Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Kirill Semenov
[REGNUM] Against the backdrop of the ongoing escalation in the Syrian province of Suwayda (a stronghold of the ethno-confessional minority, the Syrian Druze) since July 13, on Wednesday, July 16, the Israeli Air Force not only continued to strike Syrian military targets in the Daraa and As-Suwayda areas, but also bombed Damascus, taking the conflict to a new level.
In Suwayda, fighting continues between government forces, Druze groups and Bedouin tribes. And in the capital of Syria, the central part of the city came under attack, including government facilities such as the presidential palace, the Defense Ministry complex, etc.
However, despite the growing tensions and polarization of hostility between the Sunni majority and the Druze, the current conflict in Sweida still has a chance to return to the status quo. This is exactly what happened during the previous escalation in April-May 2025, when it was possible to prevent an increase in violence.
INTERNATIONAL RESONANCE
The Israeli leadership explains its actions by the need to protect the Druze population from the government in Damascus and to create a demilitarized zone in southern Syria. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz demanded an immediate withdrawal of Syrian troops from the region, warning of a possible intensification of military operations in case of refusal.
In a statement released through Israeli media, Katz insisted on a complete end to the Syrian army's presence in As-Suwayda and ensuring the safety of the Druze. He stressed Israel's determination not to leave the Druze community without support and to consistently implement the policy of demilitarization in the area.
In turn, in a harsh statement, Israeli Diaspora Affairs Minister Amichai Chikli called for the removal of the Syrian president, accusing him of terrorism and drawing parallels with the Hamas movement. Chikli described the Syrian leadership as an “extremist terrorist regime,” calling for active opposition to it.
At the same time, Israeli forces have reinforced their presence on the Syrian border. Additional units of the Border Guard and the Golani Brigade have been reported.
Against this backdrop, US Special Envoy for Syria Thomas Barrack reported on intensive talks with various Syrian parties aimed at de-escalation. Barrack expressed concern over the events in As-Suwayda, noting Washington's desire for a peaceful settlement that takes into account the interests of the Druze, Bedouin tribes, the Syrian authorities and Israel.
According to Israeli journalist Barak Ravid, Israel promised the US to stop attacks on Syria.
ISRAEL'S NEW STRATEGY
If we look at the IDF's actions in Syria from a strategic perspective, they are aimed at maintaining permanent chaos and preventing the establishment and strengthening of a central authority in the country.
Following the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, Israel reassessed its security priorities.
Now, controlled chaos along the perimeter of Israel's borders is considered preferable to the creation of stable state structures. As these structures become stronger, they will be able to threaten the Jewish state, while isolated manifestations of chaos, even those capable of "spilling over" into Israel, are much easier to manage.
For this purpose, in particular, Benjamin Netanyahu would like to create a demilitarized (for the Syrian army) buffer zone in the south of Syria, which would be controlled by Druze groups loyal to Israel. A similar puppet Christian state with the support of Israel existed in Lebanon until 2000.
However, this is a very dangerous game, since in the event of the loss of Suwayda, and then the whole of southern Syria, the regime in Damascus may not survive, which is what Israel actually wants.
This will lead to the collapse of the rudiments of the new Syrian state that never came into being, which will be taken advantage of by the most radical forces, who will most likely consolidate around ISIS* cells operating in the Syrian desert.
This could be the starting point for the restoration of a territorial ISIS* “caliphate” in Syria, as the activity of ISIS* terrorists and related groups such as Saraya Ansar al-Sunna has already increased significantly.
In fact, this is why the United States does not share Israel’s approach to supporting the Druze and the split in Syria, fearing the reincarnation and new expansion of the terrorist “caliphate,” as happened in 2013–2014 in Iraq, when no one expected it.
DRUZE VS BEDOUINS
The current conflict between official Damascus and the Druze was caused by an incident that occurred on July 11.
According to the information provided by the Druze, a gang of Bedouins robbed and captured a Druze merchant, then beat him and left him blindfolded in the desert, where he was discovered and rescued.
In response, Druze armed groups took several members of Bedouin tribes hostage.
The Bedouins, in turn, attacked a checkpoint in the Al-Maqwas area east of the city of Al-Suwayda, where they captured several members of local Druze militias. They were accused of attacking Bedouins for the purpose of looting and taking hostages.
Soon new units of Druze and Bedouins began to converge on the area, and starting on July 13, they entered into open armed conflict with each other, using heavy equipment and mortars.
The conflict spread to new areas of the province after Bedouin clans from neighboring regions arrived to help their fellow tribesmen.
