As a general principle, serious nations dont embrace surprise and bafflement as elements of their foreign policy. Canadas overnight liquidation of all relations with Iran on Friday would suggest an astonishing exception.
Its not just the speed of that decision but the cluster of official explanations that set off so much head-scratching at home and abroad.
Predictably, the Harper governments actions won immediate praise from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who called it bold leadership a clear message to Iran and the entire world.
But elsewhere, the reaction was more a mystified Whats up? Why now?
Why did Canada seemingly break away from the general line of allied and friendly nations supporting tough, U.S.- led sanctions on Iran to elbow its way into a position of all-out diplomatic confrontation?
I believe theres another story yet to emerge, which Ill come to shortly.
The only relatively new complaint cited by foreign affairs minister John Baird involved Irans support for Syrias oppressive Assad regime. The other grievances have been around for years, including threats against Israel, anti-Semitism in general, Irans nuclear program, its funding of terrorist organizations and notorious disregard for diplomatic rules.
A nasty package, for sure, and a nasty regime.
Yet does this not suggest Canada should remain firm alongside other nations in trying to keep as many diplomatic eyes and ears as possible functioning inside Iran?
I believe Harper acted on new intelligence. But the warnings were likely more about the Iranian embassy activities in Canada than they were about the safety of our personnel abroad.
Thats a point made by Canadas former ambassador to Iran, John Mundy, who called the recent severing of diplomatic ties a grave step not easily repaired.
Canada no longer has any dialogue with Iran, Mundy told the Globe and Mail, and is unable to provide consular services to Canadians in distress or even gather analysis of whats happening there.
I really cant see the rationale of this move, said Kenneth Taylor, the former ambassador famed for his role in helping U.S. officials escape a hostile Iran in the famous Canadian Caper in 1980. Its a very bold stroke to sever diplomatic relations and close the embassy within five days.
After all, Canada didnt bail out of Moscow even during the most dangerous era of the cold war, and prided itself on its China mission while human rights abuses were monstrous in the 70s and 80s. The Harper government even maintained relations with Libyas gruesome Gadhafi dictatorship right up to the point we decided to bomb it (alongside our NATO allies).
Inevitably, Canadas abrupt move with Iran stoked fears that something very dangerous was afoot in the Middle East. Hasty diplomatic departures will do that.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, left, has praised Prime Minister Stephen Harper for his tough stance on Iran.
Theory about Israeli attack
One theory is that Ottawa has intelligence that an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear sites, with or without U.S. help, is imminent dangerous news given our close ties with Israel. Many analysts, however, doubt such an attack is likely in this U.S. election year.
There were even suggestions in some foreign media that Canada bailed out of Tehran because Iranian security suspected our mission there had been collecting intelligence for the U.S., Britain and perhaps Israel and that we were on the verge of expulsion, or even worse.
However, there seem to be no grounds to believe Canadian officials did more than collect and trade the normal open-source intel and street chatter all embassies pick up.
So were still puzzled. Perhaps because were looking in the wrong direction.
I believe Harper acted on new intelligence. But the warnings were likely more about the Iranian embassy activities in Canada than they were about the safety of our personnel abroad.
Indeed, the sheer number of reasons given for the diplomatic break may mask the true one: Irans aggressive use of diplomatic cover to prepare guerrilla cells to attack in the west should Iran itself be attacked.
Western intelligence has been ringing top-secret alarm bells for governments for over a year, warning of an extraordinary build-up of Iranian personnel in Europe, Africa and particularly in Latin America, many of them believed to be linked to Irans notorious Quds Force. Thats the elite arm of Irans Revolutionary Guard, tasked with extraterritorial operations.
Iran has powered up its diplomatic arm in the Americas, from a handful of embassies a dozen years ago to 10 today, along with 17 cultural centres in various countries. Most posts are staffed with far more officials than required for normal duties 150 in Nicaragua alone.
Iran's 'extraterritorial operations'
In January, Americas top intelligence official, James Clapper, publically stated that Iranian diplomats abroad were setting up sleeper cells designed to attack U.S. and allied interests around the world in the event of war.
Members of Iran's Revolutionary Guard, seen here during military exercises, are tasked with extraterritorial operations -- which means actions beyond Iran's borders.
