Commentary by Russian military blogger tailor_war
Link to the article via Russian military journalist Boris Rozhin
Some of the translations are confused and sometimes flat wrong, so I have tried to correct it as best I could.
[SchneiderKrieg] May 10th, 7:56
I didn't write yesterday. Yesterday was a Great holiday, and therefore did not hammer this bright day with his tedious reflections.
All - with the past!
Actually, the essence of this post:
• There is often a delusion on the Internet that in Ukraine, 150,000 Russian and Donetsk-Luhansk troops are fighting with 600,000 Ukrainian forces. At the same time, there is no mobilization in Russia, as a fact.
Strictly speaking, it is not. In particular, the number of only land "active bayonets" from our side and the total number (including civilian personnel) from Ukraine are compared.
• It is also necessary to assess the scale of mobilization in Russia and Ukraine today, to compare the actual potential.
So:
1. UKRAINE:
By the beginning of the NMD, its troops numbered 209,000 people in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, 102 thousand - the defense, up to 120-130,000 (in total) - NSU, GPSU, Special Communications, Special Transport Service, etc. On the circle - 430-444,0000 people.
It is worth noting that this value included civilian personnel (up to 100,000 people). That is, in general, everyone.
Until April 2022, inclusive, three waves of mobilization - for 60,000, 6,000 and 70,000 people - 190,000 people were called up (officially). At the same time, the losses of Ukrainian troops today amount to at least 40-50,000 military personnel (killed, wounded and captured). They also have a high percentage of desertion: at least 20-30,000 people.
That is, according to the results of the mob events, they had up to 550.000 people in the ranks. Including, it is worth repeating again, all. Including numerous rather civilian personnel.
In addition, from May 15, a fourth wave of mobilization is expected, with the help of which it is planned to clean up, according to various sources, another 70 to 100,000 unlucky people (in total, mobilization will affect 260-290 thousand people by the summer). According to the results, there will be up to 620-650,000 people in the ranks. In general, everyone.
Of these, active bayonets (that is, those who directly conduct combat operations) will amount to 150,000 people (25 percent). Including more or less trained active bayonets as part of well-coordinated units - 60-70,000 people (10 percent).
As it was in Russia during the Civil War. Especially at the final stage, when 100,000 of the five million Red Army actually fought, being transferred from front to front.
Accordingly, a high percentage of losses for them, especially among "active bayonets", is fraught with a loss of combat capability.
2. RUSSIA (with LDNR):
Covert mobilization in Russia began, according to some sources, at the beginning of the year. By January 30, at least 85,000 reservists ("partisans") were called up for training. Reservists were also announced in February. A recruitment of contract soldiers to the troops and PMCs was carried out. Starting from mid-April, according to some sources, at least 60,000 people were recruited.
In total, according to certain estimates, up to 200-250,000 people were mobilized today, without the LDNR (quite comparable to Ukraine).
Your obedient servant at one time assumed that Russia needed a million fighters for the campaign in Ukraine. Without mobilization at home, subject to mobilization in the LDNR (which we consider), it was possible for us to field up to 700-800,000 people. Considering everyone in general (as in the case of Ukraine, a single method of calculation is needed).
I'll expand on the thesis. By the time the NWO began, Russia had concentrated 190-200,000 people on the borders with Ukraine, according to Western estimates. Including mobilized reservists.
The rear - the same civilian personnel, because much was transferred to outsourcing - amounted to 170-200,000 people. This, it seems, is without the potential of the Aerospace Forces and the Navy: another 70-80,000 people per circle (without rears). The National Guard numbered up to 60-70,000 people (without rears), LDNR (after mobilization) - at least 100,000 (together with rears). Plus the border troops of the FSB.
For a circle, all this amounted - together with the rear and civilian personnel, of course - the notorious 700-800,000 people. Don't be put off by this huge value. The number of "active bayonets" among these significant digital expressions did not really exceed 120-150,000 people (half - LDNR).
Additional covert mobilization from February to May, and the accompanying growth in the rear, turned out to be able to bring the number of Russian and LDNR forces on the border to almost a million people. At the same time, the number of "active bayonets" is unlikely to have grown significantly: no more than 150-200,000 people today.
