[TheAviationist] You can monitor online the U.S. RC-135S Cobra Ball aircraft used to track ballistic missiles reentry vehicles and warheads during the final phase of flight.
Early in the morning on Jul. 4, North Korea successfully tested an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) for the first time.
The ICBM, referred to as Hwasong-14, reached a height of 2,802 kilometers, according to the state-run Korea Central Television (KCTV). The missile was launched from Panghyon, in North Pyongan province, and flew into waters east of the Korean Peninsula after traveling for about 930 kilometers.
The latest missile launch, as well as the previous ones, was almost certainly monitored by the U.S. Forces deployed to the region, using a variety of aerial, ground-based, sea-going assets.
The U.S. Air Force relies on its small contingent of RC-135S Cobra Ball missile tracking aircraft. Based at Offutt Air Force Base, outside Omaha, Nebraska, and flown by the 45th Reconnaissance Squadron, these intelligence gathering aircraft are often deployed where needed to track ballistic missiles reentry vehicles and warheads during the final phase of flight. The aircraft is equipped with a powerful radar array on the starboard side of the fuselage, just aft of the cockpit. Several optical quality windows are mounted on the starboard side as well, allowing infrared and visible spectrum cameras to record the warheads during their final moments of flight. A distinctive feature of the Cobra Ball is the black low-glare paint used on the starboard wing, to improve image quality and prevent glare during photography.
Unsurprisingly, two Cobra Ball aircraft (61-2662 and 61-2663) are currently deployed to Yokota Air Base, Japan, from where it is launched when there are signs of an imminent North Korean test. What is far more surprising is the fact that, in spite of their important role, RC-135S aircraft are among the military planes that can be tracked online by exploiting the signals broadcast by their Mode S/ADS-B transponders.
By observing the activities of the RC-135S in Japan you may have a pretty clear idea of what is happening or about to happen in North Korea. For instance, last night, the fact that the Cobra Ball was airborne from Yokota might suggest that the U.S. intelligence had detected activities at the launch site and was preparing to monitor the test. This is the reason why I tweeted the following (later confirmed by the news of the ICBM test):
#1
President Trump a couple of days ago said patience with N. Korea had run out. Apparently he knew what was about to happen. If he has that good intelligence then he can prevent a launch before hand.
In recent months, the Chinese-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has left Pakistanis emboldened, Indians angry, and US analysts worried. Ostensibly, CPEC will connect Pakistan to China’s western Xinjiang province through the development of vast new transportation and energy infrastructure.
The project is part of China’s much-hyped Belt and Road Initiative, a grand, increasingly vague geopolitical plan bridging Eurasia that China’s powerful President Xi Jinping has promoted heavily. Pakistani and Chinese officials boast that CPEC will help address Pakistan’s electricity generation problem, bolster its road and rail networks, and shore up the economy through the construction of special economic zones.
Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership alike have told the public that CPEC will solve Pakistan’s chronic electricity shortages, improve an aging road and rail infrastructure, provide a fillip to Pakistan’s economy, knit an increasingly pariah state to a new Chinese-led geopolitical order, and diminish the role of the much-reviled United States in the region.
Despite the bold claims made by China and Pakistan, there are many reasons to be dubious about the purported promises of CPEC.
There’s already violence all along the corridor. The north-most part of CPEC is the Karakoram Highway (KKH), which gashes through the Karakoram Mountain Range to connect Kashgar in Xinjiang with Pakistan’s troubled province of Gilgit-Baltistan. The project is more inclined to leave Pakistan burdened with unserviceable debt while further exposing the fissures in its internal security. There’s also the stubborn problem of economic competitiveness.
For CPEC to be more competitive than the North-South Corridor that is rooted to the Iranian port of Chabahar, Gwador needs to offer a safer and shorter route from the Arabian Sea to Central Asia. For that to happen, Gwador needs to be connected by road to the Afghan Ring Road in Afghanistan’s Kandahar province, which is under sustained attacks by the Afghan Taliban. Alternatively, a new route could connect Gwador with the border crossing at Torkham (near Peshawar) by traveling up Balochistan, with its own active ethnic insurgency, through or adjacent to Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, which is the epicenter of Islamist terrorism and insurgency throughout Pakistan. It takes great faith — or idiocy, or greed, or all of the above — to believe that this is possible.
Analyst Andrew Small, among others, has argued that CPEC is, in reality, a redundant supply route for China should it face an embargo during a military conflict. It’s also possible that if the port at Gwador is not economically sustainable the real goal is the creation of a Chinese naval outpost. Many in India, Pakistan’s historic rival, have also come to this conclusion. They may well be correct, according to recent Chinese reports indicating that China may "expand its marine corps and may station new marine brigades in Gwadar."
Meanwhile, Pakistanis have learned that the current Chinese development model will do little for their economy. China prefers to use its own companies and employees rather than hire locally.
Pakistanis should be worried about the way CPEC is shaping up. If it is even partially executed, Pakistan would be indebted to China as never before. And unlike Pakistan’s other traditional allies, such as the United States, China will probably use its leverage to obtain greater compliance from its problematic client.
Posted by: Pappy ||
07/05/2017 00:00 ||
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[11126 views]
Top|| File under: Govt of Pakistan
#1
And the rest of the World can't afford Pakistan.
[Dawn] In a recent op-ed published by the New York Times ...which still proudly displays Walter Duranty's Pulitzer prize... , former US national security adviser Stephen J. Hadley and I argued for a US approach to Pakistain that centred on understanding Pakistain’s strategic anxieties. We argued that encouraging an India-Pakistain dialogue, including on how to coexist in Afghanistan, and efforts for a political settlement in Afghanistan offer the best hope for the US to get greater Pak support in Afghanistan.
Expectedly, a fair share of American policy readers didn’t bite. These voices much rather see the US punish Pakistain to coerce a change in its attitude. Of course, on the Pak side, you can always trust some to read too much into everything: for many here, the op-ed was a camouflaged attempt to blame Pakistain for sheltering the Afghan Taliban
Continued on Page 49
Posted by: trailing wife ||
07/05/2017 00:00 ||
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[11129 views]
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#1
The problem is a third-world shit hole wants to play the Great Game when they can't even stop bombings and killing of polio-workers and cholera. Islamists with bigger ambitions than brains or dicks
Posted by: Frank G ||
07/05/2017 9:19 Comments ||
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#2
When it comes, the next confrontation is likely to be deadlier and more dangerous for Israel.
True. Back in the day, when the Paleos were launching random rockets that only hit anything of value on the rarest of occasions, Israel could afford to sit back and play Tit-for-Tat. But now that HamAss has a big pile of shiny, dangerous toys, Israel will have to come strong at the first sign that something is jumping off. Given the danger, I'd expect them to take preemptive action despite the resulting howls of international outrage.
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