Heavy marijuana use can boost blood levels of a particular protein, perhaps raising a person's risk of a heart attack or stroke, U.S. government researchers said on Tuesday.
Dr. Jean Lud Cadet of the National Institute on Drug Abuse, part of the National Institutes of Health, said the findings point to another example of long-term harm from marijuana. But marijuana activists expressed doubt about the findings...
The marijuana users in the study averaged smoking 78 to 350 marijuana cigarettes per week, based on self-reported drug history, the researchers said.
#1
The marijuana users in the study averaged smoking 78 to 350 marijuana cigarettes per week, based on self-reported drug history, the researchers said.
I find it hard to believe the respondants could even determine / use the correct end of the pencil!
#2
Dr. Cadet sounds like, like, the name of someone made up by the W gustavo-cabal-thing man, of the man hah hah! I gotta cool down bro, gotta go on the happy thursday bike ride doood. Oohh, its cold out where'd I put my coat man, bummer. Its wednesday, gnarley! I got a whole day to find my threads!
#4
That's a hell of a lot of marijuana to smoke in one week. Even 50 joints a week (~7 per day) would put someone in a perpetual "high" state while awake.
Posted by: Frank G ||
05/14/2008 22:35 Comments ||
Top||
#7
thats about the rate a heavy smoker smokes tobacco... Note that tobacco somkers have similar health risks at that rate of smoking.
I wouldn't be suprised if lung cancer rates for that group are similar.
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Like a longtime business partnership formed in simpler days and now confronting a more aggressively competitive marketplace, the 75-year-old relationship between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. being celebrated this week by a visit from President George W. Bush is visibly fraying.
President Bush and King Abdullah will, of course, mark the occasion with protestations of friendship and mutual fealty. But there's little doubt that a relationship that's always been based much more on mutual dependencies than on shared values is increasingly being tested and found wanting by political forces in both countries.
Saudi Arabia no longer is able to exert as much control over oil prices as global demand rises, the dollar falls, regional uncertainties abound, and speculators' predictions of ever higher prices become self-fulfilling. More important, the neighborhood around Saudi Arabia has become much more threatening since the U.S. waged Desert Storm to remove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait and eliminate his threat to the Saudi oil fields. More recent efforts to remove Saddam from Iraq and institute a democracy have proved an agonizing display of America's political-diplomatic, though not necessarily military, impotence.
Furthermore, Iran, which Saudi Arabia rightly sees as the major threat to the kingdom these days, continues to cause mischief across the region in Iraq, Lebanon, Palestinian territories, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar in short all around the kingdom's borders. Yemen, a poor neighbor, poses an ongoing immigration and security problem not unlike that of Mexico for the U.S. Moreover, Saudis fear subversion from Iraq as the U.S. winds down its troop levels and are building a wall.
So far the U.S. has been unsuccessful in curbing Iran's nuclear ambitions, or in creating any effective counter to that nation's ability to use Hamas in the Palestinian territories or Hezbollah in Lebanon to humiliate moderates whom the U.S. or Saudi Arabia support. "Iran will become even more aggressive," predicts a Saudi official in an interview here this week. "This coming year will be very nasty for everyone."
Nor can the U.S. protect the regime from its own domestic challenges, ranging from religious zealotry to pressure for modernization to rising unemployment and a tidal wave of youth (40% of the population is under 15 years of age) all of which makes the regime's task of acting only with consensus that much harder.
In sum, the mutual needs of the U.S. and Saudi Arabia remain as great as at any time over the past 75 years, but the abilities of both parties to make the partnership mutually productive are diminishing, perhaps irretrievably so. It's difficult to see how this trend can be reversed, regardless who occupies the White House a year from now.
Iraqi Security Forces have succeeded in temporarily pacifying Basra.
Even the most diehard Iraq hawks want to reduce the U.S. military footprint in Iraq and lean more heavily on Iraqi Security Forces to do the hard work of defeating insurgents and sectarian militias. Which is why recent developments in Basra have been so encouraging. At first, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's decision to confront Moqtada al-Sadr's Iranian-backed militas looked like a major strategic misstep. Now it appears to have transformed Iraqi politics, potentially paving the way for real reconciliation between Sunni and Shia.
Maliki had long depended on Sadr's support, on the street and in Iraq's parliament, where 32 Sadrists form a crucial bloc. And, so, understandably, Sadr's Sunni opponents -- who see him, rightly, as a power-mad half-literate street tough with delusions of grandeur -- were reluctant to trust Maliki. The same was true of Sadr's Shia rivals.
