Text taken from a RUSI report by Jack Whiting and Nick Reynolds.
Fragment of the RUSI report on the battles on the Vremevsky ledge. Technical translation using a neural network.
Introduction
In the fall of 2022, Russian troops suffered a serious defeat as a result of the collapse of the Western Group of Forces in Kharkov and the forced withdrawal of troops from Kherson. In response to these failures, General Sergei Surovikin, then commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, adopted a new strategy.
First, Russia will use long-range precision strikes to carry out a campaign to deplete Ukraine's power and grid infrastructure, with the goal of making Ukrainian cities uninhabitable in the winter.
Second, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will build a series of defense lines in the occupied territories in an attempt to contain further Ukrainian advances and prolong the conflict by exhausting Ukrainian troops.
Extensive preparations for defensive operations - compared to the Kremlin's aggressive military goals - contributed to Surovikin's removal in January. and the chief of the Russian General Staff, General Valery Gerasimov, launched a poorly prepared and costly series of offensive strikes in January. 2023 However, the defensive lines were completed and Russia was able to retreat to these defenses after the failure of its offensive efforts. The Surovikin Line now poses a serious barrier to Ukrainian troops seeking to liberate the occupied territories.
During the preparation for the Ukrainian offensive, various operational concepts were considered. Much of the evidence supporting the tactics that Ukraine's international partners sought to train Ukrainian forces in was based on 20th-century operational analysis that was consistent with the range of technologies used in Ukraine. Therefore, understanding how effective these tactics were is important for improving both the tactics of Ukraine's international partners and for improving the preparation of Ukrainian forces for subsequent operations.
The purpose of this report is to examine the range of tactical actions of the Ukrainian military in the initial stages of the counteroffensive, as well as how the Ukrainian and Russian sides have improved their response.
The general plan of attack is very sensitive. Detailed reports on cumulative losses and other data are also confidential because they will provide Russia with information about the extent to which they have written off Ukrainian units. Therefore, rather than summing up the offensive, this report provides an example of a series of tactical actions that were conducted over two weeks over the villages of Novodarovka and Rivnopol, located on the border between the Donetsk and Zaporozhye regions.
The tactical series was chosen because it reflects broader trends and is informative about how Russian forces solve various tactical problems, as well as the different approaches taken by Ukrainian forces. The review is based on reports from participants about operations, captured documents from Russian command posts, materials from open sources, including satellite imagery of combat operations, as well as a review of closed-circuit videos of relevant tactical actions.
This report was submitted to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) prior to publication to ensure that its publication would not jeopardize any ongoing operations or tactics. The report remains solely the work of the named authors.
I. Capture of Novodarivka and Rovnopol
The line of contact between Ukrainian and Russian forces along the border between the Zaporozhye and Donetsk regions was relatively unchanged in the months leading up to the Ukrainian offensive. Russian offensive operations in early 2023 focused on Vulkhedar, located approximately 40–50 kilometers to the east, and Bakhmut. Ukrainian troops remained in a thicket of trees about a kilometer north of Novodarivka, around the village of Novopol. For some time, the defense was held by a brigade of the Ukrainian Territorial Defense Forces (STO), reinforced in May with a mechanized brigade and another line brigade in anticipation of an offensive. The mechanized brigade led the breakthrough.
The Russians had one company in Novodarovka and another in Rovnopol, and a third occupied a number of fighting positions between the two settlements.The approaches to populated areas were heavily mined. To begin advancing south towards the Surovikin Line, Ukrainian troops needed to break through these villages and then through Priyutnoye, approximately 6 km to the south. (since Priyutnoye is still controlled by the RF Armed Forces, it is not difficult to guess that the enemy never reached the Surovikin line here)
The Ukrainian offensive began in late May with a long period of preparatory artillery bombardment. In the Rivne-Poland direction, batteries of 155mm M777 howitzers were allocated to support the offensive, positioning their firing positions in the north-west. Typically, Ukrainian howitzers had to move from 2 to 15 minutes from the moment they opened fire, depending on their distance from various threat systems. This time it was clear that Ukrainian intelligence had pinpointed the Russian firing positions, and thanks to the greater range of the 155mm guns, the Ukrainian artillerymen quickly forced the Russian artillery to retreat.
