Russian-backed separatists launched a long-anticipated offensive maneuver on June 3 that fully severed a fraying ceasefire in eastern Ukraine. After weeks of military buildup and operational expansion along the front line, the Russian-backed forces stormed government-held military positions immediately west of the separatist stronghold of Donetsk before being driven back by Ukrainian troops. The rebel stormed nothing. Their drones found a weak spot in Ukrainian defenses near Marinka and they exploited it.
A sustained Russian-backed offensive on these frontline positions may function as component of a larger maneuver to push south along the strategic Donetsk-Mariupol highway. The maneuver around Donetsk may also be part of a coordinated tandem offensive, a signature of Russia’s hybrid operations in eastern Ukraine. Since June 3rd, rebel and Ukrainian forces have been dug in in Marinka with little indication from either side of anything other holding their static positions.
Russian-backed separatists may synchronize the offensive west of Donetsk with a maneuver operation around the city of Artemivsk, a gateway to Ukraine’s regional military and administrative headquarters. Artemovsk is a huge bite, and with available forces the rebels cannot take it with any operational maneuver. I submit that the operational depth both Ukrainian and rebel forces are capable of without air cover and without professional artillery spotters limits their depth to about 10 miles, max.
Moscow and the separatists may apply a large-scale tandem offensive to bully Kyiv into a peace settlement on their own terms for the third time in a year. The timing of the offensive on the morning after restarted ceasefire negotiations, which Kyiv accused the Russian delegation of abandoning, points to the existence of a political objective behind the operation. (snip)
Russian-backed separatists launched an offensive maneuver in eastern Ukraine early Wednesday morning, May 3, shattering the last semblance of a loose 100-day ceasefire that the separatists have steadily dismantled since April. He must mean June 3rd.
Wednesday’s assault on Ukrainian positions west of the separatist stronghold of Donetsk (1 on map) is the largest the Russian-backed forces have mounted since their February 18 capture of Debaltseve (2 on map), a key transit hub. (snip)
Russian-backed separatists under the flag of the self-styled “Donetsk People’s Republic” (DNR) assaulted Ukrainian positions around Marinka and Krasnohorivka (3 on map), government-controlled urban areas bordering the western city districts of DNR-held Donetsk. The Ukrainian military reported intensive bombardment and separatist attempts to encircle Ukrainian “Anti-Terrorist Operation” (ATO) forces west of Donetsk using a combination of armor and heavy weapons such as “Grad” multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). Both sides used heavy weapons.
International monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) recorded the movement of columns of heavy weapons moving toward southwestern Donetsk in the hours preceding the attack. According to the Ukrainian military, ATO forces in the area endured two large waves of assaults which killed at least three Ukrainian soldiers, wounded over 30, and left Marinka and Krasnohorivka in flames. Aleksandr Zakharcheko said 400 Ukrainians were killed, while militia say it was closer to 200.
Ukraine’s military claimed to have repelled the separatist maneuver after a reportedly 1,000-man combined arms force made inroads into the government-held areas west of Donetsk. The general staff of the Ukrainian armed forces announced that it redeployed heavy artillery withdrawn under the ceasefire agreement to the front line in response to the separatist offensive.
Reports of heavy shelling inside DNR-held Donetsk suggest that Ukrainian troops targeted the urban terrain that the separatists appear to have been using as a shielded launch point for attacks. Ukrainian forces claimed to have cleared separatist mechanized infantry from the town of Marinka, which separatist forces partially captured earlier in the day. ATO forces reportedly withdrew into Marinka from a checkpoint on a highway linking Donetsk to Ukrainian-held Zaporizhia, the capital of the neighboring province to the west. Rebels say Marinka is split in two.
The escalation of separatist offensive activity along the front line since April 2015 places the maneuver west of Donetsk in the context of the larger Russian-backed military operation in eastern Ukraine. Following the capture of Debaltseve, both the separatist and Ukrainian forces began withdrawing heavy weapons in accordance with the February “Minsk II” ceasefire agreement.
