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India-Pakistan
Badaber attack
2015-09-19
[DAWN] MORE than a dozen attackers, some 30 dead, over two dozen injured — the militant attack on a Pakistan Air Force camp in Badaber, Peshawar was a highly orchestrated strike with deadly consequences.

While the military has rightly emphasised the valour and bravery of the security personnel who helped prevent even more carnage — the kind of weaponry the attackers were armed with, as reported in sections of the media, suggests many more casualties and perhaps a lengthy siege was the ultimate aim yesterday — there are an unavoidable set of questions that have yet again been raised by the events in Peshawar.

To begin with, while the Badaber area is close to the tribal region and is densely populated, it is also a sensitive location where past attacks, including the ones on planes landing at the Peshawar airport, have been launched from.

Surely, for more than a dozen armed militants to disguise themselves as security personnel, travel through the Badaber area and arrive undetected at the entrance to the PAF camp is a security failure of some degree.

Moreover, it has already been claimed that there were intelligence reports of a possible strike in the area — who then was responsible for failing to tighten security quickly and adequately enough?

Then, there was the rather astonishing competition between the ISPR and the Taliban spokesperson, Muhammad Khurasani, to shape the narrative of the attack in real time.

While the ISPR was live tweeting the military’s response to the attack, the banned TTP was seemingly live blogging it — repeated messages were received by journalists from Khurasani giving an obviously one-sided though blow-by-blow account of what was allegedly taking place inside the PAF camp.

The basic question then, how were the militants able to use uninterrupted lines of communication to, firstly, communicate between themselves and, secondly, to communicate with the media?

Even if the command centre was in Afghanistan — though this has yet to be proved — it is troubling that the TTP continues to enjoy such direct and untroubled access to communications.

Furthermore, given the number of attackers, there was surely some kind of communication in the run-up to the attack between the perpetrators and the planners.

Why was all of that able to take place unhindered? If there is a plausible answer, the technical and physical limitations should be explained to the public.

It is disturbing that the TTP spokesman or his counterpart in other militant groups can continue to conduct communications with such ease inside Pakistan.

Finally, there is the issue of the National Action Plan. While the KP government and the provincial police leadership provide frequent updates about alleged terror suspects rounded up and various raids made, it still remains fairly obvious that the desirable level of cooperation and coordination between the civilian and military arms of the security apparatus is not there. Will anyone explain why and suggest immediate fixes?
Posted by:Fred

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