These statutes and their enabling regulations contain sweeping prohibitions against practices by public entities that discriminate against persons with disabilities. See, e.g., Section 202 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (no qualified individual . . . shall . . . be excluded from participation . . . or be subjected to discrimination). Furthermore, using EEOC regulations as an example, it is up to Daniel and his father to decide whether to take medication to minimize undesirable psychiatric symptoms, and to consider the consequences of not taking medication. However, medication compliance (in and of itself) is not a reasonable accommodation and, therefore, it cannot form the basis for denying access to school or punishing the father.

Separately, and based directly on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the involuntary administration of medication cannot be ordered in the absence of an evidentiary hearing that provides the individual in question with ample notice and a full opportunity to be heard by the decision maker. See, e.g., Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992). Further, the involuntary administration of medication is not permissible when less intrusive alternatives exist. Id. Additionally, Daniel has a right to be placed in the least restrictive environment suitable for his status as a hyperactive (and probably bright, bored out of his mind kid), without being segregated from society as a result of any real or perceived disability. See Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998); Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999)(recipients of state services cannot be required to relinquish participation in community life that they could enjoy if given reasonable accommodations).