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2025-06-20 Syria-Lebanon-Iran
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Interpretation of Iran's missile doctrine coincides with reality
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Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
Text taken from a patarames blogpost
[ColonelCassad] As we can see, this material from five years ago has almost completely come true. Iran's strikes on Israel are now fully consistent with its missile doctrine, which took into account, among other things, the disorganization of the country's top leadership. Despite the damage suffered from attacks and sabotage, Iran retains the ability to inflict costly targeted damage, as it planned 5 years before the war. Today's strikes on the center of Tel Aviv have become quite indicative.
INTERPRETATION OF IRAN'S MISSILE DOCTRINE
Non-nuclear weapon states may have the highest conventional military capabilities, but this is always considered insufficient when it comes to nuclear war.
This intuitive view is based on two main ideas:
There is no reliable defense against nuclear weapons
Conventional weapons cannot provide a significant counter-response to the use of nuclear weapons.
Iran’s 21st century missile warfare doctrine relies on three main capabilities:
Ballistic missiles precise enough to deliver pinpoint strikes (~50 m) against key enemy assets. These could be critical targets such as power plants and other critical infrastructure, or military targets such as missile silos or missile defense early warning radars.
The launch and deployment options for ballistic missiles are designed to survive the decapitation of the military-political leadership by an adversary's nuclear attack and to accomplish the mission of inflicting serious damage on the adversary.
The damage to the adversary is inflicted at a high enough rate that any counter-campaign aimed at neutralizing Iran's missile forces will be ineffective. Once this capability can be neutralized, it has already exhausted its ballistic missile arsenal and can no longer participate in the conflict.
Once this capability is achieved, the adversary's nuclear option is neutralized by two facts:
A nuclear preemptive strike will not deprive Iran of the ability to counterattack, and what survives is sufficient to inflict damage on a scale that the adversary cannot afford.
The scale of damage, due to the ability to strike critical and high-value targets at a pinpoint level, reaches a level high enough to be comparable to what was previously possible only with nuclear weapons or, at least, with complete air superiority.
THE BASIS OF SURVIVABILITY.
In August 2020, Iran revealed a new method of basing solid-fuel ballistic missiles in underground launchers. This concept is based on the ambiguity of true and false sites, as well as the large spaces that can be exploited at so-called “missile farms.”
For a nuclear preemptive strike to neutralize these weakly defended sites, it would be necessary to strike large areas, which would increase the number of nuclear weapons needed.
Other solid-fuel ballistic missiles in Iran’s arsenal include:
Autonomous vehicles that can launch a missile quickly upon receiving an order (e.g., Sejil).
Or off-road launcher-transporters that can hide in the terrain (e.g., Dezful).
Iran’s mountainous terrain is particularly well suited to the latter of the two launch methods. Deep valleys eliminate line-of-sight for the standoff reconnaissance assets that would need it, and also provide some protection against conventional and nuclear weapons.
Another means Iran uses to improve the survivability of its missile systems is to design them small enough to disguise them as civilian trucks, for example by using plastic containers.
LIQUID-FUELED MISSILES ARE A MORE COMPLEX MATTER.
Iran prefers to retain and even expand its liquid-fueled ballistic missiles despite the availability of solid-fueled missiles for three main reasons:
The superior performance of liquid-fueled intermediate-range ballistic missiles allows for heavier payloads and longer ranges in the same size.
They can be safely stored without the risk of explosion or catastrophic cascade, making them attractive for deep tunnel construction. This is primarily due to the physical separation of the fuel and oxidizer tanks and the warheads.
When stored dry and without fuel, their service life without significant maintenance is enormous. Thus, the investment in the arsenal is designed to last for several generations, and the life cycle costs make such conventional liquid-fueled ballistic missiles attractive.
However, the problems that liquid-fueled missiles pose are also significant: A well-trained crew is needed to fuel and handle the missile.
Iran’s new generation of missiles use fuel and oxidizer combinations that cannot be used at the high temperatures typical of Iran.
So while the solid-fueled Sejil-2 can travel hundreds of kilometers disguised as a civilian truck and hide anywhere, a similar liquid-fueled missile cannot operate very far from its base.
MISSILE CITIES
The concept of storing a valuable arsenal of ballistic missiles in deep tunnel complexes is not new, with China, North Korea and Iran being the countries that have made the most extensive use of this basing concept. Iran calls such complexes “missile cities” due to their scale.
These bases are often buried so deeply in the mountains that their arsenal is protected from nuclear strikes. However, nuclear strikes on the entrances to such bases could potentially disable them for the remainder of a high-intensity conflict or reduce their value because they cannot operate their missiles until the damage is repaired.
In conventional attacks on such missile tunnel complexes, excavators and other construction equipment either reopen the entrance within a short period of time or create alternative emergency exits if necessary.
High-quality tunnel linings made of high-performance composite concrete are also used at the entrance sites.
The damage caused by conventional bunker buster bombs to such entrance structures is less than often intuitively assumed. This is true for both bunker buster bombs that can be delivered by manned aircraft and for special means such as the GBU-57.
