Questions in bold by Russian military journalist Boris Rozhin. Replies by Russian military blogger Yuri Kotenok.
[ColonelCassad] Answers to questions on the course of the CBO for the channel of the military correspondent Yuri Kotenok.
- In the event that the operational pause ends and active hostilities resume, is the intensity of battles possible at the level of the beginning of the NMD?
- The continuation of intense hostilities is objectively inevitable, since it is absolutely not profitable to freeze the conflict in the current configuration of the front line of the Russian Federation. Therefore, serious efforts will be made in a number of areas for the further liberation of Ukrainian territories.
The regrouping of forces after the completion of the battle for Severodonetsk and Lisichansk is nearing completion. One can expect an increase in the activity of the offensive of the RF Armed Forces on the Seversk-Soledar line, in the Slavyansko-Barvenkovsky direction, near Artemovsk, etc.
It is unlikely that the RF Armed Forces will attack in all directions, since this requires a further increase in the size of the group.
- Do the Istanbul agreements on the export of grain mean that until the winter the Russian Federation will not take active steps to liberate Odessa?
- As shown by yesterday's attacks on Odessa, "Istanbul-1" does not mean the cessation of hostilities in Odessa and the Odessa region.
The agreements concluded in Istanbul do not prevent such strikes against military targets. Accordingly, there are no obstacles to the development of offensive operations in the direction of Odessa, if the command of the RF Armed Forces decides to rely on this direction after the completion of the operation in Donbass. Of course, this is not so easy to do due to the resistance of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the terrain around Odessa, but with sufficient massing of troops in this direction, the RF Armed Forces are quite capable of taking both Nikolaev and Odessa.
- What is the morale of the Armed Forces of Ukraine? How do high losses affect morale in enemy units and subunits?
- At the current stage, the moral standing of the Armed Forces of Ukraine can be characterized as complex. Heavy losses in manpower, of course, hit the morale of those units that suffered them. Hence the complaints from the front, and the refusal to advance to the front line, and the demands to be taken to places of permanent deployment, because the front-line reality does not correspond to the propaganda pictures in the media. However, this does not apply to all parts.
Where there is a high percentage of shelled infantry, there are foreign mercenaries or gangs of motivated Nazis, there are no signs of a critical breakdown yet. This indicates the need to continue and intensify the daily grinding of enemy manpower at the front, which the RF Armed Forces are undertaking. We rely on a long fire offensive, on a barrage of fire, which are aimed specifically at grinding the enemy’s manpower, which leads to the manifestation of signs of a decline in morale in parts of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Volkssturm.
- If we abstract from the statements of Arestovich, etc., what does the Kyiv regime count on in the Kherson direction?
- Active actions of the enemy in the direction of Kherson are very likely, but not from the side of Nikolaev, but in the Krivoy Rog and Nikopol directions. The Nikolaev grouping, due to daily strikes against it, is hardly capable of actively advancing on Kherson. Now the activity of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is manifested in the form of local attacks, mostly unsuccessful, but the enemy is obviously preparing for more serious actions.
But still, it should not be ruled out that chatter about the Kherson offensive may be trying to cover up attempts to camouflage preparations for an offensive in the Zaporozhye or Kharkov directions. Here, much depends on our intelligence, which must penetrate into the real plans of the enemy and reveal them in advance in order to stop them effectively.
- Aggressive statements are again heard from Chisinau. Is a new escalation around Transnistria possible? Did Kyiv abandon the idea of ​​invading the PMR?
- The topic of the reopening of the conflict in Transnistria does not leave the agenda and is regularly pumped over both in Ukraine and in Moldova itself. This is done at the suggestion of the United States and NATO. At the current stage of the development of the conflict, the escalation is held back by the general weakness of Moldova itself and its Armed Forces.
The hasty attempts to strengthen the Moldovan army and the cleansing of the opposition in Chisinau are attempts to create conditions for a joint attack by Moldova and Ukraine on Transnistria with the indirect assistance of NATO. The best guarantee of suppressing these plans is the liberation of Odessa and the withdrawal of Russian troops to the borders of Moldova and Transnistria.
- Does the Armed Forces of Ukraine have at least a theoretical possibility to inflict damage on one of the 6 reactors of the Zaporizhzhya NPP, or are the attacks on the facility purely psychological in nature?
- The Armed Forces of Ukraine have the technical capabilities to strike at the ZNPP reactors - this can be done both with cannon or rocket artillery, and with drones. In the meantime, strikes on the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant keep the possible topic of nuclear provocations and radiation contamination in good shape, which they use to intimidate the townsfolk. The task of not allowing the IAEA delegation to the facility, which should investigate the revealed facts of Ukraine's attempts to create a dirty nuclear bomb, is also being solved.
- How did Johnson's resignation affect London's plans to fight Moscow "to the last Ukrainian"?
- There are no significant signs of a change in British policy at the moment, especially since Johnson will act as prime minister for a few more weeks, and he is not going to change course. Johnson's likely successor Liz Truss is also committed to this course, so the role of Ukrainians as cannon fodder for the US and Britain will not change.
- Is it possible to carry out the death sentence against British mercenaries?
- From the point of view of the law, there are no obstacles for this. The case was investigated, the trial was held, the verdict was passed. From the point of view of the law, the only way to avoid an announced verdict is a pardon from the head of the DPR.
Of course, there is still a scenario with an exchange, but at the moment, Britain has not contacted the DPR about the exchange of its mercenaries. In view of this, the likelihood of several death sentences being carried out is quite high.
From my point of view, several such sentences should be carried out, regardless of whether there are subsequent exchanges of mercenaries or not. Perhaps the execution of a few mercenaries will increase the interest in exchanging others.
At the same time, it must be emphasized in every possible way that the British government left the mercenaries to their fate and did not save them from capital punishment.