Since the targets at this stage were mostly in close proximity, the Ukrainian artillery established a steady rhythm of strikes without the need to shift. Among the crews and infantry watching the fire, There was a feeling of delight. For several months the number of shells available was strictly limited. Ukraine tried to preserve its ammunition to create reserves for the offensive. There was now freedom of fire, and when requests for resupply came in, additional shells were delivered immediately.
The Ukrainians have also worked to weaken Russian tactical reserves with UAVs. Daytime reconnaissance will reveal Russian positions, which will be attacked at night using converted agricultural UAVs dropping RPGs. This tactic was fairly binary in its viability. If Russian electronic warfare (EW) were active, the UAVs could not penetrate and would not typically be used. If electronic security were to weaken, the consequences could be dramatic. In one incident, a company of Russian tanks took up a position in a wooden block behind the front. Five UAVs were launched, each carrying four RPGs, destroying or seriously damaging seven tanks, although all UAVs were lost.
The decision to attempt to break through the original Russian combat positions was made on the evening of June 3; this task was assigned to mechanized troops. A discussion broke out in the command group about the swampiness of the area after the recent rains. Nevertheless, the decision was made to continue. The goal of the initial attack was to break through an area where the minefields were less dense due to the short distance between the lines, and to break into the village of Novodarovka.
The village had been almost completely destroyed by Russian shelling when initially taken and was now simply a collection of fighting positions for a Russian infantry company. Long and narrow, running from east to west, the village provided the Russians with a covered position overlooking most of the approaches to their company positions to the east and west.
After identifying the breakthrough points in the early morning of June 4, the offensive began. Two UR-77 Meteorite charges were fired at the narrowest part of the minefield, exploding two six-meter-wide channels from the forest border north to the outskirts of Novodarovka. Under the cover of artillery fire, the first column advanced along the eastern gap. The column was led by a pair of tanks, followed by MaxxPro MRAPs with infantry. Unfortunately, the MRAPs struggled in swampy terrain, especially in the wake of tanks.
Several MRAPs were stuck, and the cleared lane was not wide enough for other vehicles to pass. It was at this moment, when the column was completely occupied by the breakthrough, that a pair of Russian tanks unmasked and began to attack the column. Ukrainian tanks returned fire from a distance of about 800 meters. However, the vehicles in the convoy were consistently hit. The landing infantry either turned back or moved forward along the cleared strip, trying to find cover.
Some infantry units reached the outskirts of the village, but the open ground behind them, now devastated by fire, made the crossing dangerous, threatening to isolate these forces. Too small to take the village, the Ukrainian military now had to push forward or risk losing the platoon that reached Novodarovka.
This allowed the victims to be evacuated. now devastated by fire, the transition was dangerous, which threatened to isolate these forces. Too small to take the village, the Ukrainian military now had to push forward or risk losing the platoon that reached Novodarovka. The threat to those suppressed in the minefield diminished after the SPG-9 recoilless rifles managed to hit the Russian tanks from the flank and knock them out. This allowed the victims to be evacuated.
The direction of the second company to the western breakthrough was determined both by the need to advance towards the goal and by the need to strengthen the troops in Novodarovka. The ground on this strip turned out to be more solid. However, when the column was completely occupied by the breakthrough, two more Russian tanks appeared, which quickly moved towards the column and opened fire.
With the help of a UAV, the command post monitored the appearance of the enemy and fired to try to disrupt the fighting. Having been exposed, the breakthrough group tried to speed up the breakthrough, but deviated from the course. Then all the company's vehicles were sequentially immobilized by mines. The Russians then opened fire on the column. The stormtroopers split up again: some reached the outskirts of the village, others retreated.
The Russian defenders of the village moved to repel positions that had by then been occupied, retreating to strong points on a farm to the east of the village and to several fighting positions along the central road. Realizing the importance of expanding the territory held to divert forces from Russian fire, the Ukrainian commander deployed two assault groups as reinforcements. One platoon group advanced along the breach, using stopped vehicles as cover, while fire suppressed the Russian positions. Another platoon to the west noticed that the dead ground had become viable as the redeployment of Russian troops in the village had removed it from view and thick foliage prevented UAV surveillance.