Thus, while tens of meters of soft rock can be penetrated by such weapons, including several concrete slabs, penetration values drop sharply to a few meters or less when dealing with hard granite rock formations and/or high-performance composite concrete.
The impact of such conventional weapons on critical targets inside the tunnel complexes is virtually non-existent due to the overlying rock thickness, typically 50-100 m for the least fortified of them.
Therefore, reliable capability for rapid repair and continuous operation is guaranteed against conventional bunker buster bombs.
Here it is necessary to emphasize the criticality of the operation of such missile-tunnel systems. Since their sole purpose is to launch the entire arsenal of stored ballistic missiles, for an opponent who has aviation as the only platform for delivering bunker buster bombs, a dilemma arises: in order to deliver a bunker buster, it is necessary to suppress the enemy's integrated air defense system and ensure that it is degraded to a sufficient extent to enable successful delivery of the weapon to the target.
The range of Iran's ballistic missiles allows for the placement of missile cities deep in the central regions of Iran, which is a huge country.
The distance that aviation must survive, flying through enemy airspace without a single damage or destruction, is hundreds of kilometers. Evasive maneuvering with such a heavy payload is often equated to mission failure.
The time-critical nature of ballistic missile warfare does not allow for a sustained SEAD/DEAD campaign to disable an enemy’s integrated air defenses.
Iran’s integrated air defenses and their capabilities have reached a technological level that can effectively counter low observable techniques that are primarily used by Western air forces against high-value targets.
Iran's objective would be to defend a point target (missile city) which is much easier to defend than a random area target. Subsonic cruise missile delivered warheads would suffer most in such a scenario against a point/node defense system.
COUNTERING MISSILE CITIES
The solution to the problem posed by such a missile city would be nuclear warheads delivered by precision ballistic missiles. In the future, this could be hypersonic bunker busting conventional missiles or low yield ground penetrating ballistic missiles.
Granite rock formations can withstand a 300 kt contact blast delivered by thermonuclear ballistic missile warheads (~100 m) if the depth/overburden is
~300 m if anchor bolts and mesh lined tunnels are used. This is typical for very deep missile storage areas and low risk transit tunnel sections that can withstand damage.
100m using high grade concrete lining. This is typical for critical areas with sensitive equipment and personnel.
030-50m using high strength concrete structures for entry areas. Such transit sections can withstand damage and spalling/debris and simply need to remain passable.
Entry areas, which almost always have less granite overburden than the 30-50m mentioned, can be heavily damaged due to the risk of total tunnel collapse. It takes a significant amount of time to free and clear such entry sections for continued launch operations. Multiple hits over a long period of time can completely disable a missile city for the duration of the war. Thus, although the missile arsenal cannot be destroyed by enemy nuclear weapons systems, effective actions against such missile tunnel complexes are possible in the event of a conflict.
NUCLEAR-RESISTANT MISSILE CITIES
Missile cities that can withstand nuclear strikes and continue launch operations are of the cave silo type.
This concept does not require an entry zone or opening large enough for the launchers to operate, and instead launches missiles from inside a mountain through a vertical shaft that can be several tens of meters long.
As long as the shaft remains clear, launch operations can continue, and the nature of this concept allows it to survive multiple hits from precision (e.g. Trident II) nuclear weapons and remain operational.
Since Iran lacks a nuclear triad and expensive delivery platforms like SSBNs, it can focus its resources on developing a complex and expensive basing method like cavern basing.
During the basing study for the US MX Peacekeeper ICBM, cavern basing was rated as the most successful basing concept in terms of robustness, but also one of the most expensive.
Only Iran and possibly North Korea are known to use the cavern launch concept.
However, the rock formations of such Iranian systems are likely not suitable for multiple nuclear hits due to the relatively shallow barrel depth.
The examples of such systems shown so far have been firing one missile at a time, which does not meet the timing parameter that is most important in a high-intensity missile war.
In early November 2020, Iran unveiled a new concept for launching and loading ballistic missiles. A high mobility electric railcar carrying 5 ready-to-launch liquid-fueled missiles loaded into a semi-automated erector system. It is best described as a multi-launch carousel magazine loading and launch system that allows for continuous parallel loading operations.
The IRGC Aerospace Force has not revealed how or where the missiles are launched.
The launch method could be a combination of the previously disclosed cavern launch concept, potentially a vertical shaft more than 100 meters deep.
However, it appears Iran has opted for a more down-to-earth, far less complex and resource-intensive concept that maintains the nuclear resilience requirements of the facility.
The concept is based on the following features:
The cavern is deep enough to be unaffected by the force of the blast, overpressure, and radiant heat.
Small enough to pose a very low risk of a direct hit from a nuclear bomb into the cavern.
Deep enough to require a steep-angle-of-attack weapon trajectory to hit the critical lower portion of the cavern where the rails and tunnel door are located.
Situated deep in a valley to complicate the weapon's trajectory and use natural barriers to deflect the blast.