Tehran has made no secret of the fact it has elaborate plans to wreak as much havoc as possible among nations supporting the U.S. and Israel should it come under attack.
In fact, just days before Canada hastily broke off relations, the head of the Iranian armys joint chiefs of staff boasted to the Fars News Agency that if Iran was attacked, America and its allies should expect major terror attacks in their homeland. The deputy chief commander of the Revolutionary Guard echoed this, vowing Any aggression against Iran will expand the war into the borders of the enemies. They know our power
Intelligence officials give credence to these threats because it makes grim strategic sense for Iran to hit back in this way, as its conventional forces are no match for Israel and the U.S. It also has ruthless allies to call on for joint operations, including Hezbollah, which is deemed a terrorist organization by Canada.
Canadas intelligence service believes Canadas increasing identification with Israel inevitably leave us a target for bombings, kidnappings or assassinations in an armed conflict. For years it has warned of the Iranian embassys efforts to threaten and blackmail some of the more than 100,000 Iranians living here into cooperation. Thats why Canada has refused Irans repeated requests for consuls outside Ottawa.
Some type of new intelligence seems to have seriously shaken Harpers government. Former CSIS assistant director Ray Boisvert told CBC such an unprecedented move usually only happens in very serious conditions.
Boisvert insisted the Iranian embassy was running some kind of threatening operation aimed at the Iranian community in Canada that absolutely poses a security threat in Canada.
Expect more of this story to come out in the next few weeks, when MPs return to Parliament, anxious to move beyond the current state of surprise and bafflement.
#1
In January, America's top intelligence official, James Clapper, publically stated that Iranian diplomats abroad were setting up sleeper cells designed to attack U.S. and allied interests around the world in the event of war.
#3
Is there a tie-in between this article and this one that appears in today's WOT section? Hmmm. Wonder if Mexico would be considerate enough to take the same kind of action.
[Dawn] A FEW years before the Nazi government arrested him in 1937 and sent him to a concentration camp, Martin Niemoller, a German theologian, spoke the powerful words that have come to epitomise the guilt of the bystander who watches in silence as those around suffer.
He lamented how he had not spoken up as they came first for the communists, then the unionists, and then the Jews. Finally when they came for him, "there was no one left to speak out".
Pakistain has arrived at a point where 'they' have come for the Ahmedis, the Christians, the Hindus, and the Shias. It has come to a point where we need to speak out because at some point they will come for even those that are not part of a minority community.
They will come for you either because you are a Barelvi, a Deobandi, a woman, an intellectual, a liberal, the wrong ethnic group, or simply someone who does not agree with the worldview of those who are armed and have no compulsions against killing a fellow human being. But what is the most effective way to speak out? What will make a difference?
The simple answer, of course, is that we need to learn to be more accepting and tolerant of each other. But while noble, this is a generally useless suggestion because there is a large difference between being intolerant and actually pulling people off a bus, identifying them as Shias and then murdering them for that simple fact.
What takes a person from general intolerance towards others to actually killing people for their belief? I do not have an answer to that, but I do know a few things that contribute.
It contributes when murderers like the Taliban are allowed to get away with it. Not bringing perpetrators publicly to justice in courts that speak out clearly in favour of protecting every single citizen -- regardless of caste, creed and religion -- contributes to making the next incident possible.
It contributes that in attack after attack, a few of which have been on their own bases, we do not see the police or the army going after the outfits that sponsor these.
It also contributes that in its official documents the state continues to divide us all into religious categories. What, and whose, purpose does this serve?
It contributes when public figures do not speak out loudly and regularly in favour of minorities and against the violent crimes that they suffer.
It contributes that electronic media is not awash with dramas, public service messages and talk shows promoting an understanding of minority cultures and beliefs, the value and beauty of diversity, and the idea that there should be no 'us' and 'them' within Pakistain.
It certainly contributes that the career of television anchors does not suffer terribly when they publicly convert members of minority communities to Islam on their shows. And despite popular belief, it is not a lack of education that contributes to this, but rather, the content of our educational curricula that appears to be responsible.
I discovered in my research in rural Pakistain that the person in the village with active membership of a sectarian organization was never the uneducated farm labourer, but rather the schoolteacher.
