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Syria-Lebanon-Iran
St. Elijah Church Massacre: Who is Behind the Attack on Christians in Damascus
2025-06-24
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Leonid Tsukanov

[REGNUM] On June 22, a terrorist attack occurred in the Church of St. Elijah in the suburbs of Damascus. As a result of the attack, representatives of the Christian denomination, including several foreigners, were killed.

The attack on the Greek Orthodox diocese was far from the first terrorist attack on religious sites in Syria, but it was the first major attack on Christians since the change of power in Damascus. And how the Syrian government responds to this challenge will largely determine its future relations with local minorities.

ATTACK ON THE CHURCH
According to information from Syrian security forces, a lone radical belonging to ISIS* attacked parishioners during a Sunday service, opening fire on them with small arms.

Some time later, when the scene of the terrorist attack was cordoned off by police, he entered into a shootout with them and then blew himself up.

According to various sources, between 30 and 100 people died in the attack. Of these, at least a dozen died on the spot. Another ten died on the way to hospitals and on operating tables.

At the same time, the attacker, as noted, did not take hostages and did not make any demands on the security forces, which allows the attack to be characterized as an act of intimidation without a clear political subtext.

DELAYED REACTION
Although the Syrian government almost immediately blamed ISIS* for the attacks, the group only claimed responsibility for the attack 10 hours later, calling it a "contribution to the defeat of the apostates."

According to terrorist media resources, the attack highlighted Damascus's inability to protect its citizens even near the capital, let alone the outskirts, where ISIS* activity is many times higher.

However, radical propagandists described the terrorist attack in extremely general terms, without naming the attacker or his motives.

This is noticeably different from their usual tactics, when a broad ideological basis is provided for the actions of the adherents of the "caliphate" in Syria, and the "semantic roots" of the attack are linked to the plots of Islamic history. Here, the information was presented in the most routine manner and tied exclusively to the events of the present day.

Such uncharacteristic stinginess in details allows us to assume that the radical who attacked the church was a lone wolf and acted without instructions “from above,” although he could well have shared the ideas of ISIS* or its allied groups.

However, the ambiguities did not prevent the radicals from ultimately taking credit for the attack and presenting it as one of the signs of their own growing power in the fight against the new Syrian authorities.

COUNTER-ACCUSATIONS
The attack on the Christian minority has once again stirred up discussions about the ability of the new authorities to fulfill their promises and “return Syria to peaceful life”; to protect the “suffering” national and religious minorities.

Some Syrian leaders, out of old habit, tried to convert tensions into political points and blame the tensions on the “surviving supporters of the old regime.”

For example, the country's Minister of Culture, Mohammed Yassin Saleh, stated that the destabilization of minorities is beneficial to "those parties that suffered the most from the fall." Thus hinting at the participation in the attack of representatives of the defeated republic, of whom there are still many in both the security and civilian agencies.

The placement of former associates of ousted President Bashar al-Assad on the same level as radicals suggests that the search for compromise between yesterday's opponents is still complicated, and not all of the new Syrian elite agree to peacefully coexist with the vanquished.

However, opponents of the current Syrian authorities also did not remain in debt and recalled Damascus' controversial management decisions. Among them, for example, the integration of Uyghur militants from the "Islamic Party of Turkestan"* (IPT*) into the ranks of the army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Considering that many IPT* leaders still have close ties with terrorist cells, their inclusion in government structures significantly simplifies the radicals' planning and execution of operations.

The version that was spread on emigrant resources (especially on the X network) was that the person who attacked the church had previously served in the ranks of the “Security Service” of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham* group, from whose leadership part of the current Syrian cabinet “grew” – including the country’s interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa.

Thus, the opposition placed responsibility for the terrorist attack directly on the country's leadership. However, this version was not confirmed.

KEEPING BALANCE
However, even taking into account the sharp rhetoric, neither side of the conflict is interested in elevating the voiced accusations to absolutes. Excessive pressure on Damascus could provoke the authorities to expand repressive measures against the internal opposition.

In this case, the al-Sharaa government risks repeating the same scenario as earlier with the Druze and Alawites.

Damascus does not want to create another hotbed of tension in the country, and therefore quickly shifted the emphasis in its accusations from the “Assad camp” to the terrorist underground.

Former supporters of the republic also agreed to “shift the blame” to ISIS*, due to the fact that the camp of supporters of ex-President Assad is still segmented. Most of its leaders are either in exile or do not have sufficient authority to challenge Damascus and “take” minorities under their protection.

One way or another, today's Damascus will have to seriously reconsider the model for preventing terrorist attacks, especially since the strategy for fighting ISIS, with an emphasis on destroying cells in border areas, has weakened attention to the capital region. The radicals have not failed to take advantage of this.

Posted by:badanov

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