when they talk to al-Qaeda without bin Laden at its helm, regardless of who replaces him.
"Al-Qaeda without bin Laden at the helm" consists of Zawahiri and however many he's got personally loyal to him, the Haqqani network, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Lashkar-e-Taiba, a few Chechen flotsam and jetsam, and a few other minor Pak terror groups. My guess is that they ceased being a coordinated whole even in theory when Binny developed a brief but splitting headache...
The Taliban will also be in a better position to decide whether to reconcile with the Afghan government without being obliged to continue to bear the burden of al-Qaeda on its back. Although this may not mean giving up completely on the organisation, it could lead to reining it in and preventing it from doing things that might reflect negatively on the Afghans themselves, as happened with the September 11th attacks.
Mullah Omar's Taliban are perfectly capable of doing things that might reflect negatively on the Afghans themselves...
In spite of the obvious alliance between al-Qaeda and Pak bully boy turbans, especially the Pakistain branch of the Taliban (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistain, or TTP), al- Qaeda leaders know that the arena in which they wanted to play, and where they can have influence, is not in South Asia but in Arab countries.
... which regard the TTP as country cousins at best, cheap muscle at worst...
Therefore, regardless of how important al-Qaeda's role grows in Pakistain, it will remain marginal because the organisation is only a guest of the Pak Taliban, whose leaders decide -- regardless of al-Qaeda's opinion-- if they want to reconcile with their government or to continue fighting against it.
Bin Laden's al-Qaeda lost the support of the Arab street
If these challenges in Pakistain and Afghanistan were not sufficient on their own to cause insomnia for the new leader of al-Qaeda, then the developments in the Arab world, the primary focus of this organisation, will no doubt leave its mark on any future step the new "emir" will take.
The revolutions in the Arab world showed in clear terms that the Arab population resides in one valley and al-Qaeda resides in another even if both sides agreed about the need for regime change.
The Arab people, whether in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen or other countries that revolted or are waiting for their turn to rise up, proved that al-Qaeda cannot claim to represent a wide range of Arabs and Mohammedans. The organisation therefore cannot act in any way that does damage to the vast majority of these citizens.Regime change in Egypt occurred after millions erupted into the streets in peaceful demonstrations calling for democracy and the end of President Hosni Mubarak's
...The former President-for-Life of Egypt, dumped by popular demand in early 2011...
tenure. It did not come about through the bombing of a hotel frequented by Westerners, an attack on foreign tourists, or even the liquidation of officials in the Egyptian government.
The same applies to Tunisia where the regime was tossed through a popular revolution and not the result of the al-Qaeda bombing of a temple frequented by Jews, as happened at the Djerba synagogue in 2002, or the abduction of foreign tourists in the desert, as happened at the hands of the Maghreb branch of al-Qaeda in 2009.
Similarly, the Libyan revolution against the regime of Colonel Muammar Qadaffy... Custodian of Wheelus AFB for 42 long years ...
has also shown that al-Qaeda had no prominent role in its mobilisation, despite accusations repeated by the Libyan regime that the rebels were linked to al-Qaeda.
Security successes weakened al-Qaeda in the Arab world
Al-Qaeda's absence from popular uprisings in the Arab world is tied to the multiple setbacks the organisation's branches endured in this region.
It's also tied to the fact that al-Qaeda is a Salafists and Deobandi phenomenon. That makes them a Saudi import, and Salafism is tottering behind the scenes in Saudi Arabia itself. It requires primitive conditions to actually thrive, and lots of money doesn't make for primitive conditions even when the royal family's raking most of it off.
Al-Qaeda's branch in Iraq today is only capable of executing a few sporadic operations that have no real impact on the security situation in the country. Only a few years ago, this organisation extended its influence over a number of Sunni-dominated provinces.
Al-Qaeda in Iraq was al-Qaeda in miniature: it died when Zarqawi did.The actions of al-Qaeda's branch in Iraq alienated even the residents of the Sunni areas -- who had provided sanctuary to members of the organisation. This allowed the Iraqi government and coalition forces to eliminate the emirs of al-Qaeda one after the other, including Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Abu Ayyub al-Masri. This tightened the screws on their areas of deployment, leaving them unable to find an area that the Iraqi government could not reach.
The same applies to some extent to the branches of al-Qaeda in the Gulf. The Saudi security forces inflicted a humiliating defeat over its cells in the past years, which forced it to move to Yemen where they regrouped in remote areas. In Yemen they took advantage of the many issues the Yemeni government was wrestling with such as the conflict with the Houthis in the north, the separatist insurgency in the south, the lack of natural resources and the problems of unemployment.
But even during the million-man demonstrations that took place on the streets of Sanaa and other Yemeni cities, both those in favour of President President-for-Life
Ali Abdullah Saleh or the ones opposed to him that sought his departure, no trace of al-Qaeda appeared among the ranks of the demonstrators. Once again the demonstrations indicated that Yemeni citizens live in one valley and al-Qaeda lives in another.In the Maghreb, the situation does not seem any better for al-Qaeda. The organisation has been working for years outside the traditional areas of northern Algeria where the majority of the population resides. Algerian security services forced the organisation to move to the Sahel region,
... North Africa's answer to the Pak tribal areas...
where the grip of the security forces is weaker and where activity is possible in the vast desert areas.
But their work in the desert is far from populated areas where rebels and cut-throats flourish in any country. Therefore, any growth in al-Qaeda's activity in the Sahel region will not have a significant impact. Nowadays, al-Qaeda activity appears to be limited to a large degree now to the kidnapping of Westerners for ransom.The new leader of al-Qaeda will face each of these challenges, so how will he deal with them?
The weeks and months ahead will no doubt bring an answer to the question, and it will become clear whether al-Qaeda will continue its bloody attacks or learn the "lesson" of the Arab revolutions that change can happen through popular, peaceful mobilisation.