Comments

You have commented 358 times on Rantburg.

Your Name

Your e-mail (optional)

Website (optional)

	My Original Nic Pic-a-Nic Sorry. Comments have been closed on this article.
Foto

Submit your comments on this article

Terror Networks

Black flags over the Dark Continent. Who is the Russian Afrika Korps fighting with?

2024-05-21

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Kirill Semenov

[REGNUM] On May 15, ISIS reported attacks on local soldiers and the Wagner Group (as they still call all Russian forces) in Mali and Niger, including the bombing of 20 people on mines in eastern Niger and the hijacking of a Red Cross ambulance in the western part of this country.

Thus, the local branch of the terrorist organization is trying to demonstrate its activity in the region and at the moment is probably the main opponent of the Afrika Korps of the Russian Defense Ministry, which was deployed in a number of countries in the Sahel - a region also called the “Greater Sahara”.

There is a whole mosaic of terrorist groups and organizations operating here that oppose local governments. But the main role is played by two terrorist organizations: in addition to the one indicated, Al-Qaeda. They have integrated smaller factions and are still present in many countries in the region, despite attempts to combat them (or imitate it) by anti-terrorist forces led by the United States and France.

Therefore, Western forces are leaving this part of Africa today, in many countries of which new governments have come to power.

AFRIKA KORPS, THE TURKISH FACTOR AND FIRST SUCCESSES
The Russians are acting in Africa not to impose enslaving agreements on local governments, as the Americans and French did, but only to ensure security from international terrorism, preventing its spread throughout the region and the world.

Just the sheer noble goodness of their pure Russian hearts, is it? Kewl.

The countries of the European Union and the United States are unable to provide such assistance. They make assistance programs for Africans conditional on compliance with a number of conditions. Firstly, from the promotion of “democratic reforms” and “human rights”, secondly, from the participation of local authorities in the fight against illegal migration in the interests of the EU, and thirdly, from obligations to counteract Russian influence in the region.

Russia does not make such demands and is ready to provide assistance to either a military or civilian government, democratic or Islamic, only in order to prevent terrorist leaders from taking the place of this government.

However, Western countries and Russia are not the only external players in the region.

For example, in Niger, the piquancy of the situation is added by the fact that, according to Syrian opposition sources, a group of 300 fighters of anti-government Syrian formations from the Sultan Murad, Al-Hamza and Suleiman Shah groups, operating under under the auspices of Turkey.

According to sources, they are in Niger to help the new government of this country in the fight against terrorism after it asked the Americans to “exit”.

In addition, Ankara supplies Bayraktar drones to Mali and Burkina Faso, where Russian units also operate. Therefore, it is possible that Africa will become a field of cooperation between Russia and Turkey in the counter-terrorism field.

Cooperation or opposition, given that those groups are wholly owned subsidiaries of the Turkish government. Interesting times, guys — do try to see the amusing side of this little project you’ve taken on after encouraging the locals to push out France and America.

Since the deployment of the Afrika Korps in the Greater Sahara, local armed forces have been able to achieve important successes in countering terrorists. Most notably, in April, Malian government forces killed Abu Huzeifa, a local ISIS affiliate commander, in a large-scale operation in the northern Menaka region.

And earlier this year, the Burkina Faso Air Force, where Russian forces and advisers are also deployed, killed the second-most senior leader of ISIS in the Greater Sahara, Abdulmalik Haroun Oulel, as a result of an air strike on a convoy. It is a major victory for Burkina Faso's army and a sign that the country's recent military-led modernization campaign, led by Russia, is allowing them to more effectively target jihadists.

FULANI, SAHRAWI AND TUAREG
It is significant that Abdulmalik came from the new generation of ISIS-BS leaders, since he was a native of the region and a representative of the local Fulani people, semi-sedentary inhabitants of the Sahel, who were discriminated against by local governments. Therefore, the Fulani often joined the ranks of terrorists and constituted the majority in their ranks. This applies to both ISIS and al-Qaeda.

The two previous ISIS leaders in the region with the corresponding surname al-Sahrawi (i.e. "Sahrawis") were from Western Sahara and Morocco and had previously operated in Algeria before retreating to the Sahel, where they led local Fulani militias.

In October 2015, Adnan Abu al-Walid al-Sahrawi, a jihadist fighter originally from Morocco, along with several supporters from the Mourabitoun group operating in Algeria and Mali and associated with al-Qaeda, pledged allegiance to " Islamic State".

However, at that time the activities of Abu al-Walid’s group in Africa went almost unnoticed. This was also related to the delay in recognition of this branch by the “headquarters” of the terrorists, which took place only in 2017. And when this group was nevertheless included in the “caliphate”, it was first reassigned to the branch of “ISIS - West Africa velayat”, from which “ISIS in the Greater Sahara” remains dependent to this day, despite recognition as an independent factions.

During those years, the dominant jihadist organization in the Sahel was Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). It has carried out terrorist attacks as far away as Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso, and Grand Bassam in Côte d'Ivoire.

Back in 1998, Hassan Khattab, the commander of one of the scattered extremist units during the “black decade” (civil war) in Algeria, formed his own organization called the “Salafi Group of Preaching and Combat.”

In 2006, its leadership joined the global al-Qaeda network and swore allegiance to Bin Laden. A few months later, they renamed themselves Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The group then moved its activities from Algeria to the Sahel, primarily to Mali.

