Summary written by Konstantin Strigunov.
For all their equipment and uniforms I would classify Mexican cartel armed group as militia/mercenaries. Low quality, poorly trained and poorly led, with their regulars defending a fat paycheck.
[ColonelCassad] Over the past decades, economically motivated criminal organizations have undergone a long evolutionary path, achieving the potential to pose a threat to the territorial integrity of the state, thereby acquiring the characteristics of entities with de facto political goals. As V.N. Lunin notes in his work, "the drug business as an organic component of modern united criminal groups constantly gravitates toward politicization of its activities and structures, striving in the long term to create a kind of narco-terrorist quasi-state."
At the same time, D.V. Morozov is skeptical about this possibility, since, in his opinion, "practice shows that drug structures prefer to exercise territorial control indirectly ‒ through legally operating government structures. This allows drug cartels to rule while remaining in the shadows."
On the other hand, as the author showed using the example of Mexico and Brazil, upon reaching a sufficiently high level of development, drug trafficking is capable of exercising forceful control over territories, without which they are unable to achieve economic goals, including sufficient provision of themselves with resources. Since territorial control means a threat to national security, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state, then in this case the economic and de facto political goals of the PO are indistinguishable and inseparable from each other. Therefore, a criminal group, for example, a gang or a cartel, acts as a criminal insurgent, which is a participant in a criminal rebellion, which differs from conventional terrorism and rebellion.
This difference is that the only political motive of criminal insurgents is to obtain autonomy and economic control over the territory. As A. Bustamante notes in his work, criminal insurgent movements are non-state actors with a high level of hierarchical organization based on networks or nodes, whose combat capabilities allow them to make abrupt changes within the structures of the state.
The goal of this is to parasitize on ungoverned territories and maintain territorial control over a settlement of strategic importance for the continuation of their illegal operations. It should be noted that criminal rebellion is sometimes considered a type of commercial rebellion. Supporters of the approach according to which highly developed criminal organizations should be considered as criminal rebels include, in particular, J. Sullivan, R. Bunker and M. Manwaring. Thus, R. Bunker considered developed Mexican cartels such as Los Zetas and Los Caballeros Templarios as new military formations that use “criminal soldiers”, becoming a direct threat to the integrity of the Mexican state where they operate.
The researcher notes that while the original basis of criminal rebellion is
rebellion has an economic origin, the cartels themselves, which have created hundreds of "zones of impunity" (that is, free from state influence), are considered as effectively politicized subjects. This approach is also shared by M. Manwaring and J. Sullivan. Another researcher, J. Mendizabal, notes that criminal rebellion is not aimed at overthrowing governments or imposing any ideology. On the contrary, its goal is to provoke an extremely violent struggle against the state to obtain autonomy and economic benefits from its criminal activities in conditions of complete impunity, freeing itself from all types of state control.
Thus, a criminal rebellion is an organized violent action of criminal organizations with a selfish motivation, which in the process of their evolution achieve such an organizational, personnel and resource potential, at which they are able to de facto achieve political goals through forceful territorial control and infiltration into the state apparatus, demonopolizing the state's right to socially sanctioned use of force, thereby creating a threat to its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
There are a number of factors that contribute to the emergence of a criminal rebellion, ranging from control over drug production and drug trafficking, which provides colossal resources for the criminal organization, to the fragmentation of criminal groups, sometimes leading to their organizational complication. This happened in Colombia after the liquidation of the Medellin and Cali Cartels, as shown in the work of M. Kenny, and in Mexico, where, as researchers from the Institute of Latin American Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences note in a collective monograph, the fragmentation process was accompanied by a redistribution of territory and property between cartels. This process was influenced by the militarization of the criminal organization.
The main idea of this study is that the militarization of criminal organizations contributes to a radical organizational complication and growth of their integral potential, as a result of which these actors can already take part in a criminal rebellion, having escaped state control and replacing the state in its individual territories.
The work shows that, although the militarization of crime in itself is not a new phenomenon and is quite widespread, since the leaders of many criminal organizations want to take advantage of the skills and knowledge of people with military and police experience or experience in the special services, such co-optation does not always lead to organizational transformations of groups that allow them to challenge the power of the state in certain territories and act as a subject of criminal rebellion.
For example, in traditional criminal communities, the involvement of individuals with military and operational experience allows for more sophisticated operations in drug trafficking, smuggling, financial crimes, etc. Thus, in the USA, Europe, and in the countries of the former Soviet Union, there are known examples of former military personnel and former law enforcement officers being involved in criminal activities by OCG leaders. However, these groups do not pose a threat to the territorial integrity of states.