It should be noted that today growth is in the line of building up the capacity of existing OShS (organizational staff structures). Presumably, it may include the following successive stages (thanks to https://maximlubyanov.livejournal.com/ for the tip):
• Increase in the number of people in the departments (from 6-7 to 11-13 people), the introduction of the fourth department in platoons. It is capable of leading, taking into account the shortage that took place by the beginning of the SVO, to no less than doubling the number of "active bayonets" (that is, by 150,000 people compared to the initial values);
• Introduction of the fourth platoon into companies (taking into account the previous stage, the number of companies is increased to 200-250 people). Able to give another 70-80,000 people (only active bayonets);
• The introduction of the fourth company into the battalion (growth of the battalion to 1000 people), the disbandment of the BTG (withdrawal of artillery and tanks back to regimental-brigade-divisional subordination), the introduction of the third battalion (meaning, directly operating forces on the theater of operations). Able to give another 70-80,000 people. At the same time, brigades again become brigades (for 5-6,000 people), divisions - divisions (depending on the composition of the division - 15-25,000 people).
Taking into account the recruitment of civilian personnel and others, it seems possible, after passing through the indicated stages, to increase the potential of the RF Armed Forces to 1.5 million people. Including 400-500,000 - active bayonets.
Taking into account the estimated potential for creating an army of Greater Novorossiya of half a million people, it is seen the possibility of forming a two-million-strong detachment of forces from Russia for operations in Ukraine. More than enough, given the existing balance of power.
True, given the pace, this is probably good if by the fall.
A reader responds to the remark about the disbandment of the Battalion Tactical Group (BTG):
I already expressed ideas at the VIF that the management of artillery, air defense systems and UAVs should be centralized at the army level in order to organize the ROC to combat artillery, air defense and enemy control centers (for which you need to lay down communications everywhere, and not just near line of contact).
ROC is a mistranslation for line of contact, or possibly forward line our troops (FLOT)
https://vif2ne.org/nvk/forum/0/co/2992748.htm
https://vif2ne.org/nvk/forum/0/co/2992801.htm
https://vif2ne.org/nvk/forum/ 0/co/2992841.htm
Second:
In fact, we have very different BTGs.
Airborne Forces and DShV - Nonas or D-30 - limited range, little artillery itself, weak means of artillery reconnaissance.
Nona is the 2S9 armored 120mm tracked mortar vehicle
Marines also have weak artillery, probably a platoon rather than an artillery control battery, and weak artillery reconnaissance capabilities.
Motorized rifle brigades - according to the division of 152mm artillery on the BTG - towed or self propelled, often modernized with a short reaction time and capable of operating according to the maneuver-fire scheme, also counting on the BTG a lot of air defense means are the most powerful guys.
Divisions
Since we had formed armored personnel carriers in peacetime long before, then:
In divisions we had BTR units with an attachment of regimental self propelled 122mm and a BTR unit with an attachment from an artillery regiment.
And AAA weapons, which are not many times more than in brigades, smeared as a thin layer on 5-6 BTGs.
In reality, it is very likely that the artillery regiments of the divisions are not pulled apart by the motorized rifle units, but act independently.
UAV is also very uneven.
In divisions (MSD VDD DSHD), probably a UAV company (where available) of 6-8-9 operators per division - for 5-6 armored infantry units.
In brigades (where available), probably the same UAV company of 6-8-9 operators for 2 armored infantry units.
Total: a combined hodgepodge of very different BTG strengths.
All this will also apply to regiments/brigades if they are not pulled apart by the BTGr.
Conclusion: at the army level, it is necessary to redistribute artillery and reconnaissance equipment not only in order to organize counter-battery combat in the operational direction, but also in order to equalize the combat capabilities of the existing armored infantry units, regiments or divisions.
Next.
We traditionally have a weak battalion command and control unit, both in terms of the number of officers and their status and level.
The role of the battalion link in civilian life is crushed: from above everything is driven by a lump. From below, the company steers all the life and combat training of grassroots units.
It is difficult for independent battalion commanders to appear in such a system.
This leads to the fact that the control of a reinforced battalion (regardless of whether it operates as part of a brigade / regiment or in isolation as a BTG) needs to be strengthened by pulling units to this control.
That is, if we want to put full-fledged, albeit two-battalion, regiments and brigades on the battlefield, we need to strengthen their command and control.
That is, IMHO, to raise retirees to the service.
Why so many letters:
1) regiments and brigades instead of armored personnel carriers - needed
2) regiments and brigades, if wisely, are needed with UAV companies and artillery expropriated to the army with its AIR, and then given back down from the army in some other composition for the task
3) so as not to pull the entire command staff of regiments and brigades for BTG it needs to be strengthened, preferably by sensible retirees - IMHO
In short, this is not done with one order - a set of measures is needed.