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2004-01-20 Home Front

Nine reasons why we never sent our Special Operations Forces after al Qaeda before 9/11.

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Posted by tipper 2004-01-20 8:49:37 AM|| || Front Page|| [2 views since 2007-05-07] Top

#1 The article blames fear of casualties, careerism and political caution. But the truth is that all are real concerns. The reason people in the military want total commitment is because it looks bad when the US goes after a target and fails - a reputation for failure is just as bad for deterrence as a reputation for timidity. And then, of course, there are the human costs - it's a waste of highly-trained troops and bad for morale when a mission fails miserably. Special forces strikes in foreign countries are akin to suicide missions - it's one thing to use special forces to scout out terrain, and quite another to initiate direct action. In Iraq, the reason special forces worked in securing the oil fields was because the regular troops were massed at the Kuwaiti border. If tens of thousands of US troops had not presented a threat at the Kuwaiti border, the Iraqis would have had plenty of time to knock off special forces teams one by one. Once their locations are revealed through the initiation of the assault, special forces teams are basically sitting ducks - against hordes of Somali fighters in Mogadishu, they gave a good account of themselves but were overwhelmed by sheer numbers.

Careerism is a real issue because unlike mishaps outside of the military realm, failure in military operations is catastrophic and involves dead soldiers. Failure is career-ending and can lead to long-time professionals being cashiered out of the military. Unlike failures in business, which are typically obscure, everyone hears about military failures. This is a heavy burden to take up, considering the high likelihood of disaster.

What people forget is that while the US military does have well-trained men, the reason it usually prevails is because of the ready availability of massed firepower - whether it takes the form of massed artillery barrages or smart bombs. Without the massed firepower in its favor, the odds are considerably slimmer. The problem with special forces efforts is that the massed firepower is in the enemy's favor and the enemy typically outnumbers US special forces by an order of magnitude (10x or more). In Somalia, the opposition did not have artillery or anti-aircraft missiles, yet managed to kill 19 highly-trained American commandos because they had unlimited local supplies of ammo and men. A similar mission into Afghanistan would have encountered many more obstacles, including enemy artillery, tanks and anti-aircraft missiles.

Political caution is also understandable - special forces missions are extremely risky and a failed mission can cause significant political damage. Clinton is still remembered today for the Mogadishu fiasco. Les Aspin died within six months of that disaster, probably out of a mixture of stress and guilt.

The solution to these issues isn't to send small teams of men into the lion's den - it's to emphasize areas where America's military has the advantage. Instead of teams of men skulking around, destroy the military facilities of countries that sponsor terror. (For example, carry out variations of the airstrikes in Libya). Unlike many others, I think Clinton did the right thing in launching cruise missile strikes, but the wrong thing in trying to avoid collateral damage. Reagan's airstrikes against Libya killed members of Ghadafi's family, and put him on notice that Libyan terror attacks would put not just him, but his family at risk. And in attacking al Qaeda camps, Clinton also chose the wrong targets. A more effective response would have been to systematically take out Taliban front line positions. Would Iran dare to sponsor terror attacks if the consequence was the destruction of Iran's air force? Its navy? The point here is that political leaders need to risk their political capital on missions that simultaneously have a high likelihood of success and leverage America's strengths. Special forces missions do not fit that profile.

Posted by Zhang Fei 2004-1-20 10:27:54 AM|| 2004-1-20 10:27:54 AM|| Front Page Top

#2 In Iraq, the reason special forces worked in securing the oil fields was because the regular troops were massed at the Kuwaiti border. If tens of thousands of US troops had not presented a threat at the Kuwaiti border, the Iraqis would have had plenty of time to knock off special forces teams one by one.

I should also have mentioned that US forces had air supremacy over Iraq, with both choppers and fixed-wing assets in place to carry out close air support in case special forces teams got into trouble.

Posted by Zhang Fei 2004-1-20 10:31:31 AM|| 2004-1-20 10:31:31 AM|| Front Page Top

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