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| China-Japan-Koreas |
| The Eyes of the Fleet: Distributed Maritime Operations in the First Island Chain |
| 2022-12-21 |
| By Lieutenant (junior Grade) Samuel Heenan Winegar, U.S. Navy [USNI] In the event of a future conflict with China, sensors distributed throughout the first island chain would offer a clear benefit to the United States and its allies. December 2022 Proceedings Vol. 148/12/1,438 Twentieth-century British naval theoretician Sir Julian Corbett stated that the object of naval warfare is to control the sea lines of communication (SLOCs).1 All Indo-Pacific states, including the United States, have long enjoyed unfettered access to the surrounding SLOCs under the regional maritime regime. By using gray-zone tactics such as maritime militias, a militarized coast guard, and prosecution of legitimate competing commercial vessels and platforms, China has slowly attempted to challenge the existing free-and-open maritime commons in the first island chain, referring to Taiwan as “essential strategic space for China’s rejuvenation” and a “springboard to the Pacific” in official military writings.2 Similarly, Admiral Ernest King dubbed Taiwan “the cork in the bottle” of Japanese SLOCs during World War II.3 Were Taiwanese sovereignty ever so challenged as to call into question the security of the SLOCs it straddles, a revisionist and belligerent China could threaten these vital economic links. Speaking strictly from this perspective, and without regard for the persuasive political and moral considerations of continued Taiwanese sovereignty, it is decidedly in U.S. national interest to deter a hostile takeover of Taiwan by China and maintain the kinetic capabilities necessary to protect Taiwan if deterrence fails. A MODERN READING OF CORBETT A prolonged high-end conflict with the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) will prove incredibly difficult for the U.S. Navy. It is no secret that China would seek to sever the Navy’s vulnerable supply networks, targeting resupply vessels and depots across the Indo-Pacific.4 While it is possible the United States will strengthen or otherwise diversify its logistics network, the confines of geography will endure—in a Taiwanese contingency, China would be fighting (and resupplying) in its strategic backyard.5 If deterrence fails, the Navy must be prepared to fight and win in as short a timeframe as possible. Does this mean a Mahanian-style concentration-of-forces, winner-take-all battle? Not necessarily. As Corbett puts it, a battleforce need not be “huddled together like a drove of sheep, but distributed with regard to a single common purpose, and linked together by the effectual energy of a single will.”6 In this regard, the distributed maritime operations (DMO) concept is clearly Corbettian in nature. As described by Vice Admiral Philip Sawyer, DMO is “geographically distributed naval forces integrated to synchronize operations across all domains.”7 The theories Corbett espoused in Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, however prophetic, simply cannot be applied 111 years later without significant modification. When Corbett wrote his seminal work in 1911, the unmatched guns of the British battle fleet had a maximum firing range of around ten miles.8 Today’s antiship missiles enjoy effective ranges of hundreds if not thousands of miles. A simple and enduring truth of kinetic warfare is the connection between shooter and target—who can shoot farthest and most effectively? For Corbett, this meant cruisers: fast, lightweight ships serving as “eyes of the fleet”—dedicated to seeking out enemy combatants and reporting their position and maneuvers to more capable battleships for subsequent engagement.9 Of course, the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities of Corbett’s cruisers are a far cry from those of the U.S. Navy’s Ticonderoga class, cruisers arguably just as ISR-capable as their Arleigh Burke–class destroyer compatriots, or the aircraft employed by a carrier strike group.10 Shipborne sensors offer individual units and networked strike groups a wide tactical horizon compared with the dreadnoughts of old. These advances in ISR have been matched equally by the increasing range of shore-based and sea-based strike capabilities. Read the rest at the link |
| Posted by:badanov |
| #1 I read these (thank you, Bad) and the scenarios strike me as so primitive. The author polished up some words to describe 3000 year old traditions. These scenarios could be applied equally to camel caravans moving across the desert, monitored by bandit scouts along the way to the ambush point. |
| Posted by: Skidmark 2022-12-21 11:30 |