The separatists continued to engage Ukrainian forces with indirect fire around key areas, most notably the ATO positions north of Donetsk and east of Mariupol (4 on map), the strategic city that anchors the highway from the separatists’ republics to Russian-held Crimea. Separatist forces began redeploying heavy weapons to the front line in April under the guise of preparations for May 9 “Victory Day” military parades. Both sides fired artillery at one another, and both sides claim the other started it.
Russia and the separatists have adapted Soviet operational art to their hybrid campaign in order to penetrate the Ukrainian front. The separatists gradually increased attacks from heavy weapons banned under the ceasefire agreement as the Russian-backed forces began bolstering their offensive capabilities along the front line in April. If they were using "Soviet Operational Art" they would have aircraft. "Soviet Operational Art" also means that forces will be pushed into a maneuver regardless of dangers to the flanks, just so long as sufficient relief forces are available with the maneuver meets enemy action, and sufficient forces have been committed to "keeping the door open". Even Russian backed, the rebels have none of those things.
Over the course of several weeks the separatists broadened their offensive operations, expanding their artillery targets from a few key Ukrainian positions to the majority of the front line. The separatists’ operational shift from isolated shelling to widespread attacks across a large front disguised preparations for the maneuver west of Donetsk, an area untouched during the ceasefire period until the night of May 27. Wrong. Rebels and Ukrainian artillery have been firing at one another, off and on since February 15th.
Russian-backed separatists engaged Ukrainian forces around other key areas as the offensive transpired west of Donetsk and in the day following the maneuver. Ukrainian positions north of Donetsk received intensive shelling while positions east of Mariupol endured an uptick in shelling after recent periods of relative calm. At least two incidents of shelling deep into Ukrainian territory were reported from June 1 to June 3, demonstrating longer range than the separatists have typically exhibited in the “Minsk II” ceasefire period.
Several attempts by the separatists to break through the frontline in areas away from Donetsk were reported during the same timeframe including at least one successful penetration. The separatists may have engaged ATO forces around other potential targets in order to prevent Ukraine from concentrating troops around Donetsk. Continued dispersed attacks also enable the separatists to probe for weak points in the Ukrainian defenses in order to launch a second synchronized maneuver. Which Marinka was the main probe.
The operational design that the separatists are using now likely mimics the tandem Russian- backed separatist offensive maneuvers that bookended the first Minsk ceasefire period. In August and early September 2014, Russian-backed separatists conducted a maneuver to envelop the rail hub of Ilovaisk (5 on map) while a regular Russian armored column opened a new front in the conflict by seizing coastal terrain (6 on map) along the Azov Sea. In January and February 2015, Russian-backed separatists seized the Donetsk airport before combined Russian-separatist forces encircled Debaltseve. Ilovaisk, to repeat, was a rebel defensive operation. Two Ukrainian battalions attempted to execute a large encirclement of Donetsk city, and they failed when one Ukrainian battalion withdrew from the front and the others were counterattacked and stopped cold at Ilovaisk. No one was there to "hold the door open".
The other rebel maneuver, the one in which rebel forces attempted to take Mariupol, surprised me.
These tandem offensives brought Kyiv to the negotiating table with the separatists and Moscow. The two ceasefires out of these negotiations allowed Russia to gradually bolster the military capacity of the separatists and consolidate the territorial gains made during the hot war into defensible proxy political entities. It is likely that Russia and the separatists will reapply this operational design in the current offensive to maximize territorial gains before Ukrainian forces are able to form a coherent response.
The Russian-backed separatist offensive around Marinka and Krasnohorivka may serve several operational and strategic objectives that are not mutually exclusive. These two urban areas lay between the separatists and a major government-held reservoir and thermal power plant in the city of Kurakhove (7 on map), 20 kilometers west of Donetsk. These infrastructure points provide clean water and energy for many separatist-held areas.
