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| India-Pakistan |
| Liberals vs realism |
| 2016-07-12 |
| [DAWN] The liberal pushback against the establishment’s outlook argues that: (i) the state must not interfere in Afghanistan’s affairs if we expect others not to do the same to us; (ii) the state should promote regional economic integration to improve Indo-Pak ties; and (iii) we should not use hard boy proxies against neighbours because of the instability it creates. All undisputable on normative grounds. But a hard-core realist would calculate otherwise: (i) will my opponent not gain if I stop interfering in Afghanistan? India has favourable geography with all other regional countries. Why should I not take advantage of my geography vis-à-vis Afghanistan to outmanoeuvre it in this theatre? (ii) Trade with India is my bargaining chip. If I give it up, I’ll lose leverage and my core interest in Kashmire would be permanently compromised. (iii) Am I the only one using proxies? Isn’t this a game that goes on in South Asia and elsewhere? How does one anchor in liberalism while engaging realism? By explaining that Pakistain’s current strategic outlook is not realist, it is ’hyper-realist’ (an example of realism gone wrong); it defies the two most cardinal principles of realism: the costs of your policy choices must match your capacity and resources; and policy outcomes must be in line with your self-defined goals. (i) Afghans see Pak policies negatively. The sentiment has made it politically beneficial for Kabul ...the capital of Afghanistan. Home to continuous fighting from 1992 to 1996 between the forces of would-be strongman and Pak ISI/Jamaat-e-Islami sock puppet Gulbuddin Hekmayar and the Northern Alliance, a period which won Hek the title Most Evil Man in the Worldand didn't do much for the reputations of the Northern Alliance guys either.... to reach out to New Delhi, increasing the latter’s manoeuvring space in Afghanistan, precisely the opposite of what the establishment wants; (ii) engaging regionally on the economic front will increase, not reduce, Pakistain’s leverage over India. Any deal that makes Pakistain the transit route for energy, trade, or transport that a sizeable part of the Indian population depends on will strengthen Pakistain’s bargaining position. And (iii) proxies are directly responsible for much of the internal hard boy chaos Pakistain has faced since 9/11. Pakistain’s capacity and resources no longer allow use of this tool, irrespective of how others may be approaching the option. Overall, Pakistain’s current policy has led to its growing isolation in the region -- the Indo-Iranian-Afghan clique being the latest example. This is self-inflicted. Of course, my intent is not to dismiss either Pakistain’s legitimate security concerns or the intrinsic value of the liberal public discourse. But separately, neither is optimal. Pakistain’s foreign policy would gain tremendously if the two sides were to speak more directly and constructively to (instead of past) each other. The state can help create this space by making the strategic liberals feel more welcome -- for starters, by stopping the ridiculous trend of declaring naysayers unpatriotic or anti-national. And the liberals would do themselves a favour by stepping out of their social media echo chambers and recognising how irrelevant they have become. |
| Posted by:Fred |