Text of an interview of Russian military journalist Boris Rozhin by Yuri Kotenok. Rozhin's commentary in plain typeface.
by Yuri Kotenok
[ASDNews] Russia has not yet used its potential in the Ukrainian theater
Military expert on the nature of hostilities in the former Ukraine, threats and prospects for a protracted conflict on the southwestern borders of Russia, the chances of the parties and the new Iron Curtain.
- How much has the counteroffensive potential of the Armed Forces of Ukraine decreased compared to the plans for July and August, which were announced in April and early May?
- Obviously, this process is a two-way traffic. The Armed Forces of Ukraine are trying to form reserves for offensive operations, and the RF Armed Forces both strike at these reserves and force the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to transfer reserves to strengthen the front and compensate for losses.
Nevertheless, the intentions of the enemy are obvious, and by the end of the summer he will probably try to organize a local offensive operation.
The most likely directions are Krivorozhsko-Nikopolskoye (in order to cut off the bridgehead of the RF Armed Forces on the right bank of the Dnieper and reach Kherson) and Zaporozhye (Vasilyevka-Orekhov-Gulyaipole section) by the forces of several battalion tactical groups, which will be supported by a significant artillery grouping and the remaining aircraft.
- The Armed Forces of Ukraine began to work precisely on military warehouses. There is an opinion that the Russian Army can be covered by shell hunger. Is it so?
- Taking into account the fact that the main calibers are 122-152mm plus missiles for the Grad MLRS, the destruction of several warehouses from the point of view of the total stocks is not very important. It is fundamental that the destruction of front-line warehouses makes it difficult to develop offensive operations, since artillerymen have to simply wait for new ammunition cars to be delivered to them together with the destroyed wagons of ammunition, and at this time the intensity of the work of artillery and MLRS in some areas may decrease.
So far, this has more of a tactical effect, but in the future, the systematic nature of such attacks on ammunition depots and fuel and lubricants may also have operational consequences in some areas.
- Why didn’t they hit Zmeiny right at the moment of landing, not even allowing them to be photographed with the flag? No opportunities? Or overlooked?
- According to official data, the blow was delivered after the photo shoot. Just like the group that installed the border post stolen in the Kharkiv shopping center was fired upon after the photo session and suffered losses.
From a military point of view, these are few fundamental points, since in the current realities it is fully controllable about. Serpentine can not both sides. The RF Armed Forces can also deliver their flag there for photographs, take it off and leave at the risk of receiving ammunition from the UAV.
- Will it be possible to drive the Armed Forces of Ukraine out of Slavyansk according to the "Lysychansk" scenario, or will a "second Mariupol" and the complete destruction of the city await us?
Promising is the semi-coverage of Slavyansk with the occupation of the adjacent heights, starting from the same Karachun.
Ultimately, Slavyansk itself is less suitable for defense than Severodonetsk or Mariupol. As it appears.
The main stake of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will be placed on the defense of the Kramatorsk region, and in the event of a threat of encirclement, they may well surrender Slavyansk, as they surrendered most of Rubizhne and Severodonetsk. The city itself, in any case, will certainly suffer greatly during the fighting, so it is better for civilians to leave Slavyansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkovka, Konstantinovka, Artemovsk and Soledar in advance. These n.p. are the unconditional targets of the 2nd stage of the NWO, and they will be released one way or another, regardless of the resistance of the enemy.
- How likely is it that after the final liberation of the DPR and Zaporizhia, the SVO will be suspended in favor of political games?
It seems that the war will not be stopped by the United States, and it will continue after the liberation of the occupied territories of the DPR.
The military-political leadership of the Russian Federation, most likely, after the completion of the 2nd stage, will once again probe the possibility of negotiations with even worse conditions for Ukraine and, in the event of a completely expected refusal, will proceed to the 3rd stage of the NWO.
Perhaps the political changes in the United States this autumn may change this vector of events. But so far, there are no visible prerequisites for the end of the war after the completion of operations in the Donbass.
- Kyiv, the West announce strikes on the Crimean bridge. How real are the threats? What will Russia do and will these measures be belated given the enemy's attempts to seize the initiative?
In the case of receiving new long-range missiles, such a strike is quite likely from Zaporozhye. Of course, such a strike will be carried out with the knowledge and approval of NATO, with all possible assistance with target designation.
The probability of attempting such a strike in the coming months should be regarded as quite high.
The lack of clear reactions to such an attack, if it occurs, in practical terms, is likely to lead to further strikes deep into the territory of the Russian Federation. Information preparation for the possibility of such a development of events is already being carried out by mainstream Western media.
The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are reasonably taking measures to strengthen the protection of such facilities.
“Looks like we're in for a long war. Calculation of the enemy on the depletion of the Russian Federation. And what are our reserves, given the shortage of human resources?
The Russian Federation does not have a shortage of human resources, as such. The numerical disproportion is formed from the limitations of the SVO format and the decision not to mobilize.
The mobilization potential of the Russian Federation is significantly higher than that of Ukraine. This is the huge reserve of Russia, which has not even been used even close, since at the current stage the stake is made on the contract army, various volunteer formations and PMCs.
In the long run, with the involvement of the Russian mob potential, Ukraine will lose in any case, especially if the pace and volume of grinding the enemy’s manpower is increased.
- Speaking to the leaders of the factions of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin made it clear that Russia has not really started a war yet. What do we have in stock from a military point of view?
In addition to a huge mobilization resource, the Russian Federation can also use huge stocks of conventional weapons and ammunition for a long time as part of the process of grinding the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Unlike Ukraine, the Russian Federation has every opportunity to produce the necessary weapons domestically, while most of the Ukrainian military industry has already been destroyed. For the most part, Ukraine depends on foreign supplies, which even now cannot compensate for all the losses incurred.
Of course, all this does not negate the use of the latest types of non-nuclear weapons within the framework of the military-industrial complex's ability to increase their production.
- If the statement about a new redistribution of the world in connection with the hostilities in Ukraine is true, then what configurations in the Eurasian space and at its borders should Russia be ready for? And where will its borders be?
The new borders of the Russian Federation in Ukraine will pass where our Armed Forces stop. The further they move west, the better.
It is important to understand that the final line of contact by the end of the war will become part of the New Iron Curtain, which will most likely be mothballed for decades. Therefore, without achieving the desired goals by military means, it is not advisable to make peace in an unsuitable configuration of the future state border.
Ultimately, now a lot depends on our army, which solves problems of a historical nature and directly affects what the fate of Russia will be in the 20-30s. XXI century.