The launch silo is bored into solid granite rock, reinforced and lined with high-performance concrete structures. Such relatively small structures can be well protected from nuclear weapons, just as ICBM silos are designed to remain intact from a close-in thermonuclear warhead (~300 m).
Unlike a standard ICBM silo, the Iranian silo does not contain sensitive equipment and serves no function other than to facilitate the delivery of a missile through a special door and subsequent launch. Consequently, it is not only more resistant to damage, but can also be repaired by improvised engineering means if necessary.
The purpose of this type of silo is to contain the erosion caused by a nuclear blast to a level low enough to leave the door and launch pad intact. The surface explosion, the primary mechanism for destroying hardened nuclear weapons, must remain within the limits of the yield to prevent the last 10–30 m of the missile transit tunnel from being irreparably damaged. Vibration levels in this section of the tunnel can be neglected, since a simple door collapse and malfunction must be avoided.
Multi-megaton nuclear warheads have a more adverse effect but are not used for counter strikes, mainly because they are either fewer in number or heavier. Earth-penetrating nuclear bunker busters are primarily used for air delivery, as a ballistic missile strike is considered less effective.
NEWLY OPENED COMPLEX
In addition to this new basing and launch concept, the tunnel complex also has conventional silos as a secondary launch option. The huge complex has deep missile storage bays with anchor bolts and mesh lining, polymer-lined compartments where sensitive equipment is protected and ground impacts can cause only minor damage. Warhead mating and missile loading areas, where warheads pose a concentrated risk of catastrophic cascade effects, must be separated from the rest of the complex.
Transit tunnel sections where damage and spalling are acceptable, and anchor bolts and mesh are used.
Critical areas and low cover entry areas where high quality lining is used.
In addition to these details, to estimate the overall firepower it would be necessary to know how many loading bays, how many carrier cars, and how many launch silos there are.
If it is a large complex, as is assumed, hundreds of different ballistic missiles could be stored, which would be done in the deepest bays. These inexpensive anchor and mesh lined sections have a granite cap of 300-600 m and are therefore considered impervious to nuclear attack.
Liquid fuel missile types that are likely present and compatible with minor modifications include:
SRBM Qiam with a range of 800 km with precision strike, MaRV, and warheads with submunitions. Primarily for use against air bases of neighboring countries to destroy specific sites or to ensure the impossibility of operations due to accidental interval strikes with submunitions of warheads that require removal due to the risk of unexploded ordnance and accidental placement.
SRBM Emad with a range of 1,700 km with a precision warhead MaRV for key military and high-value sites of a regional adversary.
Heavy SRBM Khorramshahr with additional ammunition and MaRV warheads With a payload that is approximately 3 times higher than the Emad and Ghadr-H missiles, this new ballistic missile with a heavy warhead(s) will be available in greater numbers. In terms of cost and benefits, one Khorramshahr with a 1.8-ton submunition warhead causes the same damage as three Gadr-H, which is a significant advantage. The range is up to 2,000 km.
In terms of firepower generation, depending on how many parallel loading sites are available in the complex to load the unmanned automatic wagon magazine, the value can vary greatly. Since the location of this static system is known and modern missiles do not require a turntable for azimuth alignment, loading is relatively fast.
Compared to Iran's tactical solid-fuel missiles, the liquid-fueled missile arsenal is launched at predetermined targets, so if the conflict is very intense, these missiles will be launched as quickly as possible.
CONCLUSION
In the past, Iran sought protection from nuclear explosions with its concept of basing liquid-fueled missiles in a vertical silo in a cavern.
The new concept of launching and loading five missiles can also be applied to this concept, but it is expensive and requires a very mature missile system with the highest reliability.
It is expected that in combination with the concept of a separate silo launch pad, a sufficient degree of protection against a nuclear explosion will be achieved.
This allows the existing missile cities to be retrofitted with this capability at an affordable cost and within a reasonable time frame.
This and other various cladding methods show that the IRGC Aerospace Force is very confident that this is necessary to achieve a specific goal with high cost effectiveness.
The dynamics of the development of this basing method are very different from those of other countries:
Iran is not a nuclear power; it requires a huge amount of precision firepower to make a difference in a conflict and ultimately deter an adversary from a first nuclear strike. In this case, silos with single missiles do not make sense, since hundreds to thousands of ballistic missiles are required in each theater. The absence of nuclear weapons, as well as various basing concepts for them, with the highest potential and most expensive option - SSBNs - allows resources to be concentrated on conventional missile forces.
Iran has the necessary sparsely populated areas, as well as high mountain topology and suitable rock formations to use such a basing method. This concept brings Iran closer to achieving a capability that no other country has: deterring nuclear powers from a preemptive preventive conventional nuclear strike. Iran is limited to a missile range of about 2,000 km. Previously, this range was the maximum that could be achieved with a relatively cost-effective single-stage missile.
As Iran's missile program rapidly improves in technology, a liquid-fueled, two-stage ICBM with direct deterrence and continental US strike capability may become a reality at some point, and the missile basing method shown is probably already quite good in its current state.
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Posted by badanov 2025-06-20 00:00||
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