The only person that I met who told me he had participated in a religious protest was a man with an FA degree who had travelled to Lahore to protest against the Danish cartoons. As we strive to educate more and more of our population without a review of what we are teaching them, where can we expect to head?
So, how do we speak out? Maybe the answer lies in becoming intolerant as well. We need to become vocally intolerant of religious groups that seek to organise people on the basis of differences and preach violence against others.
We need to become intolerant of the army's strategic games, and of the fact that deals are struck with those that kill openly and thump their chests publicly to take responsibility for it.
We need to be intolerant of political parties that cosy up to the army and tow its line of negotiating with murderers. We should be intolerant of a state that requires us to reveal our religion in official documents.
We need to be intolerant of a system that is seen to go into hyper-drive to weaken an elected government, but that allows known religious fanatics to walk free for lack of strong evidence.
How do you express such intolerance? By getting our politics right. Withdraw support for the judiciary when it lets a terrorist go. Push the political party you support to have a clear stance against those that kill minorities, and do not vote for those that make excuses for terrorist outfits.
Change the channel when talk show hosts insist that the real problem is another country, politicians or corruption, all the while defending those that kill the name of religion.
Write to channels to demand that there be more programmes on issues that affect minorities. Use social networking sites, newspapers and public protests to reduce divisions within Pakistain. Refuse to identify yourself with a religion or sect when asked to do so.
And on a personal level, stop trying to match your children with a spouse of the same sect, biradari, or class. Embrace diversity and the possibility that that will only make you less insulated and less inbred.
Do this before they come for you.
Posted by: Fred ||
09/11/2012 00:00 ||
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#1
Look who funds the intolerance ie Saudi Arabia.
#2
Look who funds the intolerance ie Saudi Arabia.
Oh no, Thrineter Juling6998. The intolerance is innate to a culture that requires exclusion, and will keep excluding new groups redefined as Other until there is no one left.
#4
Breitbart had it right on the "intolerance" crowd. They are the least tolerant of all, and are using this merely as a wedge against people with morals and/or standards (e.g. Christians).
#5
In Pakistan only the most violent sect survives.Peace loving muslims like the Ahmadis and sufis wont survive in the long term.
Gul,Beg,ISI and co support the most extreme groups because they make money/power out of their reputation.They terrorize the public and people are scared to question/argue with them.
Pakistan is a mafia state ruled by the gun/gangsters.
This, at least, is how Wang Yilin, Chairman of the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), chooses to view them. He reportedly told an audience at CNOOCs headquarters in Beijing in May that large-scale deep-water rigs are our mobile national territory and a strategic weapon.
This writer is no Sinologist and lacks the qualifications to parse his words for hidden meanings. At the same time people are all-too familiar with the sound of public figures mis-speaking. Nonetheless, it appears prudent to assume that the man knew what he was saying and that we should accept his words at face value. If we do we should be disturbed.
Six concerns spring to mind.
First, that the statement appears to reflect the mercantilist thinking of Chinas ruling elite. Mercantilism, the trading philosophy that prevailed before open markets, saw wealth as limited and trade and national power as linked such that it was not enough for one state to win commercially and therefore politically, the other state had to loose. Consequently, when it comes to Chinas great commercial corporations such as CNOOC they should not be regarded as being like modern Western companies but as arms of a competitive state in which profit-maximization sits uncomfortably alongside the need to further Chinese state policy, whatever that might happen to be at the time.
Second, the legal position is unclear: the CNOOC Chairman is asserting something that does not exist as there is nothing in the law of the sea that recognizes platforms or structures as sovereign territory, even though they are considered under title i.e. ownership of the state that put them there. In general they have much more salience in the political than in the legal realm and this appears to be what China is attempting to expand. Chairman Yilins language suggests that Chinas intends using CNOOC platforms to slowly wrest control of offshore areas by creating an ambiguous political-legal aura of authority and control. Possession is nine-tenths of the law in any language and if China as in the game of Go can establish an advantageous position then it will do so.
