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2004-04-09 Iraq-Jordan
German Press Review: Specter of Vietnam Haunts U.S.
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Posted by tipper 2004-04-09 10:03:49 AM|| || Front Page|| [1 views since 2007-05-07]  Top

#1 I've said this before...but I think it bears repeating. While this Vietnam thing plays well on the golden oldies channel, it's not just not pumping up the crowds.

Why does this whole Vietnam thing give me the mental image of aunts and uncles trying to boogie at a wedding? Am I the only one who sees Uncle Ted trying to do the gator but has to stop when he throws out his back?

Rock on grandpa...the rest of us will smile, laugh and give you a thumbs up, but we really aren't laughing WITH you...if you know what I mean.
Posted by B 2004-04-09 11:47:06 AM||   2004-04-09 11:47:06 AM|| Front Page Top

#2 German Press Review: Specter of Vietnam Haunts U.S.

Well let's see: about 600 or so soldiers have died in Iraq so far, so there's 57,400 more to go and at least nine more years until Vietnam is equaled. Any chance of the Veitnam experience being repeated? Nope.
Posted by Bomb-a-rama 2004-04-09 11:48:34 AM||   2004-04-09 11:48:34 AM|| Front Page Top

#3 Maybe if they said the specter of Vietnam is haunting Europe, it might be accurate.

I wish they would quit bringing up Vietnam. It always makes me want to go out and get some pho. ;)
Posted by Desert Blondie 2004-04-09 12:41:14 PM||   2004-04-09 12:41:14 PM|| Front Page Top

#4 "violence leads nowhere"
Wow, how deep! Too bad the jihadis do not know this "fact". Look what violence has brought to them- dhimmitude from most of Western Europe, a great hope of renewal of the caliphate.

Our emenies have a vision of a perfect world too. Listening to this pope will help them readily obtain their goal of worldwide peace (submission to the moon god). Uh, Holy Father, what part of "kill all infidels" do you not understand?
Posted by Craig  2004-04-09 1:15:07 PM||   2004-04-09 1:15:07 PM|| Front Page Top

#5 Its Vietnam as far as the left, Europe, and the media are concerned. The bad guys have read the playbook and decided to try to make their own Tet. The good guys are killing lots of them, just as in Tet.

If this is another Vietnam, at least we have hindsight to know not to get wobbly and listen to the appeasers and peaceniks this time.
Posted by ruprecht 2004-04-09 1:42:59 PM||   2004-04-09 1:42:59 PM|| Front Page Top

#6 russia today said this about European criticism of their ops in Chechnya
The fact that the EU countries have resorted to submitting a resolution shows that they are putting the political process in the North Caucasus region in doubt. Moreover, it is a kind of encouragement to terrorists and runs counter to the uncompromising struggle against international terrorism."

On the very same day, Russia condemned the US for a "disproportionate response" in Iraq.

Where Im from we call that chutzpah.
Posted by Liberalhawk 2004-04-09 1:48:32 PM||   2004-04-09 1:48:32 PM|| Front Page Top

#7 Here's a primer on the reasons for urban combat, the thought behind applying different levels of force and the way to win engagements, excerpted from an Army War College study:

Although there is much about the Tet attacks against Saigon and Hue that is indeed unique, the battles offer several lessons that planners and warfighters should consider in thinking about future Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT). A clear lesson is that MOUT vary in intensity. Everything from crowd control to small-unit actions to high-intensity conventional combat can occur in an urban setting. Planners should thus make an effort to ensure that planning and training reflect these variations in urban operations. Armored units that practice urban assaults using all of the firepower at their disposal, for instance, should recognize that their training is appropriate to only one form of urban warfare. Using heavy weapons to dislodge a small guerrilla unit that has seized an installation might work, but it would also prove to be politically counterproductive. But as the Battle for Hue demonstrates, if a large or well-armed enemy unit intends to use a city as a field fortification, urban warfare quickly degenerates into siege warfare, involving heavy weapons and enormous casualties and destruction.

Cities that are descending into chaos quickly must be isolated from the surrounding countryside. Whatever the source of urban turmoil—insurrection, terrorist attacks, or simple anarchy—outside reinforcements, supplies, or sympathizers must be prevented from reaching the centers of urban disturbances. If reinforcements can be kept from urban centers, units eventually will run out of ammunition, supplies, and personnel as security forces systematically isolate and neutralize pockets of resistance. In Saigon, sappers and cadre enjoyed some initial success, but were quickly killed or rounded up when their planned reinforcements were prevented from entering the city to capitalize on the turmoil they had created or the footholds they had gained. By contrast, PAVN in Hue had several days to resupply, build defenses, and carry out their house-to-house search for government officials. PAVN, however, made the mistake of not eliminating pockets of allied resistance in Hue, which allowed Allied units to mount simultaneous assaults on PAVN positions from both inside and outside Hue.

Additionally, the Tet attacks suggest that, almost by definition, urban warfare can emerge as a surprise to local inhabitants and friendly forces alike. Initially, the battles for Saigon and Hue were fought by military and base police, headquarters personnel, and logistic troops who never thought they would be called upon to defend their installations in cities that were considered relatively secure, even in the midst of a guerrilla war and insurgency.

Clearly, the mood in urban areas can change quickly. Even cities considered friendly to U.S. forces could burst into violence sparked by some external event, local incident, or opposition cadre. In other words, it is difficult to predict when latent hostility towards U.S. policy or a military presence will produce attacks on isolated American units or installations. This raises an important question. Should planners expect to have regular infantry or mechanized units positioned to respond to urban unrest? Or will armored and infantry units—which are in increasingly short supply—be confronting similar units “at the front”? Will commanders be willing or able to task their most capable units (measured in terms of their organic firepower) to guard against street disturbances?

Finally, the Tet attacks demonstrate that urban warfare is fought before an extremely attentive audience, namely, the inhabitants of the city under attack. Indeed, the decision to undertake urban operations is grave in itself: even desperate opponents are unlikely to threaten civilians and the centers and symbols of national authority unless they believe the potential political gains outweigh the risks. The way U.S. forces respond to urban disturbances is crucial, because their operations will send a political message to all concerned about the credibility of American commitments and the nature of American policy toward a specific conflict, issue, or area. In other words, it might be possible that U.S. forces could win an urban engagement, but lose political support for American objectives because of negative public perceptions concerning the conduct of U.S. military operations. Today, given the density of communication networks in urban areas, U.S. commanders must realize that MOUT will be conducted before a global audience able to observe events in real time. Given the prospects for global news coverage, urban operations will have widespread and immediate political ramifications.
Posted by Zhang Fei  2004-04-09 2:52:07 PM||   2004-04-09 2:52:07 PM|| Front Page Top

#8 Zhang - thanks, that's interesting. But saying one learned lessons from the Tet offensive (a good thing) and saying this is Bush's Tet are another. It's really like saying Bacon's Rebellion was George Washington's Revolutionary War. While their root causes were similar - they weren't the same at all....different place, time and situations.

If we have learned anything from Vietnam - it is that if you allow the media and self-interested (as opposed to nationally interested) politicians to drive your actions, then you might as well just bring the troops home and start learning the Koran.

Times have changed. Americans have changed. It just isn't Tet no matter how badly Jane Fonda, Ted Kennedy and John Kerry want to relive their glory days.

But you are right...we should learn from Tet and move forward.
Posted by anon 2004-04-09 4:15:23 PM||   2004-04-09 4:15:23 PM|| Front Page Top

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