Text by Russian military journalist Boris Rozhin;
[ColonelCassad] Expert of the Center for Military-Political Journalism, author of the Telegram channel @boris_rozhin Boris Rozhin
While the United States has either allowed, or has not allowed, or is about to allow the use of long-range missiles on Russian territory, it is high time to speculate on what options there may be. From my point of view, this is a strategic inevitability caused by the West's desire to turn the tide of the war in Ukraine, since the Ukrainian Armed Forces are inexorably losing territory, personnel, and equipment. Having consistently gone through all the stages of the escalation track, the United States and NATO have come close to the next step, namely, strikes deep into Russia from Ukrainian territory.
Since 2022, I have been confident that everything below the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons can and will be used in Ukraine. The West considers the sovereign policy of the Russian Federation an existential threat to the late Washington world order, and it will try to eliminate this threat by any means necessary. Therefore, the approach to the brink of a nuclear war with direct strikes against Russia fits perfectly into this paradigm. It is important to understand that the enemy is not thinking about how to end the war through negotiations, but about how to win it by military and other means. Not to understand this means being a prisoner of illusions about the enemy's intentions.
The US is confident that Moscow will not use nuclear weapons in this case either, and if so, then there is no reason not to shell Russian territory from Ukrainian territory, causing Russia various damage. Therefore, the question of transferring such missiles (and it is quite possible that they have already been delivered and are awaiting political approval, as was the case with the deliveries of missiles for HIMARS, ATACMS, Storm Shadow) is most likely not worth it, since the missiles are probably already on Ukrainian territory.
Of course, a significant portion of long-range missiles (https://russian.rt.com/ussr/news/1367301-ukraina-atacms-rashod) will be shot down, as HIMARS, ATACMS, Storm Shadow, SCALP-EG missiles and so on are shot down. But some percentage may reach their targets, and we must be prepared for this.
We must prepare for these attacks in advance by implementing measures to disperse aircraft, disaggregate ammunition depots, and ensure the security of headquarters and command posts, as was done in the case of the threat from other long-range enemy weapons. Of course, it is necessary to continue to build up the capabilities of operational-tactical and object air defense, including in the context of combating long-range missiles of Western manufacture.
Will these missiles change the overall dynamics of hostilities in Ukraine? No, they will not. Just as the deliveries of the same ATACMS or the deliveries of F-16 aircraft did not change it. Of course, despite any damage that the enemy will try to inflict, the Russian Armed Forces will continue offensive operations in Ukraine, and targets on its territory will be subjected to increasingly powerful fire damage.
Autumn will be hot.