Third, how this view of oil rigs as strategic weapons, and this peculiar interpretation of their legal status, coincides with Chinas Three Warfares thinking. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) in its 2011 Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China described this as a three-pronged offensive strategy based on:
Psychological Warfare, which seeks to undermine an enemys ability to conduct combat operations by deterring, shocking, and demoralizing enemy military personnel and supporting civilian populations;
Media Warfare that is aimed at influencing domestic and international public opinion to build support for Chinas military actions and dissuade an adversary from pursuing actions contrary to Chinas interests; and
Legal Warfare that uses international and domestic law to claim the legal high ground or assert Chinese interests, employing both to hamstring an adversarys operational freedom and shape the operational space. Legal warfare is also intended to build international support and manage possible political repercussions of Chinas military actions.
A fuller account of this thinking can be found here.
The nine-dash line
Fourth, the implications of this thinking and CNOOCs state-directed role in advancing Chinas national interests in the current disputes in the South China Sea. China is looking to control 80% of its area and is prepared to use all arms of national power diplomatic, military, paramilitary and commercial to get what it wants. The starting point is an historic claim which is usually delineated by the so-called nine-dash line based on a similar line drawn up by the previous nationalist regime. This line and Chinas claims are contested by Vietnam and the Philippines particularly but by other littoral states as well.
A semi-submersible deep-water rig of the type China launched in May the Haiyang Shiyou 981 (HYSY 981) and which Chairman Yilin was celebrating when he spoke about a strategic weapon, would give China access to all but the very deepest seabed areas within the line. The Stimson Center and Collins and Erickson writing in China SignPost, both believe that for the present China will not deploy such a vulnerable asset outside its undisputed EEZ even though the rig now enables it to undertake drilling operations in the deep waters off the Vietnamese coast.
Collins and Erickson (who provide a useful map illustrating how HYSY 981 extends Chinas exploratory range) take the view that
for the near future CNOOCs deepwater drilling operations will remain in the Liwan trough and other areas that lie unequivocally within Chinas EEZ. For Beijing, the diplomatic costs of drilling in a disputed zone such as the Spratlys against the wishes of the other claimants would likely substantially exceed the additional oil or gas production gained. Even a large new oilfield producing 200,000 bpd or more in a disputed zone would not be worth drilling unilaterally if doing so catalyzed further development of anti-China regional security alignments.
This may be true for the moment given that despite its provocative stance vis-a-vis the Philippines off the Scarborough Shoal, and despite the failure of the ASEAN nations to maintain a united front in the face of its brazen manipulation, China lacks the resources to defend the whole of its claim militarily. That it is working to change this is indisputable.
At the same time China through the agency of CNOOC has for the first time invited tenders for oil and gas exploration blocks in disputed waters off Vietnams coast. These blocks overlap already proclaimed Vietnamese blocks. The consequent uncertainty means that in all likelihood there will be few takers for what is on offer, certainly from major oil companies with the necessary deep-water technology and expertise. Suggestions that this move revealed a lack of policy coordination between the Chinese foreign affairs ministry and CNOOC may, or may not, be true with CNOOC acting on the basis that Chinas right to everything within the nine-dash line is unarguable just at the moment the foreign ministry was taking a somewhat more conciliatory line. Whichever interpretation proves correct, China is still sending a signal to Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries that it will proceed on its terms; one that is reinforced by the declaration of a new prefecture covering the Paracel and Spratly Islands and an increase in the size of the PLA garrison on the tiny Woody (or Yongxing) Island.
Fifth is how this view of the world, and the concomitant view of oil rigs as strategic weapons, could play out in more distant waters where China has similar natural resource interests. Pertinent examples are the emerging oil and gas province off East Africa and the seabed mineral deposits in the South-West Indian Ocean for which the UN International Seabed Authority recently granted China an exploratory license. It is unlikely that China will behave as aggressively in these areas as it is being in the South China Sea, but the grant of the mineral license has nonetheless provoked worries in India about an enlarged Chinese Indian Ocean naval presence. What its words (and actions) reveal is that it continues to regard the sea as territory, as compared the Western view that has prevailed for the past 300 years of the sea as space open to all subject only to limited restrictions. China attempted to assert its view during the negotiations which resulted in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) but failed to have it accepted. Some states are nonetheless sympathetic to its position and, while none assert it as vigorously as China, may well be tempted to follow its lead if it crushes the objections of its neighbors and gains the level of control over the South China Sea to which it feels it is entitled. If its does, and its blue water naval capability expands, then it is likely it will be able to subtly shift the international rules governing the maritime domain in its favor.