These factions recognized what too many American observers miss, which is Sadr's uniquely pernicious role in Iraqi politics -- both as an agent of instability and as a stalking horse for Iran. Virtually all of Iraq's political factions have been at one time or another beneficiaries of Iranian largesse, but the Sadrist relationship with Iran is of a different kind. Sadr first came to prominence as the authentic voice of Iraq's Shia masses, those who endured Saddam's misrule and never had the good fortune of slipping away into exile. He had a level of nationalist credibility other Shia leaders lacked, which is why some Sunni cheered him on when he first challenged the U.S. occupation. Since then, however, Sadrist ties to Iran have deepened: Whereas other Shia factions take money from Teheran, the Sadrist forces are directly armed and trained by Iranians, and some claim that Iranian operatives are embedded with Sadr's so-called "Special Groups." These forces -- which Sadr himself may no longer directly control -- have been particularly agressive in fighting Americans and Iraqis alike.
This is the context in which Maliki launched his "Charge of the Knights," which was meant to be a small-scale police operation in Basra targeted at local warlords with ties to Sadr. Astutely, Sadr interpreted this thrust as part of broader campaign against his influence, and he succeeded in rallying his loyalists within the ISF, a large number of whom abandoned their posts on his command, seemingly dooming Maliki's offensive. Many American observers saw their expectations fulfilled -- once again, Iraq's feckless central government had failed to rein in its opponents -- and decided to tune out whatever came next.
But Maliki did something unexpected: He fired those who refused to fight and pressed on with the offensive, in Basra and also in Sadr City, where a second front opened up. A tenuous ceasefire took hold in Basra, and ISF forces have cleared the streets of the militias, using tactics drawn from the surge. This was done with a strikingly small number of American and British troops, though coalition assistance proved crucial. And now, as The New York Times reported yesterday, something resembling normal life is taking hold. In particular, the vigilantes who use violence to enforce their allegedly Islamic ethical code have been driven out, and you can once again hear music playing in the streets.
Though these gains may be temporary, there has also been a more lasting change: The Sadrists have been marginalized. Even the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who has been reluctant to make political interventions in recent years, pointedly condemned Sadr for refusing to disarm. Leading Sunni faction have also returned to the fold. The Kurds, who have their own problems with Sadr, are also on board. Maliki, suprisingly enough, increasingly looks like the leader of all Iraqis.
So what does this mean for our debate over Iraq? Advocates of withdrawal will insist that Maliki's forces are just as penetrated by the Iranians as the Sadrist militias. But as noted above, this reflects a simple misunderstanding of Iranian influence. The fighting in Basra and Sadr City hasn't simply pitted one set of Iranian-backed militas (one in ISF uniforms) against another, and it's clear that the forces that controlled Basra weren't popular at all: The city really was, as Maliki argued, in the grip of criminal gangs who terrorized the population.
Alternatively, proponents of withdrawal will argue that Maliki's Charge of the Knights would have failed without substantial American assistance, which is true -- but it's also true that the ISF has become an increasingly effective fighting force. Moreover, the successes of the last month demonstrate that Maliki's government isn't the Vichy government the most strident anti-war voices have suggested. Rather, it is a government that actually represents the interests of Iraq's vast majority.
The smartest case for withdrawal would acknowledge this new reality, and claim that it demonstrates that coalition forces are superfluous and can thus be safely withdrawn. It's true that Maliki's government now has momentum, and would have a fighting chance to survive if U.S. forces are rapidly withdrawn. But the government's chances would be far stronger with a continued American presence backing its efforts up. Unfortunately, few Americans understand what Maliki has accomplished, and how much international assistance he needs to beat back foreign elements that aim to undermine Iraq's fragile democracy -- which is, as far as neighboring governments are concerned (particularly those that begin with an "I" and end with an "n"), a profoundly subversive influence.
A multi-volume chronology and reference guide set detailing three years of the Mexican Drug War between 2010 and 2012.
Rantburg.com and borderlandbeat.com correspondent and author Chris Covert presents his first non-fiction work detailing
the drug and gang related violence in Mexico.
Chris gives us Mexican press dispatches of drug and gang war violence
over three years, presented in a multi volume set intended to chronicle the death, violence and mayhem which has
dominated Mexico for six years.
Rantburg was assembled from recycled algorithms in the United States of America. No
trees were destroyed in the production of this weblog. We did hurt some, though. Sorry.