These troops advanced cautiously to the western end of Novodarovka and began an assault on Russian positions to secure the crossroads dividing the settlement. After fierce fighting, Russian troops withdrew east to prevent their positions from being isolated. Fighting inside Novodarovka will continue for another week, with Russian firing positions on the eastern estate holding out until they are isolated by further Ukrainian actions in the direction of Rovnopol. Although the Russians held some positions, they no longer controlled the approaches to other Russian positions, opening up additional attack opportunities. The first new position to come under attack was the high ground west of Novodarovka. Previously, Russian positions in the populated area blocked the approaches to the heights,
Before any further action could be taken, the Russian company in front of the village of Rovnopol to the east had to be dealt with. This position controlled access to a series of wooden blocks that ran semi-contiguous from north to south. Ukrainian commanders were concerned that if they tried to push forward, Russian anti-tank guided weapons (ATGM) teams and other troops would flank them and cause significant damage to critical equipment. Therefore, it was necessary to take such a position. However, at the same time, the Ukrainian command was cautious. They lost two companies of equipment during the capture of Novodarovka. This level of casualties would have been unacceptable if they had eventually broken through the Surovikin Line.Therefore, it was extremely important that the assault on the Rivne Poland positions take place without such setbacks.
The attack on the positions of the Russian company in front of Rovnopol will be led by naval infantry forces. To carry out the operation, the attacking forces were reinforced by two tanks from a neighboring brigade and an artillery battery. The attack began with artillery preparation of Russian positions. After this, two tanks took up positions providing direct visibility of the target and began firing. Tanks moved in and out of cover and attacked Russian firing positions to attract attention and suppress the defenders. Soon after this, artillery strikes on combat positions were combined with the supply of smoke in front of the tanks. The tanks moved forward, giving the impression that they were covering the advance of the infantry with smoke.
While the tanks attracted the attention of the defenders, several platoons of Ukrainian paratroopers moved along the tree line east of the Russian combat positions. From here he began to lay down suppressive fire and advance in pairs. This action attracted the attention of the defense, who were now aware of a clear tactical game with a fixing action on its front and a major attack about to begin from its flank. The Russian unit began repositioning itself to prepare for this attack and attempted to win the skirmish in the east. Reinforcing the feeling that the city was about to be attacked, Ukrainian artillery then fired a heavy salvo into the positions, signaling an imminent attack.
The attack, when it occurred, did not materialize as Russian defenders had expected. Instead, a platoon of assault troops, having penetrated forward along the western flank of the position, then quickly advanced forward, reaching defensive positions that had been thinned out in anticipation of an attack to the east. Disoriented and fearful of encirclement, Russian troops began to retreat towards Rovnopol, abandoning communications equipment and leaving five soldiers captured.
Ukrainian forces had to quickly develop an attack beyond the company's positions, since its coordinates had been previously recorded by Russian artillery, which was striking the trenches. However, the rapid collapse of this position forced a redistribution of forces in Rovnopol itself, which allowed another brigade to launch an attack on the village and, within a few days, force the Russians to retreat to the tree line beyond the village.
Eventually, Russian troops withdrew through the water barrier behind the village and blew up several agricultural dams, flooding the area and setting up a series of ATGM firing posts in the woods beyond. The density of the anti-tank shield was significant: approximately four launchers per tree line with 50 missiles. These ATGM teams allow themselves to be advanced and then conduct anti-tank ambushes from the flank before attempting to retreat. They therefore had to be deliberately cleared before any armor could be brought forward. With only one vehicle available to overcome obstacles, Ukrainian units had to pause to consolidate their successes.
These ATGM teams allow themselves to be advanced and then conduct anti-tank ambushes from the flank before attempting to retreat. They therefore had to be deliberately cleared before any armor could be brought forward. With only one vehicle available to overcome obstacles, Ukrainian units had to pause to consolidate their successes.
The capture of Novodarovka and Rovnopol took two weeks, while the need to secure flank positions was a prerequisite for further offensive. The rate of advance during this period was therefore one tactical offensive per three days of fighting, with each offensive moving the line of control approximately 700–1,200 meters forward. The difference in methods for achieving various successes has led to completely opposite results in terms of the level of costs for the successes achieved. While the first tactical offensive on Novodarovka cost two companies of equipment, losses during the offensive on Rovnopol were small. Since these initial exchanges, both Russian and Ukrainian forces have adapted their methods. The emphasis of the Ukrainian troops shifted to withdrawing positions while preserving equipment and personnel.
II. Russian Language Lessons and Adaptation
The tactical actions around Novodarivka and Rovnopol were largely viewed as successes by Russian forces, as they inflicted enough early equipment losses to reduce the reach of Ukrainian maneuver units, suggesting a constant level of casualties deep in Russian defensive positions. At the same time, Russian losses in artillery and tanks were high, with the former worrying the Russian command more.
