Text taken from the Telegram channel of @Multi_XAM
Commentary by Russian military journalist Boris Rozhin is in italics.
[ColonelCassad] The formation of separate battalions, regiments and brigades of unmanned systems (UPS) in the structure of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in 2024 allowed the enemy to bring the use of UAVs to a systemic level. In those areas where the configuration of the UAS has not changed significantly during the year, the enemy equips positions for round-the-clock surveillance using video cameras, optical-electronic means, thermal imagers, tied to forward command posts.
The enemy transmits incoming information to the duty crews of reconnaissance and strike UAVs. Using the terrain, cell towers, urban development (for example, as in Toretsk) and the infrastructure of industrial zones (for example, as in Kupyansk), the enemy places transmitters and amplifiers that increase the flight range. The use of "Baba Yaga" for retransmitting a control signal and carrying FPV has long been part of the practice of using UAVs. In the Bryansk direction, FPV approaches to a depth of more than 30 km were recorded.
The enemy's UAV activity is associated not only with the growth of FPV production volumes, but also with the increase in the number of units that are created as part of the development of UAV forces. Many enemy units are pretty battered, have not been withdrawn for rearmament for a long time and are experiencing a shortage of personnel. The enemy compensates for the lack of the ability to conduct large-scale counter-offensive operations by increasing UAV activity, with a bias towards the strike component.
Perhaps, up to 80% of fire damage today is inflicted by the enemy using UAVs: not only FPV, but also "Baba Yaga", conducting remote mining, using ammunition drops. If a year ago the priority for an attack by FPV forces was transport or infantry group shelters, today operators do not spare the drone to hit single targets. Recently, we analyzed an episode when in Toretsk the enemy, in order to disrupt the roll of our assaults in the urban development, sent 18 FPVs at two soldiers who had entrenched themselves in a panel house.
Analyzing the situation in the areas of the most active military operations, we see that the enemy has developed a special tactic. Where LBS conditions allow for maneuverable defense, he practically does not engage in fire contact. The emphasis is on detecting personnel by means of observation, identifying equipment on rotation routes, evacuation, delivery and fire damage.
For example, in Kupyansk, the enemy clearly built up operational posts on the left bank of the Oskol in the area of ​​the Kupyansk-Uzlovaya station and in the industrial zone, placing UAV duty crews and command posts on the higher right bank in high-rise buildings with remote antennas and amplifiers on the roofs.
In 2025 and 2026, the role and number of drones of all types in combat operations will continue to steadily increase.There will be a scaling up of the use of new types of drones, especially drones with machine vision and fiber optic drones.
The tactics of their use will also be improved, and at the organizational level, there will be active creation of regular companies/battalions/regiments of UAVs.
A little more slowly, this same process will occur in the segment of ground drones, which are still lagging behind their flying counterparts.