Commentary by retired FSB reserve Colonel Igor Girkin, call sign Igor Strelkov. From a post on V Kontakte:
As for the situation in the Balakleysko-Izyum direction, I do not have my own information yet.
An analysis of open sources allows us to draw the following conclusions relatively confidently:
1. The enemy has achieved operational success in the main direction of attack and is developing an offensive south of the city of Volokhov Yar. Currently, the fighting is going on north of the settlements of Vesyoloye and Kunye, which means that the Armed Forces of Ukraine are aiming to capture the most important road junction (to keep our troops from Balakliya and the entire "gut" that is still occupied by the RF Armed Forces).
The offensive is going along the major highway Chuguev-Izyum, which allows you to directly supply the advancing grouping and build it up along a direct line of operations. In the event that the enemy captures the indicated road junction (Chuguev-Izyum and Balakleya-Chistovodovka) - in the operational environment (generally without paved roads connecting with the "mainland") - not only Balakleya, but also our entire grouping in its area and south.
2. The enemy - after the failure of the first attacks directly on Balakleya - is limited to the blockade of the garrison. At the same time, there is a cleansing of the territory that turned out to be in the rear of the shock group that broke through to the south and east. Whether any of our units remained there (encircled northwest of Shevchenkovo) - I do not know.
3. In the eastern direction, the enemy is trying to expand the "throat" of his breakthrough, trying to capture Shevchenkove or outflank it. If successful, the enemy will not only eliminate the threat to his left flank of the offensive, but will also begin to threaten a breakthrough in the direction of Kupyansk. In fact, it now depends on the retention of this point whether the enemy will be able to consolidate his operational success and develop it further.
Contrary to numerous opinions that "it turns out that there was a" diversionary offensive" in the Kherson direction - I believe that this is not so. The forces brought into battle by the enemy in the direction of Balakleya do not exceed the total forces that the enemy continues to use in the Kherson and Berislav directions. Rather, we are talking about two parallel equivalent strikes.
And the whole difference between the "tight" advance of the enemy near Kherson and the rapid breakthrough in the area east of Balakleya lies in the fact that the last section turned out to be NEARLY COMPLETELY EXHAUSTED in the sense of the presence of regular army units - both at the front and in reserve. In fact, the front here was held by a "liquid" chain of strongholds of "mobiks" with also a few garrisons of the "Russian Guard" in large settlements. Which led to a quick breakthrough and advance (in the main direction - up to 30 km in depth) of the enemy strike groups, passing through some settlements without the slightest resistance at all (there was simply no one to provide it).
And this factor personally confirms me (as a security officer in reserve) once again in the opinion that the matter could hardly have happened without TREASON. Since I PERSONALLY received data on the concentration of strike forces by the enemy in this direction at least a week before the start of the offensive. I cannot admit that our intelligence managed to "miss" something that was not a secret even on the Internet. And if intelligence knew, but no measures were taken by the command, then ....