by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] The Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), formed after the fall of Damascus, is gradually resetting contacts with its former allies, in particular, Qatar.
A high-level delegation of Qatari diplomats visited Damascus on Sunday to “finalize preparations” for the opening of the country’s embassy. After 13 years, Doha, which supported the Syrian opposition “from afar,” is officially returning to Syria, giving the new authorities a chance to strengthen their international status.
However, despite the warm welcome, other allies of yesterday's opposition have their own plans for developing ties with the "new Syria." And here Qatar will have to show some urgency to keep up with its competitors.
FRIENDS OF THE OPPOSITION
In 2011, Doha froze relations with Damascus in response to "repressive measures" taken by the government of Bashar al-Assad to suppress mass protests.
In addition, the Qatari authorities quickly established channels of communication with the armed opposition in Syria: in 2013, their first “diplomatic mission” in the region opened on Qatari territory.
Individual Qatari philanthropists provided financial support to the “born of the revolution” by launching special charity projects and supplying food and supplies to Idlib, which is controlled by anti-government forces.
However, the fact of support for the opposition and the reduced level of diplomatic relations with official Damascus did not prevent Qatari business from consistently developing the Syrian market.
By mid-2024, at least two Qatari banks, several dozen large technology and trading firms, as well as a large number of small and medium-sized enterprises were operating in Syria (at the representative office level).
Moreover, during the diplomatic crisis (2017–2021), when Qatar found itself politically isolated by most of its Arab partners, the Syrian market turned into one of the “windows” that allowed Doha to bypass the economic blockade and keep its own exports afloat.
The fall of the Assad regime gives Qatar the opportunity to take economic cooperation with Syria to a new level and take over a part of the market that was previously controlled by other players, such as the Iranians.
Given its solid economic background, Doha has every chance of taking the position of one of the leading partners of the “new Syria” – especially in light of the willingness of Qatari leaders to unfreeze investment programs for the post-war reconstruction of Syria.
Another opportunity that has opened up for Qatar is the revival of the joint gas pipeline project with the Turks through Syrian territory, which was “cut short” at one time due to the fundamental disagreement of the Assad government.
The new Syrian authorities are showing interest in the project, seeing it as an opportunity to strengthen not only their international prestige, but also their local power, and are ready to provide their partners with every possible assistance.
Of course, Qatar is showing much less zeal here than its ally Turkey (the key beneficiary of the project) – for Doha, the gas pipeline project still looks like a “side project”. Especially considering that over the past decade, the country has been consistently building up its gas fleet, making seaborne LNG deliveries its “calling card”.
At the same time, the opportunity to strengthen influence on official Damascus through smart investments in infrastructure is interpreted positively by the Qatari government.
THERE ARE OTHER PEOPLE WHO WANT TO
Despite the intensive dialogue between Doha and Damascus and the mutual desire to take relations to a new level, Qatar is far from the only contender for a leading role in the development of the “new Syria.” And, more importantly, it is not the only major sponsor of yesterday’s opposition.
Turkey is pulling the blanket over itself, in whose eyes Doha is still a “junior partner” in the alliance of the two countries, and therefore can only act in Syria as a supporter of Turkish foreign policy plans.
There is a rationale for such claims. Ankara was among the first to initiate a discussion about unfreezing and increasing foreign investment in the “new Syria”; it was also at its instigation that the forgotten gas pipeline project returned to the forefront.
In addition, Turkey was among the first to launch a discussion on the possible rehabilitation of the representatives of the “Idlib freebooters” and the removal of the terrorist organization label from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham* (HTS*). It is not surprising that, with so many efforts, Ankara demands that the new Syrian authorities prioritize their interests.
In addition, Qatar's neighbors on the Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, will not allow Qatar's influence in Syria to grow too strong. And this is not just a matter of economic interests, although Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are not averse to developing new niches in local markets.
The Arabian monarchies still suspect Doha of secret sympathies for Iran and fear that Qatar will try (through the new Syrian authorities) to maintain the Iranian transit corridor through Syria, thereby creating new threats to Arabian interests in Iraq and Lebanon.
Finally, Qatar's position inside Syria is affected by the deepening contradictions between factions of the new Syrian government. The disagreements that have been accumulating since the "Idlib liberties" have only intensified with the fall of Damascus (although they are carefully hidden from the eyes of external partners).
And despite the fact that Doha is currently trying to build relations with the PSS as a whole, without singling out any specific party or group, sooner or later it will have to choose a favorite.
True, the longer Qatar takes a wait-and-see position, the fewer factions in the new government are left without a strong external patron. And Doha is not in the mood to “beat off” someone else’s creature – at least for now.