The losses of Russian troops, although acceptable for the 58th Combined Arms Army in terms of attrition, were nevertheless unsustainable in the conditions of a protracted offensive without the supply of reinforcements. In short, Russia achieved tactical success in preventing a breakout and could have achieved operational success if it had continued to inflict comparable materiel losses on the enemy. However, the reduction in personnel, if it continues until the fall, will create the risk of operational defeat, and the loss of artillery systems threatens to reduce the ability to deplete Ukrainian troops. Given these dynamics, several changes were made to Russian defensive operations.
The first adaptation was to increase the depth of the minefields. Before the offensive, Russian minefields were doctrinally set to a depth of 120 meters. After the initial engagements, it was noted that mines of this depth could be penetrated by MICLIC and UR-77 to a depth sufficient to allow infantry to penetrate Russian defensive positions.
Thus, the goal was to increase the depth of the minefields to 500 meters, which far exceeds the capabilities of a quick breakthrough. This had a number of secondary consequences. First, Russian logistics systems were organized to equip brigades with sufficient mines in accordance with doctrinal templates. The increased field depth means that Russian forces do not have enough mines to consistently counter this load with a mine density consistent with doctrine. The result was the improvisation of explosive devices, an expansion of the range of mines available and a decrease in the regularity of minefields.
Other common measures included placing two anti-tank mines together—one on top of the other—to compensate for the reduced density by ensuring single mine strikes immobilized vehicles, even if the vehicles were equipped with dozer blades. Before this, a tank equipped with a bulldozer blade often withstood three mine hits before being immobilized by the fourth. Although minefield consistency has now decreased, this has made Ukrainian minefield planning and exploration much more difficult.
Russian forces have also concluded that the practice of using pre-registered fire to hit friendly positions if they are lost is ineffective and dangerous when the enemy has an artillery advantage in terms of detection, range and counterbattery accuracy. Problems with this method include detection of friendly guns, reduced effectiveness due to the tendency of Ukrainians to withdraw from combat positions as quickly as possible, and dependence on communications.
To solve these problems, the Russians resorted to preparing their combat positions to destroy their reserves. This is often done using improvised charges. The plan is to blow up the first line as soon as Ukrainian troops reach their fighting positions and Russian troops withdraw through the rear of the trenches. According to the Russians, this is more rapid and effective than the use of artillery fire, and poses a threat to the bravest and most combat-ready airborne units of Ukrainian formations, deterring attacks on firing posts.
If the increased complexity and extent of minefields imposes restrictions on the enemy's tempo, and the backup demolition of combat positions inhibits the rapid clearing of positions, then such an enemy consolidation requires that the Russians have the means to inflict damage on advancing troops. Artillery remains the primary method, but due to fewer guns and the need to protect them, greater emphasis is now placed on other means.
One of the main methods adopted by the Russian Armed Forces is to place groups of ATGMs on the flanks of their positions, with priority given to more trained and motivated troops to conduct anti-tank ambushes. While there are limited personnel capable and willing to fight in this manner, there appears to be no shortage of Russian anti-tank systems, with the Ukrainian military noting that these groups are well equipped with newly produced ammunition. These troops also have priority for engaging enemy aircraft.
The use of strike aircraft presented a constant challenge to Ukrainian forces throughout the counteroffensive. The greatest threat is posed by the Ka-52 “Alligators” firing the “Vikhr” and “Ataka” ATGMs.
However, the Russians have also begun installing Ataka on the Mi-35M, which also perform area attacks using salvos of raised S-8 missiles.Air strikes are carried out from a depth of approximately eight to ten kilometers from the target. The Ukrainian military notes that the presence of strike aircraft is often indicated by the removal of GPS jamming among Russian formations, reflecting the need for precise navigation to coordinate strikes given that both armies use many of the same platforms.
Russian helicopter groups also often use helicopters equipped with electronic warfare equipment for defensive purposes, equipped with targeting units designed for radar guidance. The Russians have to keep helicopters relatively close to the front lines, leaving their forward weapons, refueling and other infrastructure vulnerable. However, the lack of Ukrainian tactical air defense, the low altitude supported by these assets, and the limited period of time,
The Russian military also decided to tactically exploit opportunities when Ukrainian forces became bogged down in aggressive flanking attacks with armored vehicles to cripple Ukrainian systems. It is worth noting that Russia often loses tanks used for these counterattacks, but they cause disproportionate damage because the mines limit the ability of Ukrainian vehicles to maneuver or react. This willingness to counterattack and the decision to defend attackers underscores that the training of Russian tank crews and other specialists continues to function, producing new crews with some tactical competence compared to the problems of collective training that hamper Russian infantry.
