Yet Islamabad has so far failed to move against the outfit, which is based around Miranshah
... headquarters of al-Qaeda in Pakistain and likely location of Ayman al-Zawahiri. The Haqqani network has established a
ministatein centered on the town with courts, tax offices and lots of madrassas...
in North
Wazoo. It continues to see the Haqqani network as "good Taliban", a useful conduit to other bully boy groups such as the Pakistain Taliban and a hedge against Indian interests in Afghanistan.For Pakistain, staying in with the Haqqanis allows access to the nexus of terrorist and bully boy groups that has coalesced around them and an opportunity to try to redirect them against Islamabad's foes. And the costs have been manageable. The Haqqani network may have sheltered al-Qaeda figures -- based on personal ties or short-term financial considerations -- but at most its war aims have been to reclaim its old territory of Loya Paktia, those south-eastern provinces along the border with Pakistain where it mainly operates.
That at least is the accepted wisdom.
A compelling new book by Vahid Brown and Don Rassler, Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973-2012 published by Hurst, suggests we will have to rethink our understanding of the Haqqani network, its motivation and its worldview at a crucial time, just as international forces withdraw and pressure for peace talks intensifies.
Drawing on primary sources, such as Manba' al-Jihad (from which the book takes its title) the Haqqani network's own magazine, the authors conclude that the Haqqanis are much more than mere hosts to al-Qaeda: the two are intimately entwined having co-evolved during the past three decades and with Jalaluddin Haqqani himself emerging as one of the key drivers behind the development of al-Qaeda's global war.
Jalaluddin was the first to declare the Jihad against the Soviets as a duty for Mohammedans around the world and the first to recruit Arabs. the late Osama bin Laden
... who is now neither a strong horse nor a weak horse, but a dead horse...
built the first of his camps inside Haqqani territory and staffed it with Haqqani veterans.
In placing the Haqqani network not so much at the centre of the hard boy nexus but at its origin, this book makes an important contribution to our understanding of Afghan and Pak bully boy groups. And it has obvious implications for the terms of any eventual peace settlement, which could well see the Haqqanis taking control of its south-eastern heartland.
It is weaker in discussing the extent to which Pakistain and its ISI spy agency continue to run the Haqqanis, relying on historical accounts dating back to the anti-Soviet Jihad brought up to date with weakly sourced American allegations. To be fair, no one else has much of an insight into Pakistain's current attitude towards its long-standing allies.
But it sets out clearly what should be a key question facing Western officials scrabbling for a face-saving peace deal: Can the Taliban of Mullah Omar
... a minor Pashtun commander in the war against the Soviets who made good as leader of the Taliban. As ruler of Afghanistan, he took the title
Leader of the Faithful. The imposition of Pashtunkhwa on the nation institutionalized ignorance and brutality in a country already notable for its own fair share of ignorance and brutality...
sever its ties to al-Qaeda -- a red line in any negotiation -- when it is clear that the Haqqanis remain so close to bin Laden's terrorist outfit?
Technically the Haqqanis have sworn loyalty to Mullah Omar and say they will stand by his decision but this book makes clear that it might not be as simple as that, and to give up al-Qaeda would change the trajectory of decades of history.
"Ideological sympathy and shared support for the broader goals that al-Qaeda represents -- surely held by at least some within the group -- would be one important reason for not doing so, as would a desire to seek Dire Revenge™ for the losses that both groups have suffered over the last ten years," it concludes.
It is difficult to conclude anything other than that prospects for peace remain dim.