Separatist leaders have highlighted the priority of securing major infrastructure points as a means to create viable states independent of Kyiv. Separatists have often targeted Ukrainian-held energy infrastructure along the front line, resulting in regular outages particularly during the winter period. Kurakhove’s strategic position on elevated terrain would also make it highly defensible as a westernmost point of separatist control. Separatist penetration beyond Marinka and Krasnohorivka would reveal Kurakhove as the probable target of the maneuver.
The way the rebels operate, it may be August before they can make Kurakhove.
The maneuver launched on June 3 is more likely part of an operation to seize the northern leg of the Donetsk-Mariupol H20 highway (8 on map). Russian-backed forces began shelling both Marinka and areas of the highway south of Donetsk at the end of May after three months of inactivity and continued to target the Ukrainian positions on the highway during the offensive maneuver. The coincidence of attacks west and south of Donetsk suggests that these efforts are part of a single coordinated operation to seize the H20 highway.
Marinka acts as the forward most Ukrainian positon (sic) to southwestern Donetsk, a primary axis from which the separatists would likely launch an assault on that road. The capture of the government-controlled highway is a necessary precondition for a Russian-backed siege on the strategic port city of Mariupol.
A separatist advance into Marinka and intensified targeting of Ukrainian positions south of Donetsk would indicate that the H20 is the target of the operation.
If the tandem offensive is underway, Russian-backed separatist offensive operations will likely sharply intensify around a government-held pocket between the separatist frontline cities of Horlivka (9 on map) and Pervomaysk (10 on map).The second Russian-backed maneuver in this set would likely focus on the highway between separatist-held Debaltseve and Ukrainian-controlled Artemivsk (11 on map). IMO, Artemovsk is a likely target with sufficient forces. Artemovsk is a supply/road hub for Ukrainian forces blocking the road to Slavyansk.
Artemivsk is strategic gateway to the Kyiv-backed regional government and the ATO headquarters in northern Donetsk Oblast (12 on map). Separatist forces are well positioned to attempt to encircle Artemivsk from the western and eastern flanks. Separatist forces demonstrated that the city is in range of both their artillery systems and their infantry sabotage groups on the night of June 1 by launching small attacks around Artemivsk, 15 kilometers beyond the front line. The rebels couldn't maneuver the cut off Debaltsevo north of Svetlodarsk when they were prepared in February. They had to settle for Logvinovka.
The decision of the separatists, and likely Russian President Vladimir Putin himself, to launch an offensive as ceasefire negotiations resume likely indicates their intentions to apply military force to extract political concessions from Kyiv. Representatives from Ukraine, Russia and the separatist “republics” gathered in the Belarussian capital on the eve of the offensive to discuss the implementation of the February “Minsk II” agreement.
#4
Surprised me Russia hasn't swallowed the entire Ukraine yet. Either I overestimate their capabilities (they are sorta fighting through proxies) or Putin is punching light hoping not to offend folks any more than he has to.
#7
Several times I have sarcastically mentioned that von Manstein would clean up this messy operation very quickly. I'll rephrase that obscure reference: Why is there a seeming lack of creative military tactics/resolve/leadership on either side? The Crips versus the Bloods show more sophistication in the art of warfare!
#9
I'd say Russia's strategy is to wait for Ukraine to go completely broke and the EU stops giving them money. Then Putin will have a peace settlement on his terms.
Crimea is a gateway to the Mediterranean. The Russians would have fought over that.
The only reason the Ukraine matters is that it makes the Rooskis twitchy to have hostile forces (like NATO) on their borders. There is some historical precedent for this, along with the fact that Russia is basically flat and indefensible. We are lucky the Canadians are so well-behaved.
[DAWN] THE $46 billion investment tag being associated with the China-Pakistain Economic Corridor could be transformational. But its ultimate fate will depend on whether Pakistani is able to fulfil its side of the bargain.
This is going to be a tall order. The corridor will involve a series of complicated infrastructure and investment projects needing more than political will to execute. The actual ability of government institutions to conceive specific projects, ensure transparency and accountability in their implementation, and alter and introduce federal or provincial rules and routines necessary to removing red tape would be crucial. Current capacities and attitudes won't do.