DAMASCUS'S INTERVENTION
At the same time, on July 14, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defense of Syria began introducing their units into the province of Suwayda under the pretext of preventing a conflict between the Druze and the Bedouins.
At the same time, the rhetoric of the statements by Damascus officials contained clear indications that the goal of the operation was also to disarm groups that “intend to split Syria” and “call for separatism.” By these they meant supporters of one of the three spiritual leaders of the Druze, Hikmat al-Hijri, and the so-called “Military Council” associated with him (this group primarily brought together former supporters of Assad ).
It should be noted that from the very beginning of the armed confrontation with the Bedouins, al-Hijri blamed everything on the government in Damascus, which, in his opinion, “incited” the Bedouin tribes against the Druze.
He also called for disobedience to Damascus and resistance to the Syrian troops entering the province. It is significant that he had previously accused the authorities of being unable to ensure security on the Es-Suwayda-Damascus highway, but at the same time did not allow the presence of the Syrian troops themselves or the security forces that were supposed to ensure this security.
Therefore, as soon as the Syrian troops began to enter the province of Suwayda, they were immediately attacked by the forces of the "Military Council", which led to significant losses and made the conflict irreversible.
"ANNOYING VIOLATIONS"
The situation was aggravated by the fact that many units of the Syrian army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs still consist of militants from radical groups and are inclined to view the confrontation with the Druze through a sectarian prism.
Videos appearing online with radical calls from some representatives of the Syrian army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs added fuel to the fire of the confrontation, as did crimes against civilians by the Syrian military.
The militants of the new Syrian regime carried out reprisals against Druze civilians.
According to various estimates, between 10 and 20 people, including three women, were killed in such criminal acts. In addition, many Druze faced beatings and humiliation, when their moustaches, which have an important religious and symbolic meaning, were forcibly cut off.
As Igor Subbotin, a specialist in the Middle East and an expert at the Russian International Affairs Council, told Regnum :
"The current authorities in Damascus have already had great difficulty overcoming the reputational problems created for them by the massacre in the coastal areas of Syria in March. Now, after the outbreak of violence in the south, which has led to an unprecedented activism of the Israeli Druze and Israel itself, the Syrian authorities will have to explain to the world that the Druze population of Syria is not in danger. Although there is no doubt that these days the Syrian troops have tried to side with the Sunni Bedouins and, according to monitoring organizations, have abused their powers."
At the same time, unlike the Alawites, there is no such thing as a “consensus of rejection” among the Sunni majority in Syria regarding the Druze.
Sectarian calls against the Druze are heard from individual representatives of the most radical factions that have entered the new Syrian army, while others have no prejudice against the Druze as an ethno-confessional minority.
Many of them are still perceived as comrades in the fight against the Assad regime, while the accusations against the Alawites were sweeping and were made on behalf of all Sunni circles, including quite secular ones, and were not the prerogative of exclusively religious radicals.
This is precisely why the massacre of Alawites on the coast was possible on such a horrific scale.
However, as already noted, the opposition of many Druze to Assad does not save them from individual acts of reprisals by the most radical representatives of the Syrian security forces and army, which the transitional president Ahmed al-Sharaa has already been forced to draw attention to, condemning these, in his words, “shameful acts” and reaffirming his commitment to investigate them.
"The Syrian state is following with great attention the unfortunate violations that have recently taken place in some areas of the province of As-Suwayda. These actions, which constitute criminal and illegal behavior, cannot be accepted under any circumstances and are completely contrary to the principles on which the Syrian state is founded," the statement by the interim president of Syria said.
DECEPTIVE MANEUVER
Of course, the actions of Israel and Hikmat al-Hijri also contribute to the radicalization of the views of part of the Syrian Sunni majority regarding the solution to the Druze problem.
Although the balanced and moderate position of other leaders of the Druze community gives a chance for normalization. They do not allow cooperation with Israel and advocate for continuing the dialogue with Damascus, whose authorities, albeit with reservations, they consider legitimate.
This approach also creates an obstacle to an open IDF invasion of Suwayda, which al-Hijri is so keen on, since instead of meeting the Israeli military with flowers, they could end up under fire from the very same Druze groups that do not share al-Hijri's views.
The latter is also blamed for the disruption of the agreement on a ceasefire and normalization of the situation between the Druze leaders and the government in Damascus on the night of July 15: after this sheikh secured the support of Tel Aviv, he immediately violated the agreement.
