Wazoo in this newspaper yesterday indicated, the experience of each agency has been different and there are crucial distinctions. Back in 2009, when the cut-throats seemed to be in the ascendant, Paks were told that South Waziristan was the root of most militancy problems and drastic action had to be taken. Public opinion was courted to support another major military operation in South Waziristan following the failure of the last one in 2008. Now, nearly three years on from Operation Rah-e-Nijat, only one of the six subdivisions in South Waziristan -- Sararogha -- has been denotified as a conflict area and there too, the return of IDPs has been painfully slow.What went wrong in South Waziristan? After clearing the Mehsud areas of their human population, the security forces did manage to dominate the physical space for a while. In fact, even today the security forces would argue that they do dominate the physical landscape, given that they control the major roads and the strategic hilltops. But there is also the reality that the newly constructed roads have virtually no traffic, that the security forces are frequently targeted by IEDs and hit-and-run tactics and that even the hardened population of South Waziristan is reluctant to return home for fear of reprisals from the beturbanned goons. Essentially, the military learned how to clear and hold an area under beturbanned goon control but has little understanding about how to permanently keep cut-throats out and restore an area to a civil administration-led state of relative normality. Perhaps what is most worrying is that these problems have slipped off the national radar, like when the tribal areas did after the Soviets were defeated and few were concerned about the new, more lethal problems that were brewing there.