We would require additional human resource capacity, especially technical expertise in the relevant government departments; resources will have to be realigned to support the parts of government and private-sector entities most involved in the initiative; and our bureaucratic approaches that thrive on hindering processes will need to be turned around.
Pakistain's track record isn't encouraging. Even the recent history of engagement with China is poor. President Zardari made somewhat of a habit out of signing MOUs with Chinese companies. The Sharif government hasn't let off on this either.
But what most don't realise is that between 2001 and 2011, only 60pc of Chinese pledged aid was actually delivered in terms of projects on the ground. In the majority of cases, it was lack of seriousness, capacity, or resources on the Pak side that dissuaded Chinese counterparts from following through.
Posted by: Fred ||
06/09/2015 00:00 ||
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[DAWN] AS the one-year anniversary of the launch of Operation Zarb-e-Azb ..the Pak offensive against Qaeda in Pakistain and the Pak Taliban in North Wazoo. The name refers to the sword of the Prophet (PTUI!)... approaches, it is helpful to recall just how much has changed inside Pakistain over the last year on the security front -- and how much has not.
Consider first consecutive ISPR blurbs. First, speaking on Sunday in Colombo to a group of Sri Lankan soldiers trained in Pakistain, army chief Gen Raheel Sharif had this to say: "Referring to the ongoing operation Zarb-e-Azb, COAS said ... we have successfully dismantled their infrastructure and created significant effects. We as a nation are determined to take this surge to its logical end, whatever it may take."
Then, yesterday, an ISPR blurb had this to say: "19 bad boyz were potted including five of their commanders in an intense exchange of fire with security forces last night in uncleared pocket along NWA-Afghan border."
While the two claims are far from contradictory, together they underscore that the challenge in North Wazoo is far from over (as Sunday's killing of seven soldiers in the area shows) -- and that for all the gains there, militancy and terrorism are far from being in terminal decline.
Perhaps one of the biggest ongoing concerns about North Waziristan is how little has changed in terms of the media and the public's access to information from the region.
Before Zarb-e-Azb, when large swathes of territory were effectively ruled by turbans, it was apparent why there was, by and large, a news blackout and only rare access to independent information.
Then, as the military leadership pushed the political government to abandon its campaign to try and secure a peace deal with the banned TTP, there was, for a brief while, a window provided in the military mindset and the strategic approach to North Waziristan. Quickly enough, however, that evaporated.
Today, for example, how many can be sure about the operational endgame in the tribal agency? Has the military or politicianship provided any timelines, however loose, for when the much-expected-but-yet-to-materialise push in the Shawal region will begin? Also, what are the measures being taken to secure the Pak-Afghan border to prevent bully boyz from re-entering?
Finally, and perhaps most critically, what efforts are being made to track down and capture or eliminate turban leaders from North Waziristan whichever side of the border they may be?
In asking these questions, military officials tend to be aggressive in response or dismissive all together.
Clearly, the present army chief did well by launching Zarb-e-Azb. It had been delayed too long under the previous military leadership and the political government's strategy of first trying to secure a peace deal with elements of the TTP had only given the bully boyz yet more space and time to consolidate and regroup.
But if an operation was needed, that surely cannot mean no further questions should be asked. A militarised strategy in North Waziristan or Fata does not appear to have within it the seeds of long-term peace in the region.
Posted by: Fred ||
06/09/2015 00:00 ||
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Top|| File under: Govt of Pakistan
A multi-volume chronology and reference guide set detailing three years of the Mexican Drug War between 2010 and 2012.
Rantburg.com and borderlandbeat.com correspondent and author Chris Covert presents his first non-fiction work detailing
the drug and gang related violence in Mexico.
Chris gives us Mexican press dispatches of drug and gang war violence
over three years, presented in a multi volume set intended to chronicle the death, violence and mayhem which has
dominated Mexico for six years.
Rantburg was assembled from recycled algorithms in the United States of America. No
trees were destroyed in the production of this weblog. We did hurt some, though. Sorry.
Wazoo