Sixth and finally, Chairman Yilins words do not square with CNOOCs statement to the Wall Street Journal that it is respectful of the regulatory requirements across all the respective jurisdictions and that it aims to cooperate with all regulatory authorities. Why this is relevant to the United States is because CNOOC is attempting to buy a large Canadian energy company, Nexen, in a deal worth $15.1 billion. US regulatory approval is required because Nexen has assets in the Gulf of Mexico. While there are good reasons to allow the purchase the Chinese are arguably over-paying (60% premium over pre-deal stock price) nonetheless Nexen does have deep-water extractive technology that will help CNOOC in the South China Sea and elsewhere, and could allow it to maximize the return on its investment in HYSY 981 more quickly that it would be able to do otherwise. Is this in the interest of the United States? More particularly, how does approval and the Obama Administrations strange reluctance to challenge Chinas political posturing in maritime matters help its Southeast Asian allies who may, sometime in the near future depending upon how the negotiations in which China is aiming to pick them off one-by-one play out, see this rig and others like it parked in waters for which previously they had a valid claim?
Posted by: Alaska Paul ||
09/11/2012 17:53 ||
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#3
The English Channel sea forts during WW2 were awkward-looking [ugly ducklings] but were also heavily armed + served their deterrence or combat function very well.
Despite China setting up its new "Sansha/Sashi" City-Province in the South China Sea, wid PLA garrison to boot, IMO THESE [ARMED = DUAL-USE?] OIL RIGS ARE LIKELY STILL USEFUL TO CHINA AS PER ITS DESIRE TO MINIMIZE OR ALLEVIATE TENSIONS WID ASEAN, + ALLOW THE PLA TO FOCUS ON NE ASIA + INDIAN OCEAN REGIONS.
[Yemen Post] Over the past decade U.S. drone strikes have killed between 1,800 and 3,100 people in Pakistain, along with hundreds more in drone attacks in Yemen and Somalia, as a result of the United States' efforts to combat al-Qaeda and its affiliates. The rise in strikes since the beginning of the B.O. regime, and the growing stridency of questions surrounding the legal, moral, and practical efficacy of the program, have led to a lively debate among the commentariat. This debate is indeed important, but it is also crucial to understand how the drone program has affected the jihadis, and how jihadis have deployed the issue of drones in their propaganda. This is a necessary part of gaining a wider understanding of whether the program is a worthwhile endeavor.
Surprisingly, one does not see much discussion of drones by al-Qaeda Central (AQC), or by the Taliban (though it is possible that individuals in these groups are talking more about this in face-to-face encounters than online). Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), on the other hand, has exploited the drone issue extensively in the newsletter put out by their front group, Ansar al-Shari'ah (AS). As a result, question of whether drones are drawing more individuals into the arms of AQAP has been raised frequently in the past year.
In the documents collected by Navy SEALs during their raid of the late Osama bin Laden ... who is now beyond all cares and woe... 's compound in Abbottabad ... A pleasant city located only 30 convenient miles from Islamabad. The city is noted for its nice weather and good schools. It is the site of Pakistain's military academy, which was within comfortable walking distance of the residence of the late Osama bin Laden.... , Pakistain last May, bin Laden nicknamed Pakistain's tribal areas the "circle of espionage" for the network of spies that helps identify targets and place tracking devices for the strikes. The issue of spies has become so prevalent that Abu Yahya al-Libi wrote a book in 2009 regarding rulings on how they should be treated and prosecuted once captured.
The fear of infiltrators has created an atmosphere of paranoia within the jihadi movement, and has led many of al-Qaeda's operatives in the Pak tribal areas to move to more urban areas like Bloody Karachi ...formerly the capital of Pakistain, now merely its most important port and financial center. It may be the largest city in the world, with a population of 18 million, most of whom hate each other and many of whom are armed and dangerous... . In one of bin Laden's Abbottabad documents, he advises the "brothers" with "media exposure" to move "away from aircraft photography and bombardment." Bin Laden also suggested that individuals flee to Afghanistan's Kunar province ... which is right down the road from Chitral. Kunar is Haqqani country..... , where he thought they would be safer from the spy networks that have supported the drone campaign.
