| See here for counterpoint referenced at the bottom of this piece. |
[VoxDay] The End of Airpower Confirmed
Simplicius observes how the US failure in the Red Sea has underlined the lessons of the NATO-Russian war.
The US is unable to safely conduct operations near even Yemen’s airspace, with its so-called ‘rudimentary’ air defenses. F-35s—claimed to be ‘the most advanced fighter jets ever assembled’—are unable to safely operate without being detected. What do you think it could be that’s allowing the Houthis to detect “invisible” F-35s to such an extent as to fire on them, causing evasive maneuvers? Is it hand-me-down Iranian radars, which themselves are likely hand-me-down Russian ones? How would the vaunted F-35s and B-2s handle the far larger and superior national Iranian AD network if they can’t even handle the Houthi one?
The costs of that complete failure have been staggering:
He proposed an eight- to 10-month campaign in which Air Force and Navy warplanes would take out Houthi air defense systems. Then, he said, U.S. forces would mount targeted assassinations modeled on Israel’s recent operation against Hezbollah, three U.S. officials said.
Saudi officials backed General Kurilla’s plan and provided a target list of 12 Houthi senior leaders whose deaths, they said, would cripple the movement. But the United Arab Emirates, another powerful U.S. ally in the region, was not so sure. The Houthis had weathered years of bombings by the Saudis and the Emiratis.
By early March, Mr. Trump had signed off on part of General Kurilla’s plan — airstrikes against Houthi air defense systems and strikes against the group’s leaders. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth named the campaign Operation Rough Rider.
At some point, General Kurilla’s eight- to 10-month campaign was given just 30 days to show results.
In those first 30 days, the Houthis shot down seven American MQ-9 drones (around $30 million each), hampering Central Command’s ability to track and strike the militant group. Several American F-16s and an F-35 fighter jet were nearly struck by Houthi air defenses, making real the possibility of American casualties, multiple U.S. officials said. That possibility became reality when two pilots and a flight deck crew member were injured in the two episodes involving the F/A-18 Super Hornets, which fell into the Red Sea from the aircraft carrier Harry S. Truman within 10 days of each other…
But the cost of the operation was staggering. The Pentagon had deployed two aircraft carriers, additional B-2 bombers and fighter jets, as well as Patriot and THAAD air defenses, to the Middle East, officials acknowledged privately. By the end of the first 30 days of the campaign, the cost had exceeded $1 billion, the officials said.
So many precision munitions were being used, especially advanced long-range ones, that some Pentagon contingency planners were growing increasingly concerned about overall stocks and the implications for any situation in which the United States might have to ward off an attempted invasion of Taiwan by China.
And through it all, the Houthis were still shooting at vessels and drones, fortifying their bunkers and moving weapons stockpiles underground.
Airpower as it has been conventionally understood is over. Anti-air defenses are only going to improve, given the pressures created by drone warfare, and what can shoot down a tiny, agile drone is usually going to be able to take down a much larger, much less agile jetfighter.
| And yet the Houthis did not manage to shoot down the Israelis on their bombing runs, admittedly fewer though they were. Neither did Iran, nor Syria, which suggests a flaw somewhere in the analysis — not that I have any idea where… |
|