[LB] The Avdiyivka offensive operation under the command of the commander of the enemy troop group "Yug" and the defensive operation of the Tavriya anti-aircraft missile defense system led by General Tarnavskyi will still be investigated, but we can already look at the front prospects through the prism of the battles in the Avdiyivka area.
What is it, this Avdiev prism?
Let's start from the end - with the results of the sides of the confrontation: the enemy captured Avdiivka, and our "Tavria", accordingly, retreated.
Why?
by Viktor Kevlyuk
Center for Defense Strategies
The enemy concentrated the troops of the 2nd and 41st Armies, most of the troops of the 8th Army (the 1st AK of the so-called "DPR" a long time ago β a combination of the 8th Army and the 2nd AK " LPR") and the 90th tank division. The number at various stages of the operation was from 65,000 to 80,000 military personnel and about 10,000β12,000 reserves (mainly the formation of the backbone of the mobilization reserve, territorial troops, BARS, etc.).
There was also a significant advantage in the main types of weapons and military equipment: about 450 tanks, 1,300 BBM, 1,200 guns and up to 300 anti-aircraft guns. It is worth noting that the life-giving Javelin taught the enemy - and he created a reserve of equipment to quickly replenish losses: directly in the areas of concentration in the operational direction, the enemy kept up to 100 tanks, 220 BBM, up to 60 guns and 30 self-propelled guns. The choice of the 2nd and 41st armies, which were transferred to Avdiivka from the Lyman direction, can be explained by their relatively light composition - three brigades each, that is, it is much easier to maneuver them and provide them, and it is easier to achieve operational suddenness.
Russia began to reorder their army compositions in 2009, after reorganizing their army with the additions of brigades around 1989, something they had not done since WWII.
For comparison, the 90th TD was the last to be deployed (it is difficult to move 300 tanks from one direction to another and not get burned at the same time). Part of the forces of this division remained in the Lyman direction almost until the end of the Avdiiv operation. The 8th Army was near Avdiivka almost from the beginning of the invasion and only needed to restore combat capability.
ABOUT THE DEFENSE OPERATION IN AVDIIVKA. TIME TO DO MORE
For the first time, we saw the creation and implementation of air superiority, including air support for ground troops. Although the latter did not take place in the classic version - there were no advanced air gunners among the attacking infantry, but missile and bomb strikes were carried out clearly in the interests of the ground forces. The aviation component operating in the interests of the Yug Air Force had 182 combat aircraft, 147 helicopters, of which up to 70 were attack aircraft.
In order to cover the groups from our air strikes, an air defense system, echeloned in height and range, was deployed, while the density of means was almost twice the standard requirement.
The operation was materially and technically secured in advance, actively using communications, primarily the railway, which made it possible to create the necessary stocks, and for some items to exceed them by 10-20%. The rate of accumulation was quite high, because well-established logistics, well-laid rolling roads, minimization of the so-called "carriage shoulder", infrastructural facilities and transport hubs saved from destruction by our troops allowed the enemy to provide his troops with everything they needed. A side effect of a well-prepared infrastructure was the freedom to maneuver reserves from the rear to the front, and parallel to it. Our "Tavria" did not find any arguments to prevent this.
The enemy implemented a complex of operational camouflage measures. He moved six brigades and army sets of forces and equipment in a rolling, battalion-by-battalion manner, hiding the scale of the measures. He restored the combat capability of the units in the base areas of the armies in the operational zone of the "Center" military base, which was supposed to mislead the command of the "Tavria" and "Khortytsia" military bases at the same time.
This movement was accompanied by an information operation with a leading narrative about the intensification of the offensive in the Zaporizhzhia direction, where the troops from Luhansk region were allegedly transferred. But this strange "two to the south" was correctly read by our General Staff and the headquarters of Tavria, so in the future the enemy did not achieve operational suddenness of actions, even while simultaneously attacking in 14 directions. However, this happened somewhat later.
Use of the terrain: for the actions of the troops, the enemy command chose areas that allowed the widespread use of armored vehicles and other means of troop mobility (except for some). To this should be added the convenient starting position of the enemy's troops, already at the beginning of the operation they occupied a favorable covering position in relation to our forces. It was precisely to achieve this that a forming operation was carried out, which made it possible to reach the Vodyane-Opytne border and the Krasnohorivka district. In addition, the troops of the 1st AK regularly tried to reach convenient lines to the north and south of Avdiivka - in the direction of Krasnohorivka - Stepove, and from Vodyanyi and Opytny - to the southern outskirts of Avdiivka.
This was a short analysis of the organizational work of the headquarters of the enemy's air force "Yug", which should be evaluated as professional, because the enemy staff managed to create a decisive advantage in forces and means in the chosen directions.
A small interim conclusion β there are enough competent executors with a good vision of the operational zone in the headquarters of the enemy's troop groups, so identifying and destroying such objects is one of the priorities of our reconnaissance and strike systems.
