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| Russia doesn't need a diplomatic buffet |
| 2024-02-23 |
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. by Gevorg Mirzayan [REGNUM] The other day, President Vladimir Putin met with Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. And in the open part of the conversation with him, he spoke about his vision of negotiations with the United States on issues of strategic stability, that is, on ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. “We have never refused dialogue. But, of course, to pretend that the United States and the West, on the one hand, are calling for the strategic defeat of Russia, and on the other hand, allegedly intend and want to negotiate with us on strategic stability, believing that one issue is in no way connected with the other, this will not be possible. If they seek to inflict a strategic defeat on us, then we must think about what strategic stability means for our country." And in these proposals the president carries out two most important thoughts. Firstly, about what kind of negotiations should take place with the United States, and secondly, about what strategic stability is for Russia in the world after February 2022. As for negotiations, Vladimir Putin fundamentally rejects the so-called buffet principle, when the parties take from the bilateral agenda only those topics on which they can agree. And it would seem that the president’s position is ambiguous. Even during the Cold War—especially after the Cuban Missile Crisis—Russia and the United States enjoyed a buffet. Even despite the bilateral confrontation, they negotiated on the same strategic stability, as well as on other issues of mutual interest. As responsible world powers who did not want their conflict to spill over into a global nuclear war. However, the problem is that the current confrontation is very different from that of the Cold War. Now Russia has fewer resources than the Union. Now the American leadership is different, possessing much less knowledge and strategic thinking than in the days of Kissinger or even Brzezinski. Now the rules of the game are different, or rather, their practical absence, as can be seen in the example of the same attack by the United States on the Nord Stream and its supply of weapons to the Ukrainian Armed Forces attacking Russian territory. Finally, now the stakes are different: what is at stake is not the competition of the two systems, but the fate of a unipolar world in which Moscow does not and cannot have a worthy place. And in this situation, the Swedish diplomatic table becomes impossible. Firstly, due to a lack of trust between the parties. Secondly, due to the unwillingness of the United States to negotiate, Washington does not and cannot consider Russia an equal partner. He is fundamentally not ready to go with her to any “New Yalta”. Thirdly, Moscow is fundamentally not ready to legitimize the American approach towards Russia, that is, to transform it into some kind of new normality in bilateral relations, when in order to cooperate with Moscow, America does not need to abandon the course of inflicting strategic defeat on it. And finally, fourthly, a buffet is impossible because Russia is now developing a new concept of strategic stability. Yes, ideal stability is a situation when all the great powers play their concert strictly according to the rules. If there are wars, then only on the periphery, in other countries. If there are conflicts, then only within the red lines that are prohibited to be crossed. If there are agreements, then those that must be observed. And a huge number of common strategic goals, including the principles of indivisible security, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, arms reduction and the search for common denominators in everything and everywhere. That is, what is called, if not good neighborliness, then at least the principles of decent coexistence. Now this stability is impossible. It was made so by the United States, whose authorities are now ready to fight to preserve their unipolar world at any cost. Regardless of the rules, or the interests of others, or even the principles of national security of the United States itself. The new stability rules are now different. And it's not just about giving up the diplomatic buffet. We are also talking about demonstrative freedom of hands. Moscow must have every opportunity to respond to escalation with escalation. Taking out from the Pandora's box opened by the Americans what was previously unacceptable. That is why Russia does not particularly object to the spread of rumors in the West that it allegedly has weapons to destroy the Western satellite constellation and is supposedly ready to use them. The next rule is “fortress Russia,” as Sergei Karaganov called it. Not autarky or Juche, but still self-reliance. And above all, on the emerging Russian patriotic society. The one that volunteers, helps the front and is ready to endure Western pressure without selling the country for jeans and chewing gum. The one thanks to which Russia survived the period of sanctions, but at the same time, the one with which the authorities must comply. Including our actions on the international stage. Finally, another rule is collectivity. Russia is betting on the formation of a multipolar world, which means its strategic stability must be built on broad compromises with non-Western great powers. If you like, a kind of “board of directors” of the multipolar world - China, India, Iran and other representatives of the “global south”. Yes, it is impossible to exclude the United States and Europe from global stability, but in conditions where they themselves are not ready to participate in the process, new contours can and should be formed without them. With those who are ready to seriously negotiate and who take a responsible approach to issues of global security. And if (or when) the moment comes and the United States and Europe change their attitude, then it will be possible to negotiate with them. But not at the buffet, but at the common table. |
| Posted by:badanov |