Commentary by Russian military journalist Boris Rozhin
[ColonelCassad] The hacker group "Beregini" published https://t.me/hackberegini/1008 the stolen plan for the offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Kherson direction, which was drawn up at the headquarters of the operational group "Primorye". In fact, this is the failed attack on Kherson, which was talked about during the summer.
Of the noteworthy moments:
1. The combat order for the offensive was given on August 10th.
2. The main goals are to disrupt the logistics of the grouping of the RF Armed Forces in the Krivoy Rog direction and to ensure fire control over the Kakhovskaya hydroelectric power station and Novaya Kakhovka.
3. At the offensive preparation stage, various imitation actions are envisaged to mislead the RF Armed Forces, as well as strikes against the positions of the RF Armed Forces to ensure the achievement of the assigned tasks.
4. Direction of the main attack - Murahovka-Berislav. Auxiliary strikes in the direction - Limany, Sofiyivka, Novonikolaevka, Novokievka.
5. From August 13 to 14, imitation of actions in other directions should be provided, and by August 14, strike groups should be concentrated, and fire damage should be inflicted on units of the RF Armed Forces.
6. On August 14, at the signal of STORMOVOY 3485, the offensive begins directly. During which advancement to the Dnieper in the direction of Berislav is envisaged, with the simultaneous infliction of maximum damage to the RF Armed Forces and the occupation of the intended positions.
7. After reaching the planned tactical goals, a transition to the defense was envisaged to repel the counterattacks of the BTG of the 76th brigade of the Airborne Forces of the RF Armed Forces.
8. During the operation, it was envisaged to gain temporary dominance in the use of UAVs by defeating UAV control posts. Similarly, it was envisaged to achieve superiority in artillery by destroying the positions of cannon and rocket artillery of the RF Armed Forces.
9. In the event of a successful offensive, by the end of the second day of the offensive, it was supposed to defeat the reserves of the RF Armed Forces in head-on battles and continue the offensive on Berislav.
10. The 35th Naval Infantry Brigade, 46th Airborne Brigade, units of the 59th Naval Infantry Brigade, 36th Naval Infantry Brigade + a combined hodgepodge of various special forces, artillery, missile and air defense units were supposed to take part in the offensive. Parts of the 28th Separate Infantry Brigade and 59th Separate Mechanized Infantry Brigade were kept in reserve.
As stellar a light rifle group as could be had in the Ukrainian military.
11. To achieve the set goals with losses of no more than 30 percent, they requested six artillery batteries
(36 tubes/launchers in total, two artillery regiments)
, several Bayraktars, several Tor air defense systems, as well as three standard amunition loads for artillery
(along the old Soviet line of measuring supply needs for an artillery unit in an attack)
and the ability to provide four aircraft/sorties per day per vehicle.
12. The authors of the plan are Brigadier General Gnatov (commander of the operational group of troops "Primorye") and his chief of staff, Colonel Viktor Brignets.
PS. As it is not difficult to guess from the indicated dates, the attack on Berislav did not take place.
Link to graphical shots of the stolen material. (All in Russian)
Apparently, the headquarter's computers were broken once again.