In the same document that bin Laden suggested his associates move, he also warned that even if one is in a safer place, one should still be cognizant that spies are lurking. The drone danger has also forced the Taliban to think twice about which journalists they meet with. A local Taliban leader remarked to Pak journalist Pir Zubair Shah: "You never know who is a news hound and who is a spy." But even if drone strikes provoke a higher level of distrust of outsiders (which itself is a normal characteristic of a terrorist or bad turban group), it does not appear to have hindered the Taliban's ability to project power into Afghanistan over the past few years. Many individuals look to the Taliban's shadow shari'ah courts for solving disputes, and the Taliban has been collecting taxes at the local level.
Frequent drone strikes in northwest Pakistain have also degraded al-Qaeda's ability to train individuals over long periods of time. In the past, AQC could spend a month (if not longer) training an operative in bomb making. In some cases, such training lasts as little as a few days now. Abbreviated training is less effective. Faisal Shahzad, the failed Times Square bomber, received five days of training in the tribal areas with AQC's affiliate the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistain (TTP). This lack of training proved decisive when Shahzad's bomb malfunctioned and he was spotted acting suspiciously.
Similarly, AQAP has been forced to change the locations of their training camps. The move to more mountainous areas like Ibb and al-Daleh provinces came about because AQAP was exposed to Arclight airstrikes when they had been training in Radaa directorate. Like the Taliban, however, AQAP has still been able to plot large-scale attacks against the West - even if they have failed - as well as occupy towns locally. And although there have yet to be any extensive academic studies on the wider effects of the drones in Yemen, Patrick B. Johnston and Anoop Sarbahi concluded in a working paper that the drones in Pakistain have actually decreased suicide kabooms across the country.
Propaganda
Although AQC and the Taliban have been under severe drone pressure for the past several years, they have said little about the strikes in the propaganda they release. When eulogizing Abu al-Layth al-Libi in 2008 after he was killed in a drone attack, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid described the drones as cowardly, since the United States did not confront him on the battlefield, but rather in a manner of "treachery and betrayal." More recently, Ayman al-Zawahiri ... Formerly second in command of al-Qaeda, now the head cheese, occasionally described as the real brains of the outfit. Formerly the Mister Big of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Bumped off Abdullah Azzam with a car boom in the course of one of their little disputes. Is thought to have composed bin Laden's fatwa entitled World Islamic Front Against Jews and Crusaders. Currently residing in the North Wazoo area. That is not a horn growing from the middle of his forehead, but a prayer bump, attesting to how devout he is... called in a message directed toward Paks in March for them to rise up against the government and "compel them to stop drone strikes."
Unlike AQC and the Taliban, AQAP has only seen frequent drone attacks for the past year and a half, but AQAP has exploited the issue extensively in their media work. (It should be noted that the United States has also used cruise missiles in attacking AQAP and al-Shabaab ... the Islamic version of the old Somali warlord... operatives. There have been claims that what have been reported as Yemeni Arclight airstrikes have really been drones, and vice versa). AQAP has been especially active in highlighting the achievements of its counter-spy networks. In February 2012, AQAP sentenced three spies - two Yemenis and a Saudi - to death in a shari'ah court in Ja'ar. They had allegedly been placing tracking devices on cars for drone targeting. One of the individuals was killed in Azzan by way of crucifixion while another was shot at point blank range in Shabwa as a circle of men cheered. The execution was shown in a video as part of AS' "Eyes on the Event" series. This was not only a message to the locals to deter them from becoming spies, but also a way for AQAP to show the United States and Soddy Arabia ...a kingdom taking up the bulk of the Arabian peninsula. Its primary economic activity involves exporting oil and soaking Islamic rubes on the annual hajj pilgrimage. The country supports a large number of princes in whatcha might call princely splendor. When the oil runs out the rest of the world is going to kick sand in their national face... that they were bringing the war back to them.
