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[ColonelCassad] About the corps structure of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Using materials from colleagues Z committee and ZVI Search Engine, we summarized all available information about the new corps system of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, about the reforms of which we wrote in Military Maps.
The point is this: in addition to various reforms such as reducing taxes for military-industrial complex enterprises, recruiting through impressment, the Armed Forces of Ukraine still reached the finalized corps system.
In 2023, before the counteroffensive, the enemy created two army corps - 9th and 10th. Then they included an average of five brigades, and they were the striking force, which was lost in attempts to advance in the Zaporizhzhya direction.
This five brigade structure follows a 1980s Soviet experiment at the height of the Afghanistan intervention, whereby Soviet planners mixed armor and mechanized rifles into the pattern of three for one type and two for the other.
In addition to them, there was a reserve corps, where the 5th OTBR was supposed to be the basis, but it did not work out. It was torn apart, which subsequently became commonplace. Now the new reform even bans such practices.
So, the corps.
The 9th Army Corps now, according to information from open sources, consists of three brigades: the 33rd and 47th Separate Motorized Brigade, as well as the 3rd Separate Airborne Brigade.
Thus, mirroring to a limited extent the corps structure the Russian Army currently uses.
The 10th Army Corps also consists of three formations: the 116th and 118th Separate Motorized Brigade, and the recently reformed 117th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade.
The 11th Army Corps is the largest for now. It has ten brigades. This is due to the fact that it was previously a reserve corps, and all brigades that were sent for full manning were assigned to it.
The 12th Army Corps is a new corps. There is not even information about who will join it. And it seems that some of the formations of the 11th Army Corps will be transferred to it. This will be logical for the operational manning of the 12th Army Corps.
In addition, there is the 30th Naval Infantry Corps. Its composition has also recently undergone changes. The 150th Separate Motorized Brigade became the 40th Separate Coastal Defense Brigade (OCBR). In addition, it has the 39th Separate Brigade of Defense, which will most likely be created on the basis of the 124th Separate Brigade of TerO.
This follows the pattern of Soviet structures for coastal-operational units. It likely is task-organized and temporary.
Separately, TerO consists of local levies and partially trained militia.
The 7th Corps of the Airborne Assault Forces includes all airmobile and airborne assault units. Almost all of them are fighting in various areas, so they have a huge turnover.
In general, the structure of the Armed Forces of Ukraine has changed radically. If we evaluate it by combat capabilities, the most important improvement is the creation of separate lines of command that are independent of each other.
That is, each corps, or rather the command, can make decisions independently. This simplifies both replenishment, staffing, and the conduct of hostilities, since they do not wait for a decision from Kiev. In conflicts of such intensity, this is a key factor.
Brigades by definition normally maneuver, fight, and supply as independent units in the Russian Army.
Separate battalions of UAVs and BEKs deserve special attention. Priority staffing, large financing and PR are important changes in the context of the growing importance of this weapon.