I don't see the point in retelling the progress of the defense of Avdiyivka, we all watched it carefully not long ago, so let's immediately draw some conclusions.
WHY DID THE ENEMY SUCCEED?
β The enemy's command correctly identified the area on which the stability of the defense of the "Tavria" anti-aircraft defense system in the Avdiivka area - AKHZ depended, which the enemy bypassed from the east and southeast, took control of the communications of the defenders of the city. The enemy commander made a risky decision to advance through a narrow corridor between the positions of the "Tavria" self-propelled artillery units on the AKHZ and the sand pit, and, in addition, to engage in assault actions in the conditions of urban development. Subsequently, this decision made it possible to take the shortest route to the key area of ββdefense and achieve the overall success of the operation within two and a half weeks;
β With the experience of fighting in Azovstal, the "Yug" submarine, resting in Koksokhim, understood that it would get bogged down here in the same way as in Mariupol, so it began to look for another solution, how to attack head-on. Viewing the interactive maps allows you to see that the enemy started the operation as an encirclement operation, but his left (southern) flank rested on the AKHZ and stopped. It was this circumstance that prompted him to shift the direction of the main attack from the left flank to the right (northern), in the direction of Stepove β Berdychi and partly to the north of the sand quarry.
This is the first time in two years since the invasion that the enemy command has changed the direction of the main strike directly during the operation. There is an unpleasant feeling that this circumstance was not noticed by the headquarters of the "Tavria" OSUV in time, which is why it did not read the movement of the enemy's 15th and 21st OMBR to the north;
β The headquarters of the "Yug" military brigade managed to hide the regrouping of the 21st, 30th, 114th EMS Brigade and part of the troops of the 90th TD to the southeast of the AKHZ by means of active attacks by the 15th EMS Brigade on Berdychi, which pretended to attack Koksokhim from the north. These actions were supported by a sharp increase in the intensity of bomb attacks on the positions of the "Tavria" anti-aircraft missile defense system in this direction. At the same time, the enemy prevented the "Tavria" anti-aircraft defense system from maneuvering by intensifying the assault actions of units from the 1st AK, in particular, let's mention the well-known sewer breakthrough. Also here, the Russians deployed two-thirds of the available artillery group;
β The enemy clearly tried to penetrate the defense of the "Tavria" anti-aircraft missile defense system in the Avdiyivka region on the flanks, but for some reason the Defense Forces did not have the reserves to strengthen these directions, as well as the reserves to unblock the garrison, which could very well get into a much more difficult situation. The fact that the 3rd OShBr was transferred in time to Avdiivka, where it ensured the withdrawal of troops from the city, was clearly not foreseen by the Tavria defensive operation plan;
β The enemy is ready to pay an excessively high price in order to achieve the goal of the operation: to attack head-on in an unfavorable area, to overwhelm our positions with their own corpses, to advance 10-20 meters with meat assaults, etc.
The operational art of the commander of the enemy air defense system "Yug" allows us to state that the encirclement operation is today the main form of offensive operation and this experience is scaled to all other enemy air defense systems. The goals of the operation can be achieved in two ways β by pushing through the flanks (Bakhmut) or by a decisive strike in the direction of the gravity point, an area that ensures the stability of the entire defense system in the direction (Avdiivka).
NOW LET'S LOOK AT THE MAP:
- Kupyansk - continuous attempts of the enemy to attack our flanks in Synkivka and Tabaivka. Bakhmut script. A special feature is the Oskil River, on which the "Khortytsia" OSUV relies;
β Siversk β the pressure is still in three points: Dibrova, Bilogorivka, Spirne, but the enemy is deploying the main forces of the 2nd AK from Bakhmut in the direction of Siversk;
β Toretsk β two flanks, Bakhmut and Avdiivka (more precisely, Ocheretyne). As at the beginning of the Avdiyiv operation;
β Orikhov direction: flanks β Robotine and Verbove.
All this is either happening now or will start in the near future.
If you look into the prism from a certain distance, you can see the following:
β the encirclement of the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration β for a long time, at the end of the summer - in the fall, most likely, and as the direction of another strike in a strategic offensive operation. It will not be possible to take this area cheaply, but it is easy to bind a bunch of our troops there;
- Ugledar - to bypass from the north and develop success in the flank of the "Tavria" OSUV, crushing our entire southern front. I think at the end of the summer, simultaneously with the battles for Sloviansk β Kramatorsk.
But the purpose of all these actions is still not completely clear: the Russians have promised more than once to seize Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk and Kherson regions within their administrative borders, but such an operation will allow taking only Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia and Kherson regions, that is, not all, what they wanted Then why? Negotiations and peace on their terms? Maybe.
ABOUT STRATEGY. IT'S TIME FOR LIONS TO RISE
From there, there are two more points - there will be a mobilization in Russia, because more troops are needed. Our mobilization is already delayed by at least a month, and if the amendments to the legislation are adopted in May, the risk of losing and sitting down at the negotiating table not on our terms is growing before our eyes and many times over.