Let us recall that after Syrian government forces and the Interior Ministry managed to take control of most of the provincial capital of As-Suwayda by the evening of July 14, an agreement on a ceasefire and normalization was reached between Druze leaders and Damascus.
In particular, the Druze spiritual leaders, including Sheikh al-Hijri, announced their agreement to the introduction of government troops into al-Suwayda in order to stop the ongoing violence. They called on all armed groups in the area to cooperate and surrender their weapons.
Apparently, these negotiations served as a cover for al-Hijri and his men in the "Military Council" to buy time and regroup while negotiating with Israel for military support.
Before this, Israel itself had not yet made a decision to launch aggression against Syria under the pretext of protecting the Druze, and consultations were underway between the political leadership and the IDF.
In addition, after the ceasefire was announced, heavy equipment and units of the Ministry of Defense were withdrawn from the city, leaving only the Ministry of Internal Affairs and military police forces.
IDF STRIKES
As soon as Tel Aviv decided to launch an operation against the Syrian army, Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri published a video in which he called on Druze fighters to “resist the brutal campaign (of official Damascus) by all available means,” thereby violating agreements with Damascus, accompanied by Israeli bombing.
The Israeli Air Force strikes primarily hit the positions of Syrian troops withdrawn from the city, who were unable to provide support to the Interior Ministry and military police forces, who were driven out of As-Suwayda by Druze forces with heavy losses.
These actions by al-Hijri are perceived by many Syrians as an outright betrayal, as is the raising of Israeli flags in As-Suwayda by individual Druze fighters in place of the overthrown Syrian ones.
In addition, the IDF air strikes on July 16 on Damascus, on the Defense Ministry and General Staff complex, as well as the presidential palace area and other targets in the Syrian capital, have caused “hatred and indignation” among Syrians, and now there is a threat that this “indignation and hatred” will be channeled towards the Druze.
On the other hand, apparently, Al-Hijri and Israel themselves are counting on this. That is, for them, the worse the situation and the more victims and especially reprisals against civilians, the more compelling the reason for Israel's direct intervention in the conflict and the creation of an Israeli "buffer zone" in southern Syria with support from the Druze.
But even despite the bombing of the Syrian capital, the position of the United States, which advocates a settlement between the Druze and Damascus, somewhat binds Netanyahu in his actions.
As long as the acts of reprisals that have captured the world's attention are isolated and do not exceed the number of Syrian civilians killed by Israeli strikes on Syria, Netanyahu has no arguments to convince Donald Trump to support his more active actions under the pretext of saving the Druze from genocide.
NEW HOPE
Further developments will largely depend on how viable the next attempt at a ceasefire and a new agreement between the Druze and Damascus will be.
Thus, on the evening of July 16, Sheikh Yusuf Jarbu, one of the three spiritual leaders of the Druze, announced an agreement with the Syrian state to resolve the situation in Suwayda.
According to the statement, the parties agreed to an immediate cessation of all military actions, Syrian police and internal security forces, including local personnel, will be deployed in the city of As-Suwayda and its environs, and Druze groups undertake not to attack their posts.
It is also proposed to create a joint monitoring committee of representatives of the state and the Druze clergy to monitor compliance with the agreement.
In addition, the agreement emphasizes " the appointment of honest and professional police officers from Suwayda to senior positions in the province's security agencies."
The state also undertakes to protect the housing and property of citizens from attacks and robberies and to create a joint commission to investigate crimes and violations, with compensation for victims and bringing the perpetrators to justice.
The success of the agreements will largely depend on the implementation of the last point.
RISK OF ESCALATION
Although Damascus has already taken certain steps and demonstrated the Syrian military detained for crimes (which, by the way, was not done during the massacre on the coast), it is important to bring these cases to a court decision.
Moreover, the presence of Salafi-jihadist groups within the ranks of the new Syrian army and the Interior Ministry continues to pose a threat to Syrians.
Although no less of a threat is posed by other radical elements in the ranks of the security forces, although they do not profess radical interpretations of Salafism and are even entirely secular, they speak from the position of radical Syrian Sunni nationalism and call for reprisals against Syrian minorities as “accomplices of the Assad regime,” placing collective responsibility on them.
Although the recruitment of new recruits into the Syrian army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs has reduced the percentage of radicals in them, they are still grouped in a number of divisions and brigades of the new Syrian army and are used, among other things, in operations against minorities.
On the other hand, maintaining the leading positions in Suwayda al-Hijri and the “Military Council” associated with it threatens to turn any small security incident into a full-scale conflict between the Druze and Damascus, with the prospect of drawing Israel into it.
Continued on Page 47
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