The situation changes dramatically when the militarization of criminal organizations becomes widespread, as is the case in some countries in Latin America and the Caribbean in the context of weakening state institutions. In such cases, criminal organizations are not only trained in more complex operations and schemes, but are also able to challenge state power in a certain territory, forcing governments to respond not only with police forces, but also with troops. Consequently, all the prerequisites are created for an internal armed conflict (IAC) in the form of a criminal rebellion, when the militarization of the PI acts as part of a complex of factors of organizational transformations of groups, due to which these violent actors are able to undermine state sovereignty and violate its territorial integrity. PR in such an IAC act as de facto political subjects.
The key features of an IAC are:
1) ) achieving the necessary level of intensity of violence
2) the presence of organization of the parties to the conflict.
We determine the level of intensity of violence on the basis of the classification of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, according to which a conflict is considered insignificant if the number of deaths is from 25 to 1,000 people per year, and over 1,000 - corresponds to a war.
The threshold of organization is a set of a number of indicators, while the party to the IAC can correspond to only some of them, including the presence of a command structure and disciplinary rules, control of territory, access to weapons or military equipment, recruitment of recruits.
The purpose of this paper is to show, using the example of a number of Latin American gangs and cartels, the militarization of these POs as a factor in their transformation into de facto political subjects of criminal rebellion and participants in the VVK.
CO-OPTATION OF FIGHTERS OF SECURITY AGENCIES AND EX-COMBATANTS OF REBEL FORMATIONS INTO CRIMINAL GROUPS
One of the most important reasons leading to the militarization of POs is the inclusion in their organization of current or former employees of security agencies, as well as ex-combatants of paramilitary formations with experience in irregular warfare. These individuals, who have military knowledge and skills, increase the military potential of the POs that receive double benefit from their involvement. Firstly, former employees of the security agencies and former members of rebel/terrorist organizations act as instructors for ordinary members of the PO. Secondly, they themselves are involved in the group's operations, which increases the likelihood of their success.
Examples of such symbiosis include the participation of former military personnel in training gang fighters in Brazilian favelas. As a result of such interaction, gang members acquired skills by learning small-group tactics in urban conditions, overcoming obstacles, using camouflage, coordination, etc.
Consequently, PO members trained in this way increase their chances of survival in clashes with Brazilian security forces. For example, the largest Brazilian gang, Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), hires dissidents from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC). The goal is to obtain heavy weapons and military training, which are necessary for the PCC to fight the security forces of Brazil, as well as to expand its activities in neighboring countries, including Colombia.
Another example of militarization is the inclusion of militants from rebel/terrorist organizations in its structure, up to command positions. In particular, the guerrilla of Chilean origin Mauricio Hernandez Norambuena, a former member of the left-wing radical organization "Patriotic Front of Manuel Rodríguez" (Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez), previously established contact with the PCC.
Researchers M. Cristina and K. Tognolli note in their work the complication of the PCC structure during the time when M. Norambuena interacted with it. Such co-optation contributed to the increase in the integral potential of this PO, the improvement of its ability to plan its actions, including countering the security forces and carrying out large-scale robberies.
A striking example of the militarization of the PO are the Mexican cartels. One of the first and most iconic cases of professional soldiers defecting to join major cartels was the defection of fighters from the elite Special Airmobile Group (Grupo Aeromóvil de Fuerzas Especiales, GAFES) to the Cártel del Golfo. They later broke away to form the Los Zetas cartel, known for its extreme violence. As a criminal group made up of former soldiers, Los Zetas demonstrated an advantage over other cartels due to its professional training, established hierarchy, identity, knowledge and capacity for territorial control, recognition among civilians, and, finally, being autonomous in its activities and flexible in its structure.
Another Mexican organization that has co-opted the military is the Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). This cartel’s innovative approach, which included recruiting military personnel, has allowed it to expand its operations to 40 countries in just 15 years (the cartel is believed to have formed in 2009). For example, Otto Fernando Godoy Cordón, a colonel in the Guatemalan armed forces, provided logistical support to the CJNG in the cocaine trade. The cartel is reported to have recruited dozens of former Colombian soldiers and US Marines with combat experience to improve the tactical capabilities of its armed forces.
The criminal insurgency is particularly pronounced in Haiti, where the state has essentially collapsed, as explored in detail in the work of O. James. The crisis in Haiti escalated critically in 2023, when the murder rate was 40.9 deaths per 100,000 people, more than double the 2022 level. After the US occupation in 1994, the armed forces in Haiti were disbanded and only much later, in 2017, were they partially restored (the number is estimated at 2,000 people). The country also has a National Police.