There are also areas of adaptation that reflect significant improvements in practice and are not specific to the current context. One area in which Russia will continue to adapt, as well as improve, is electronic warfare. The Russian electronic warfare system is a major area of investment, and Russian electronic warfare operators are generally technically competent. However, Russian EW platforms are largely modernized versions of Soviet equipment, with each type of actuator placed on one large platform, with groups of platforms providing a wide range of EW effects.
The vulnerability of this approach was recognized by the RF Armed Forces, given the focus on specific emission sources.
First of all, this led to a much more subtle use of large platforms, such as the Resident R330-Zh. This has also led to a preference for mounting antennas on lightweight platforms, or dismantling and deploying antennas that can be placed to cover tactical positions. Thus, the transmission of influence through the antenna can be carried out by electronic warfare systems that are not tied to the emitting signature. Losing an antenna when they come under attack is a cost the Russian military thinks they can bear.
This is a period of transition and therefore there is no uniform approach. However, the preference to use systems like Pole-21 and treat them as expendable systems to provide broad protection against UAV strikes reflects a change in thinking and how the Russian electronic warfare industry is learning lessons from the conflict.
Another interesting area of conceptual innovation that began before the Ukrainian offensive but has been accelerated by today's dynamics is the transition to Russian fire doctrine. Based on statistics collected during World War II, Russian artillery established fire levels that were estimated to provide a certain effect on certain targets.
For example, it was estimated that 720 rounds were needed to suppress a platoon's fighting position. This is the basis on which Russian fires operated during the early stages of the invasion of Ukraine. Russians now consider this approach unviable. First, Russian forces do not have the ammunition to withstand this volume of fire. Secondly, the logistics that provide such a volume of fire are too vulnerable to detection and high-precision strikes at a long distance. Thirdly, the loss of the counter-battery radar and wear of the barrels led to a decrease in the effectiveness of this mass approach to firing.
The general conclusion that Russian fire doctrine is not viable has led to a redoubled focus on the concept of the Reconnaissance Fire Complex (ROC), which prioritizes effect over volume. While production of a range of Russian ammunition has become limited, production of the 152mm Krasnopol laser-guided rounds has been a priority, with the new rounds being widely available across the front. The use of UAVs to provide guidance to Krasnopol has also increased. The Lancet was also widely used in conjunction with FPV UAVs to strike forward Ukrainian units. When used in conjunction with ISR UAVs, these effects ensure accuracy.
The Russian military, of course, continues to rely heavily on MLRS, 120mm mortars and other inaccurate systems, while cutting corners in ammunition production becomes apparent. Nevertheless,the trend seems to be towards maximizing accuracy and reducing the number of shots needed to achieve the desired result, rather than resorting to saturating fire. This is a worrying trend as it will likely significantly improve Russian artillery over time.
The increasing complexity, variety and density of Russian UAVs is a cause for concern. The improvement in both warhead efficiency and economics of its design between Lancet 3 and Lancet 3M demonstrates how the Russians are actively improving their warhead equipment. Also noteworthy are modifications to loitering ammunition to reduce noise on the Shahed-136 and improve navigation. It is obvious here that the AFRF is actively learning from Ukrainian forces and thereby reducing the extent of some Ukrainian advantages.
Effective warfare depends on communications. And here the Russian army has made important progress. At the start of the full-scale invasion, Russian forces relied heavily on custom-made military radios. The scramble for equipment late last year involved a wide range of civilian systems. Conceptually, however, the Russians now appear to have moved on, relying increasingly on military data networks as well as application-based services to encode and access data.
As a result, a system like Strelets can provide 3G connectivity to multiple devices running applications that are intuitive for civilian users.This separation of communication channels and services is in its infancy, and the security and reliability of the systems under test must be questioned. However, the reduced training burden associated with this approach and the improvements already achieved in fire control mean that the Russian military will likely continue to move in this direction and increasingly systematize its communications architecture around these methods.
(c) Jack Whiting and Nick Reynolds
PS. Then there was a lengthy block about the problems of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and what NATO should do to eliminate structural deficiencies and problems before the 2024 campaign.