AQIM was able to unite several disparate groups in the north and central part of Mali, including the remnants of the Mourabitun movement. Then, in early March 2017, an organization associated with AQIM, Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), appeared. In it, in addition to the Fulani, who make up the majority in ISIS, there are also Tuaregs, along with their Salafi-jihadist group “Ansar al-Sunna”.

"SAHEL PHENOMENON"
Unlike the Syrian-Iraqi conflict arc, where ISIS waged an irreconcilable fight not only with Iraqi and Syrian government forces, but also with its competitors from Al-Qaeda, in the Greater Sahara, the dominant JNIM tried to maintain friendly relations with ISIS -BS.

In the expert community, such relations between the two groups were defined as the “Sahel phenomenon” or “Sahel exception”: local factions of the two largest terrorist groups were able to move in parallel courses for some time without coming into conflict with each other.

The ideas of reconciliation with ISIS (contrary to the general course of Al-Qaeda) were promoted by three AQIM field commanders.

The first of them, al-Humam, was known for openly supporting the Paris terrorist attacks on November 13, 2015.

The second, Abu Iyad al-Tunisi, leader of the Ansar al-Sharia group and member of the AQIM Shura, believed that ISIS could be “returned to the right path.” A noticeable number of his yesterday's recruits from Ansar al-Sharia were already in the ranks of the organization in Syria, and some occupied important positions.

Both were killed by French troops on February 21, 2019 in Elak, north of Timbuktu.

The third AQIM commander who tried to get closer to ISIS, Abu Yahya al-Jazairi, was killed during an attack on Malian armed forces in Bamba on April 6, 2020.

After this, the two groups moved on to open confrontation.

In 2020, ISIS invaded JNIM-controlled territories, committed atrocities against civilians (potentially alienating locals from the jihadist movement itself), and demonstrated the ability to overshadow JNIM activities with terrorist attacks.

The weakening of JNIM and the strengthening of ISIS in the Sahel was also facilitated by the fact that the then government of Mali began negotiations with prominent Tuareg JNIM leaders and openly announced this. These negotiations split the ranks of AQIM/JNIM and pushed its most radical elements to join ISIS.

A significant part of the Tuaregs also left the JNIM, moving to the more moderate group “High Council for the Unity of Azawad”, which does not share the jihadist views of Al-Qaeda.

As a result, the Mali government refused to negotiate not only with radical jihadists, but also with Tuareg rebel groups and moderate Islamists. This caused great displeasure in Algeria, which actively lobbied for the peace process and blamed “the machinations of the UAE” for its failure.

As a result, the failure of the negotiation process led to certain groups of the local population calling on the “jihadists” to unite with each other again.

UNITY ON ETHNIC GROUNDS
The combination of ISIS and AQIM/DNIM could create new risks not only for local governments, but also for the Russian military present in the Sahel countries. Let us recall that it was Russian PMCs (Wagner) that played the main role in the capture of Kidal in Mali in November 2023.

After this, they started talking about the possibilities of restoring ties between ISIS and AQIM/DNIM. Then a new group appeared on the scene: Wahdat al-Muslimin (Unity of Muslims), which called on warring terrorist organizations to unite against common enemies “to preserve the blood of Muslims.”

Wahdat al-Muslimeen is not a jihadist group per se, but rather a pro-jihadist (or simply anti-government) propaganda group that seeks to unite ISIS and AQIM/JNIM to fight local armies and their allies, including those from Russia.

This group is associated with local Fulani communities in the triangle between Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. As already noted, representatives of this nationality feel alienated and stigmatized by the armies of the three countries in which they live. The local military often baselessly accuses all Fulanis of having links with terrorists, bringing down repression on them and thereby facilitating the transition of many Fulanis to these organizations.

Therefore, as both JNIM and ISIS-BS become more and more “Fulani” in their ethnic composition (Tuaregs, on the contrary, tend to move into more moderate groups), the threat of unification of the two groups on an ethnic basis remains.

This is an important example of the fact that any actions of the Russian military in Africa must be provided with appropriate expert and diplomatic support, taking into account all regional specifics and ethnic diversity.

The argument that since a certain group has raised this or that terrorist flag, it must be destroyed is not always adequate to local conditions. In reality, such a group can go through a whole chain of “ideological rebirths,” pursuing not religious, but purely tribal goals and objectives, and simply looking for allies among those who are able to protect this tribe or ethnic group from repression and discrimination.

This applies not only to the Fulani, but also to the Tuareg.

Terrorism in the Sahel is still identified with the Tuareg movement. Indeed, jihadist groups and Tuaregs fighting against states in the region are sometimes forced to cooperate with each other. However, jihadists and Tuaregs still should not be identified. They are temporary fellow travelers, sharply diverging in their ultimate goals.

Previously, jihadists had repeatedly knocked out the Tuaregs from their bases, and the Tuaregs, as noted, moved into more moderate movements.

In this regard, information about the nature of certain groups and factions coming from local authorities and the military must be carefully checked. Often, under the pretext of fighting terrorism, groups that are not related to terrorist activities can also be “purged.”

Instead of gaining new supporters in the fight against terrorism, this may lead to increased support for the terrorists themselves from ethnic groups subject to various forms of discrimination.

Posted by:badanov

00:00