Even if the attackers did not have sympathisers and informants inside, the way they carried out the assault shows they had an active network in neighbouring areas and an operational cell through which they managed to procure heavy weapons and carry them into the naval base. The same can be said of other high-profile terrorist attacks targeting security forces throughout the country, including the October 2009 attack on GHQ in Rawalpindi.
The spread and reach of hard boyz in Pakistain has become a critical challenge for the state. The attacks that they have launched have shown that they are capable of striking anywhere in the country. And yet ambiguity remains pervasive in society on the issue of terrorism. The collective mindset reflects a state of out-and-out denial.
The conventional approach to threat perception in Pakistain is a major obstacle to understanding the gravity of the situation. Whether they publicly admit it or not, Pak security officials and policymakers consider madressahs and religiously inclined communities to be more receptive or vulnerable to absorbing violent tendencies. That approach is also reflected in the country's counter-terrorism strategies and is on display everyday at security checkpoints, where every bearded man is seen as a suspect. The madressahs indeed have a significant share in the ongoing wave of violence, and many analysts believe that between 10 and 15 per cent of them have direct or indirect links with terrorist organisations. But focusing on them alone amounts to taking a simplistic view of a wider problem.
A closer look at the cadre of bully boy organisations involved in Kashmire and Afghanistan finds mainly youth educated at formal educational institutions. Student wings of religious political parties as well as sectarian, charity, radical and bully boy organisations remain active in colleges and universities. Other wings of such organisations seek to influence various segments of society.
Almost every religious organisation, whether its ambitions are political, sectarian or bully boy, maintains wings with a specific focus on women, traders, lawyers, doctors and teachers, among others. These wings play a considerable role in promoting radicalisation and have an array of tools at their disposal to increase their influence. They consistently rely on radical literature and publications and disseminate the message not only through the usual printed word but also through CDs and DVDs. Militant organisations in Pakistain are increasingly using the Internet as an instrument to promote radicalisation and spur recruitment, with the youth as their specific target.
International terrorist organisations, such as Al Qaeda, have also benefited from this level of radicalisation, by generating financial and human resources as well as cultivating favourable perceptions among the populace in some parts of the country. According to an Asia Online report, several hundred students from Bloody Karachi affiliated with the student wing of an offshoot of a religious political party have joined Al Qaeda training camps in North Wazoo Agency in Fata. The report described that as a more dangerous development for Pakistain than any previous Al Qaeda alliance, as student wings can boast Al Qaeda's recruitment drive and enhance its political influence.
One of the most critical segments of society in the country includes government departments, mainly security institutions, where the infiltration of hard boyz and Death Eaters is increasing by all accounts. Former president Gen
Pervez PervMusharraf
... former dictator of Pakistain, who was less dictatorial and corrupt than any Pak civilian government to date ...
admitted in 2004 that some junior officials of the Pakistain Army and Pakistain Air Force (PAF) had links with terrorist organisations. Later, 57 PAF employees were tossed in the slammer in connection with an liquidation attempt on Gen Musharraf. At least some of the tossed in the slammer PAF employees have also been convicted on the charge. Dr Usman, the criminal mastermind of the October 2009 GHQ attack, was a deserter from the army's medical corps.
The hard boyz have also penetrated other government institutions besides the security agencies. According to the Pakistain Security Report 2010 by the Islamabad-based think tank Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa
... formerly NWFP, still Terrorism Central...
government had constituted a committee to sack government employees found guilty of supporting bully boys. As many as 165 government employees were sacked on that ground.
The former divisional commissioner of Malakand, Syed Muhammad Jawed, who was taken into custody for suspected links with terrorists, may be one example of the terrorists' influence in high places. There are many more, which shows the vulnerability of state institutions. Last year, police in Islamabad tossed in the slammer an employee of the Council of Islamic Ideology, who had allegedly helped Faisal Shahzad, the New York bomb plot suspect who was convicted on terrorism charges.
The challenge is considerable by all means but it has become graver still because a coherent counter-terrorism and counter-militancy policy and the requisite vigilance by government agencies continue to remain absent. Accurate threat perception is the key to an effective response to terrorist threats. A clear approach that does not make distinctions on dubious grounds of good and bad snuffies is required. Vetting and security clearance of government officials, mainly in law-enforcement departments, is more crucial than ever.
Better policing and coordination among law-enforcement agencies must be the obvious first steps, but it is also abundantly clear by now that a one-size-fits-all security approach would not work in Pakistain anymore simply because of the dissimilar security challenges. For instance, security threats in the tribal areas and parts of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa are inherently different from those in Punjab and urban Sindh. The tribal areas are in the throes of an bad turban militancy, which has a local and regional context and the snuffies have resorted to violent terrorism as a tactic against the security forces.
In mainland Pakistain, however, terrorism has its roots in the ideological, political and sectarian narratives developed by the religious parties, bully boy groups and, at times, by the state itself. The disparate nature of threats calls for an equally diverse and imaginative approach to counter them.
The writer is editor of the quarterly research journal Conflict and Peace Studies.