by Kamran Gasanov
[REGNUM] The curtailment of Iran's presence in Syria brought Israel great relief, since the loss of Damascus deprived Tehran of both access to Hezbollah in bordering Lebanon and a powerful trump card to put pressure on Tel Aviv.
However, after the change of power in Damascus in December 2024, Iran was replaced by an equally formidable adversary: Türkiye.
| Possibly not equally formidable, though they certainly would like to be. What say you, O Rantburg experts? |
The commission members believe that it is capable of unleashing a proxy war against the Jewish state through the Palestinian movement Hamas and the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)* group.
Israel has had reasons to worry since the war in the Gaza Strip escalated. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan not only began accusing the Israeli leadership of genocide and imposed an economic embargo, but also began openly threatening to create an “Islamic coalition” and send in troops.
The rise to power in Damascus of HTS* and Ahmed al-Sharaa, whose main ally was Ankara, brought Turkey and Syria closer together. Now the Turkish military is settling in Syrian military bases and modernizing them, including the Tiyas (T4) base, where the Israelis used to bomb Iranian formations stationed there.
Israel does not like the fact that Turkish air defenses can restrict the freedom of movement of its aircraft, and in general the emergence of another Islamist regime in addition to Hamas and Hezbollah is alarming Benjamin Netanyahu and his right-wing ministers.
In the context of the ongoing conflict in Gaza, the strengthening of Syria with the help of Turkey deprives Israel of the advantage that arose in early December 2024.
Netanyahu has made it clear several times that no military presence – neither Syrian nor, especially, Turkish – south of Damascus (the provinces of Daraa, Quneitra and As-Suwayda) is permissible.
Israel needs a buffer zone, to achieve which it began to support the Syrian Druze in their confrontation with the forces of Al-Sharaa.
Israel's determination has been demonstrated at least three times.
The first time was during the overthrow of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, when the IDF occupied a buffer zone in the Golan Heights.
The second time was in early April, when Israeli airstrikes hit military targets in Homs, Hama and Damascus, including the T4 base.
And the third time was from April 30 to May 2, when targets near the presidential palace in the Syrian capital, as well as in Latakia, Hama and Daraa were bombed. These strikes were linked to support for the Druze, and Netanyahu sent a “clear signal” to al-Sharaa that his troops were not allowed to advance south.
All three operations were harshly criticized by Ankara, which accused Israel of violating the integrity of Syria and occupying it.
| President Erdogan has criticized Israel of many harsh things over the past two decades, none of which were true. The real accusation is that the uppity Jewish state dares to consider itself equal, dares to resist being properly conquered as Allah assuredly must have intended. |
In April, US President Donald Trump tried to act as a mediator between Erdogan and Netanyahu, calling on the latter to show prudence.
After Netanyahu's visit to Washington, the Israeli army did bomb the future Turkish bases, but a week later, on April 10, representatives of the Turkish and Israeli defense ministries held a meeting in Baku.
They made no progress, but the very fact of negotiations gave hope for some kind of mutual understanding and de-escalation.
Moreover, Netanyahu was supposed to arrive in Baku for a five-day visit in the first week of May. Erdogan was also supposed to arrive there.
There were rumors that Azerbaijan, as an ally of both Turkey and Israel, would be able to organize a meeting between their leaders. However, just days before the trip, Turkey refused to provide airspace for Netanyahu's plane to fly over. The Israeli prime minister himself postponed the trip, formally due to events in Gaza and Syria.
According to sources of The Associated Press, the Israeli cabinet approved a plan to expand the military operation in Gaza with a full occupation of the Palestinian enclave. And for this purpose, tens of thousands of reservists were called up to the army. And in Syria, the Israelis carried out more airstrikes, allegedly to protect the oppressed Druze.
The fragile Turkish-Israeli normalization has stalled almost before it began. Erdogan has accused Israel of provoking a new intra-Syrian conflict and said he is watching to see “what steps it will take or plans to take with respect to Turkey.”
A new large-scale operation in Gaza, fraught with a humanitarian catastrophe (as the UN warned), the deportation of Palestinians and the occupation of the enclave, will further aggravate the situation between Turkey and Israel.
| That’s because Turkey wants Hamas to win and Israel to be conquered. |
But Trump, a good friend of Erdogan and Netanyahu, may well let off some steam in the region. He will visit the Gulf states in the second week of May. On his way there or back, he may call on both the Israeli prime minister and the Turkish president.
Trump recently had another phone call with Erdogan and agreed to promote stability in Gaza, Syria and Ukraine. Trump does not want his regional allies to quarrel.
Calm relations between Israel and Turkey, coupled with rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, will strengthen the hand of US Special Envoy Steven Witkoff in negotiations with Iran.
So Trump will continue to try to reconcile the two rivals. Israel is awaiting his visit and at the same time fearing the reaction to the new operation in Gaza. According to media reports, it will not begin until the head of the White House's Middle East tour. And on May 12, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth will arrive in Israel .
Trump has already proven that he can persuade and pressure Netanyahu during the Hamas-Israel deal. He also has something to pressure Turkey with - the F35 deal, sanctions and tariffs.
But judging by the dialogue with Netanyahu in the US, where Trump demanded prudence from him, the American needs Ankara more than Tel Aviv. And that is why he recently decided to reduce the American military presence in Deir ez-Zor. And thus helped Erdogan take another step towards “zeroing out” the theoretically possible Kurdish autonomy.
As for Russia, despite the overthrow of Assad, the initiative and advantages in the region have not yet been lost. Russia has entered into direct dialogue with Damascus and held a meeting at the level of representatives of the special services in Baku in April. Al-Sharaa is in no hurry to curtail the Russian military presence.
Moscow is also consulting with Turkey, while maintaining dialogue with both Palestine and Israel. Russia's strong point is also its support for Iran.
| I’m not sure that’s exactly a strong point — Russia used to support Syria, and look where that got everyone. |
The current American leadership is more inclined to cooperate with Russia than to push it out of the Middle East.
So a potential reconciliation between Turkey and Israel with Trump's participation, which has yet to be achieved, will not necessarily have any negative consequences for Russia.