We kind of know what Obamas new strategy for Afghanistan means for that country: hes squared the differences between two of his generals. Gen Stanley McChrystal will get most of what he asked for (though its worth bearing in mind that he apparently asked for half of what he thought he needed). Gen Rahm Emmanuel has got his war plan for politics back home.
McChrystal gets the first shot: he has 18 months to see what can be achieved from the COIN bible, FM 3-24. Meanwhile, back in the US, watching the poll numbers like a hawk will be White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emmanuel.
The Democratic Party will go into the mid-term elections next year with a comfortable majority in the two houses of Congress, so Emmanuel can take the risk of alienating the anti-war camp in the party base then. But July 2011, the date when Obama has suggested the troops may start to return home from Afghanistan, is when the big show begins, the US presidential election season.
If things are still going badly in Afghanistan at that point, you can bet your bottom dollar that Gen Emmanuel will unleash his legendary anger until he gets his way and the US scampers out of Afghanistan.
Here in Pakistan, we should all be praying that Gen McChrystal succeeds and Emmanuel is kept on a leash.
Heres why. Cut through the rhetoric and public posturing of American officials and you begin to see an understanding of the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan that is perhaps not as removed from the Pakistani security establishments view as many may think.
First, Pakistan has argued vehemently that the insurgency in Afghanistan is self-sustaining and that while it may get some support from tribal badlands along the Pak-Afghan border, the contribution is not decisive.
And guess what? McChrystal himself agrees: While the existence of safe havens in Pakistan does not guarantee Isaf failure, Afghanistan does require Pakistani cooperation and action against violent militancy, particularly against those groups active in Afghanistan, he wrote in his now-public assessment of the situation in Afghanistan.
Strikingly, in the two short paragraphs devoted to Pakistan in the section External influences, McChrystal also thought it fit to point out this: Nonetheless, the insurgency in Afghanistan is predominantly Afghan. By defending the population, improving sub-national governance, and giving disenfranchised rural communities a voice in their government, [the Afghan government] with support from Isaf can strengthen Afghanistan against both domestic and foreign insurgent penetration.
For those predisposed to focusing on differences and disagreements, this may not mean much, but in terms of a counter-insurgency strategy in which no side gets all that it wants, it isnt all doom and gloom.
Second, the US dislike of Pakistans prioritisation approach to fighting militants here isnt necessarily fatal to relations between the two countries.
This is what McChrystal has written: The major insurgent groups in order of their threat to the mission [in Afghanistan] are: the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST), the Haqqani Network (HQN) and the Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG).
None of those groups have been the focus of counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency operations by the Pakistani security forces and that remains a source of a good deal of tension between the US and Pakistan.
But we need to zoom out a bit. Heres what Obama said on Tuesday: Our overarching goal remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.
Add to this the fact that stability is a key concern of the Americans in Pakistan and you really have three broad clusters of militants that the US is worried about in this region: the Afghan-centric Taliban (the cluster of the so-called Quetta shura and the Haqqani and Hekmatyar networks), the Pakistan-centric Taliban (TTP and its affiliates) and of course Al Qaeda.
Pakistan is seriously fighting two of those clusters: the Pakistani Taliban attacking the state and Al Qaeda. Despite the occasional prickly American statements about Pakistan knowing where Al Qaeda leaders are, few would seriously argue that Pakistan has any interest in keeping Al Qaeda active in the region.
So two out of three isnt a terrible situation, and the Americans know this. Moreover, they know something about our limitations in attacking the third group, the Afghan-centric militants.
First, there is the problem of opening too many fronts simultaneously and over stretching the security forces. Second, there are some very real questions about the so-called Quetta shura. Does it exist in the shape and form the Americans claim? And if it does, what exactly can Pakistan do about it?
To the extent that Afghan Taliban are hiding out in Balochistan, they are doing so in the refugee camps that have been there for years. Do you bomb the camps or send in troops? Why not just pack up the camps and send the refugees back to Afghanistan, where the Afghan and American forces can deal with them, instead?
And to those Americans obsessing over Pakistans lack of action against the Afghan Taliban, why not throw their own commanders words back at them the existence of safe havens in Pakistan does not guarantee Isaf failure?
So the McChrystal phase of Obamas new strategy in Afghanistan should not lead to an immediate worsening of relations between the US and Pakistan.
But if it doesnt succeed not least because of the narrow window McChrystal has been given to produce results we here in Pakistan should be very worried about the Rahm Emmanuel phase.
McChrystals plan is the last chance saloon. If it fails, the Americans will only see a few very unsettling things in the region from afar: an unstable Afghanistan with the Afghan Taliban resurgent; a Pak-Afghan border that is the stamping ground of all kinds of militants, headlined by Al Qaeda, and the source of reverse strategic depth for penetration into Pakistan proper; and a nuclear-armed Pakistan beset by perennial political instability, racked by militant violence and paranoid about Indian designs in the region.