In addition to highlighting civilian casualties and showing pictures of dead children, AQAP has used critical analysis of the drone program from individuals in the West to gain sympathy for their plight. In issue nineteen of Ansar al-Shari'ah's newsletter they write an exposé on Obama's "crusade." In it, AS points out the "signature strike" policy, which allows the United States to target individuals based on behavioral patterns without actually identifying the individual: "Hellfire missiles ... troll the skies of Yemen to kill ... in cold blood and without accountability, as usual!" In the past, Yemen expert Gregory Johnsen has pointed out that signature strikes pose the danger of targeting and killing individuals that are not members of or associated with AQAP. In issue three of the newsletter, AS also questions the United States' commitment to the rule of law in light of the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki ... Born in Las Cruces, New Mexico, zapped in Yemen, al-Awlaki was a dual citizen of the U.S. and Yemen. He was an Islamic holy man who was a trainer for al-Qaeda and its franchises. His sermons were attended by three of the 9/11 hijackers, by Fort Hood murderer Nidal Malik Hussein, and Undieboomer Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. He was the first U.S. citizen ever placed on a CIA target list... and his son Abdul Rahman in a U.S. drone strike "without charging them [Anwar and his son] with a single crime."
Some analysts believe there could be blowback from the drone program from AQAP, which might be encouraged to plan a Dire Revenge™ attack on the United States. AQAP hinted at this in the eulogy for Fahd al-Quso, who was killed in a drone strike in May this year: "war between us is not over and the days are pregnant [and] will give birth to something new."
While the jihad boy response to drone strikes in Yemen remains to be seen, there is scant evidence that drones strikes have been mobilizing AQC to conduct attacks in response. After Faisal Shahzad's Times Square plot failed, he told Sherlocks that one of his primary motivations had been the increased pace of drone strikes in the Pak tribal belt. Al-Qaeda leader Ilyas Kashmiri was also reportedly frustrated over the drone strikes in the tribal areas, leading him to plan an attack on the CEO of Lockheed Martin, according to the testimony of prior associate David Headley, a key operative in the 2008 Mumbai attacks. But besides Shahzad's failed attack and Kashmiri's aspirational plan drone strikes do not appear to be the primary reason why al-Qaeda, its branches, and its affiliates are plotting attacks against the United States.
During the B.O. regime, drone strikes have taken out many top al-Qaeda, AQAP, and Taliban leaders, and killed hundreds of mid-level fighters. The losses have pushed these jihad boy groups to establish counter-spy networks, as well as beef up their operational security. Al-Qaeda Central's ability to operate in Pakistain has been severely degraded. At the same time, the drone campaign does not appear to have had an appreciable impact on AQAP or the Taliban - both still show the ability to plan attacks against the United States (either into Afghanistan for the Taliban or against the American homeland for AQAP) and still have influence in their local areas of operation. Defeating these groups with drones is unlikely, but the strikes have at the very least created a nuisance for the jihad boys, as well as prevented more invasive military action that might have otherwise occurred. There are still lingering questions on whether or not the drones have played a significant role in radicalizing a new generation of fighters, but understanding how the drones are affecting and changing these groups can provide new perspective on a vexing challenge.
Aaron Y. Zelin is the Richard Borow Fellow in the Washington Institute for Near East Policy's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence.
#2
Pakistain has been severely degraded. At the same time, the drone campaign does not appear to have had an appreciable impact on AQAP or the Taliban
I mow my lawn and trim the walkway faithfully each week, but the grass simply will not go away. It remains both lush and green and within a few days requires mowing again. What am I doing wrong?
A multi-volume chronology and reference guide set detailing three years of the Mexican Drug War between 2010 and 2012.
Rantburg.com and borderlandbeat.com correspondent and author Chris Covert presents his first non-fiction work detailing
the drug and gang related violence in Mexico.
Chris gives us Mexican press dispatches of drug and gang war violence
over three years, presented in a multi volume set intended to chronicle the death, violence and mayhem which has
dominated Mexico for six years.
Rantburg was assembled from recycled algorithms in the United States of America. No
trees were destroyed in the production of this weblog. We did hurt some, though. Sorry.
As a general principle, serious nations dont embrace surprise and bafflement as elements of their foreign policy. Canadas overnight liquidation of all relations with Iran on Friday would suggest an astonishing exception.
Zawahiri