An analysis of the structure of Haitian PO indicates that the security agencies act as “donors” to local gangs that are waging an all-out war between themselves and what remains of the state. Thus, on October 13, 2023, in the La Saline area in the center of the capital Port-au-Prince (90% controlled by the PO), clashes resumed between gangs belonging to the G-9 famille et alliés coalition (hereinafter referred to as G-9), associated with the ruling Haitian Tet Kale party (French: Parti Haïtien Tèt Kale), which began in September due to the distribution of "income" from truck thefts.
The leader of the G-9 is former police officer Jimmy Cherizier (known by the nickname "Barbecue"), which means that representatives of the security forces in Haiti are not just used by the PO, but also occupy key "posts" in the hierarchy of local gangs. This alliance of gangs, led by the ex-policeman, attempted to eliminate the leader of the allied "Tokyo" gang, who challenged his power. The coalition was divided into two camps: on the one hand, the gangs of Carrefour Drouillard, Chen Mechan, Tokyo and Wharf Jérémie; on the other, the gangs of Belekou, Boston, Fort Dimanche, La Saline and the gang of D. Cherizier Delm.
The fighting, which lasted four days, weakened the G-9, as gangs from the first camp abandoned the coalition. The internal conflict within the G-9 is compounded by an armed confrontation with the criminal alliance G-pèp, which is supported by political opponents of Tete Kale and led by Jean-Pierre Gabriel (nickname Ti Gabriel). At the same time, in response to the formation of the Bwa Kale civilian militia, gang conglomerates were able to unite for a coordinated attack. In February 2024, the G9 and G-pèp, together (known as Viv Ansanm), attacked critical civilian infrastructure in Port-au-Prince.
Another example of the participation of security forces in the PO is Dimitri Herard, the former head of security for the President of Haiti, Jovenel Moïse, who was assassinated in 2021.
According to media reports citing intelligence and diplomatic sources, D. Gerard works with Johnson Andre, known as Izo, the leader of the powerful gang 5 Segonn, which is part of the criminal alliance G-pèp. It should be noted that it was after the murder of Jovenel Moïse that the PO, used by local political and business elites to suppress voter turnout, anti-government protests and seize land, actually got out of control, becoming a largely autonomous force and participants in a criminal rebellion.
Recruitment of military personnel by gangs is also recorded in Ecuador. In particular, the PO Los Chone Killers recruited sailors from the Ecuadorian Navy, who not only acted as sicarios (hired killers) for the group, but were also involved in the theft of ammunition and weapons from various units of the Navy, according to intelligence data.
The process of militarization of the PO is especially facilitated by the proximity of a state on whose territory there is a long-term internal armed conflict. For example, this kind of situation is observed in Venezuela, where local groups, growing in number over 100 people (the so-called mega-gangs), adopt the organizational structures, logistical systems and even strategies of rebel (guerrilla) organizations that are active in Colombia, as well as in Venezuela itself. As researchers note, guerrillas of Colombian origin have become a “school” for some Venezuelan gangs.
One of the largest Venezuelan POs, Tren de Aragua, adopted the organizational structure and practices of FARC and the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN) during the period of intensified migration from Venezuela since 2014. Such mimicry of insurgents is an important stage in the evolutionary transformation of this group. Moreover, the very imitation of guerrilla groups with extensive combat experience is a very dangerous phenomenon.
In fact, the software adopts the model, tactics, methods and procedures of organizations that are most adapted to asymmetric warfare against government forces, which contributes to the establishment of territorial control by these POs.
The examples provided confirm the hypothesis put forward at the beginning of the paper about the militarization of POs in the LAC countries through the co-optation of individuals with military and operational experience, which in the conditions of this region contributes to the emergence of VVC in the form of a criminal rebellion. In such conditions, gangs and cartels act as criminal insurgents, which distinguishes them from traditional organized crime, since in this case these violent actors act as de facto political subjects. It should be noted that the situation
in Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Haiti is characterized by extreme levels of violence.
Thus, in 2023, the number of violent deaths in these countries was 46,328, 31,062, 13,432, 7,878, 6,973 and 4,789 cases, respectively. Such
intensity of violence in the presence of organized, stable, resourced and well-armed PO gives grounds to conclude that there are signs of VVK in these countries.
You can download the article in full for free in FDF format here https://dropmefiles.com/NF5fR (link available for a week)
(c) Konstantin Strigunov