Bomb em, squeeze em, bury em whatever the Americans will choose to do then, it wont be pretty and it definitely will not enhance Pakistans interests or stability.
Few anywhere have reacted with confidence that the McChrystal phase will work. So if youre a Pakistani who believes in miracles, now is the time to be fervently praying for one. Because chances are you wont want to see what the Emmanuel phase will look like.
by Marcus Noland, Peterson Institute for International Economics
North Korea announced a surprise currency reform this week. The move isn't about good economics, however; it is yet another stratagem by the central authorities to short-circuit the development of an entrepreneurial class independent of the state.
Currency reforms are not a bad thing in principle. Stable governments historically have used this tactic to draw a line under bad economic policies of the past, often after taming a hyperinflation. Good reforms typically involve knocking zeros off the old paper and issuing new currency, perhaps at approximate parity to major currencies such as the dollar or the euro to make it easier for citizens to hold their government accountable for macroeconomic performance. In recent years Turkey and Ghana, among others, have successfully implemented such reforms.
What occurred Monday in North Korea is different. Unlike a Turkish or Ghanaian-style reform, in which all citizens are encouraged to convert all their holdings of the old currency, the North Korean regime limits the amount of currency that can be converted. This renders excess holdings worthless, and has set off the frenzy this week to get out of old won and into anything else--dollars, Chinese yuan, physical goods--that will maintain value. Any economic "reform" also creates opportunities to parcel out benefits, as with a 2002 price and wage reform that favored the military.
This move is part of Pyongyang's broader effort to curtail the rise of market activities and the development of pathways to wealth--and potentially power--beyond state control. Participants in North Korea's bootstrap capitalism include everyone from laid-off factory workers to government officials who exploit their inside knowledge to deal privately in everything from grain to imported Chinese consumer goods.
In a society so highly atomized by the government, a private-sector market would be one of the few ways for North Koreans to interact with each other away from the state's watchful eyes. So it stands to reason the regime would be worried about the market quite apart from any subversion of the state's own economic machinery. Roughly every decade since the founding of the country in 1948, the government has initiated a currency reform or similar policy to confiscate the savings and working capital of private entrepreneurs.
The Swiss are the most tolerant and open-minded people in Europe; this is due to the make-up of their country which is comprised of a blend of three peoples, and so [Switzerland] is a country that speaks German, French and Italian. There is no other country in the world that is made up of the same ingredients and which has lived in peace under one roof for hundreds of years. The ban on minaret construction in Switzerland represents a test for two categories [of Swiss society], firstly the blend of Europeans that make up the population of Geneva, and secondly the Muslim community; this is a great test for all, the Muslims and others.
This time I can confidently say that the Muslims have succeeded where in the past they have failed, and this is in dealing with issues that they feel are against them, which is something that only serves to provoke them, whether this is religiously, politically, or personally. We are aware that many Muslims suffer from a general feeling of persecution, sometimes legitimately, and sometimes illegitimately, but there can be no doubt that the vote to ban minarets frustrated the Muslim population.
The Muslims may have lost [the right] to build minarets, but despite this they succeeded because they did not burn flags or threaten anybody and they did not take part in noisy demonstrations in 40 countries across the world. The majority voted against them in Switzerland, with 57 percent voting to ban the construction of minarets, and this committed the Swiss government to [implement] this despite its opposition to this measure because the Swiss system is based upon the referendum of its citizens on every detail, and this is more than is done in other European countries.
The Muslims have won because their objection was logical, constitutional, moral, and cultural; it was a protest without noise or controversy or attacks. Why was this response so calm? Is this because only the building of minarets is forbidden, and not the construction of mosques or schools? Or have they become bored of protests and demonstrations? Or is it because the Muslims in Switzerland constitute one of the smallest Muslim minorities in Europe, and number just 400,000? Or is there a greater awareness and understanding of the laws and dynamics of political action in this politically-free country?
I believe that all of the above is correct, and the most important thing in my opinion is that there is a growing awareness among the Islamic leaders that expressing anger to the public in a violent manner does not achieve anything, and only serves to harm the reputation of all Muslims. The Swiss politicians that raised their objections to this law and its results repeated an important point which is that the public reaction to the referendum was a result of the Muslims bad image. While it is wrong to punish a group of people for the actions of individuals, this is the reality of life [for Muslims] in the non-Muslim world, and the Muslims are suffering an image crisis not just in Europe and America, but in Russia, China, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere. However what distinguishes countries like Switzerland is that they are open minded, and listen to opinions from multiple perspectives, and now the far right has triggered a campaign of intimidation against mosques and minarets and Muslims in general, and was successful in gaining votes but only by a small majority. This means that if the Muslim leadership had explained their position and reassured the Swiss, they may have succeeded in redressing the balance in favour of minaret construction etc. All that was needed was six percent of votes to change their minds. This result is not bad considering the intimidation campaign versus no campaign at all from the other.
Posted by: Fred ||
12/04/2009 00:00 ||
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#1
Nah - they didn't protest because those numbered accounts might disappear if they upset the wrong folks...
#2
Wrong- the Swiss are not open-minded, they have contempt for outsiders which is natural when you see the invaders (not only Muslims, but gypsies from Romania and others from the Balkans) roll into town and don't assimilate.
As for the "it was a protest without noise or controversy or attacks. ", give 'em time. Haven't seen an over-under on the projected protest death toll, but I'm going with five.
#3
Hansen *isn't* an insider to CRU. He wouldn't have access to their systems in that fashion. If he's the leak, he'd have to have hacked or sponsored the hack. Highly unlikely. I kind of think people are just connecting dots they've noticed, because they can be seen, not because those points are particularly proximate. Sort of like mountain peaks rising up out of a heavy cloudbank.
Posted by: Mitch H. ||
12/04/2009 9:10 Comments ||
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#4
I truly wish Hansen would get fingered as the guy responsible, especially if it resulted in a whole slew of his disciples at GISS having their careers ruined.
The one group that is part of the cabal that hasn't been touched yet is NOAA. Early on as VP, Al Gore made it his personal mission to both break their resistance to his schemes, and fully corrupt them into supporting them.
I even got his free DVD, produced by NOAA, mostly for the video footage on it of the Arctic, but unfortunately I pitched it long ago. It was the prototype for Al's movie.
#9
It appears what was 'leaked' was a zip file possibly prepared for a FOI request and then distributed for review by interested parties - ie "Do you have a problem with us releasing this stuff?"
Which makes Hansen releasing it after deleting stuff incriminating to him and his cronies at least possible.
If so, Jones and others at CRU must be livid.
Note that CRU has said nothing about how the material was 'lost'.
"Governments that are incapable ofto pluck at randomenforcing their southern border, reducing waiting times for routine operations to below two years, or doing something about the nightly ritual of car-torching youths, are nevertheless taken seriously when they claim to be able to change the very heavensif only they can tax and regulate us enough."
#1
Everything seems to be blocked by the empoyer's content filter. Not the 'Burg, yet.
Posted by: Bobby ||
12/04/2009 6:08 Comments ||
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#2
"Theres a legal concept known as fruit of the poison tree. Basically, it states that any evidence or conclusions derived from improper or illegal techniques are inadmissible in court".
A bit off topic, but this "concept" has always bugged me. This is not a law; this is some judge getting PO'd at the cops for illegal search, so to punish the cops, he lets the guilty perp go. Then it became precedent and enshrined in case law. Wrong on any number of points: The cops aren't punished, the public is. The judge conflates two separate crimes - just because the cop breaks a law doesn't mean the accused should get a free pass. Use the evidence against the perp and charge the cop with whatever crime he committed.
Under this concept, if a cop was sure that Joe Blow was a serial killer and had a victim in his basement and he broke in and rescued the victim, the serial killer couldn't be charged because the evidence was obtained illegally.
Past time to focus on finding the truth as opposed to treading an ever more complex maze of case law hoops.
#3
The emphasis is on preventing events that are highly improbable in the first place. So, governments tax their citizens billions to prevent something that is unlikely to occur. And when, imagine that, this improbable event doesnt occur, its proof that the economy wrecking policy is working.
Politicians also love the speculated probabilty/risk system of persuasion for its convienient escape valve. After this type of scheme is inacted, should there be proof that the policy is failing the excuse template follows a predictable path. The first step is to create a diversion. Find a strawman and stick with him. The second step is to imply universal ignorance. Even the critics of a policy are included when its implied that no one could have possibly predicted the short commings. And finally, announce that the original policy may have worked had it just been allowed to fully develop. The intent of this blame shifting system is to allow for the continuation of the same policy in a differnet vehicle. There are pleanty of examples of how the speculated probabilty/risk scheme works in practice. For instance, how about the policies adopted to address the US economic situation? Now that theres serious doubts about the Stimulus Package meet the son of Stimulus The Jobs Creation Package.
A multi-volume chronology and reference guide set detailing three years of the Mexican Drug War between 2010 and 2012.
Rantburg.com and borderlandbeat.com correspondent and author Chris Covert presents his first non-fiction work detailing
the drug and gang related violence in Mexico.
Chris gives us Mexican press dispatches of drug and gang war violence
over three years, presented in a multi volume set intended to chronicle the death, violence and mayhem which has
dominated Mexico for six years.
Rantburg was assembled from recycled algorithms in the United States of America. No
trees were destroyed in the production of this weblog. We did hurt some, though. Sorry.
Europe-style entitlements mean Europe-sized defenses. 
