Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
A bit of background:
When I was writing about the war in Ukraine in late 2014, Ukrainians protested that whole Russian units were deployed in Donetsk and Lugansk, and that the volunteers on the front line were not volunteers but conscripts. One Ukrainian, a politician as it turned out, had I continued to include his information would have us believe a Russian Tank Army (900 tanks) was in the breakaway republics.
As it turns out there were Russian volunteers in Lugansk and Donets, likely funded by Russian military or FSB operatives like reserve FSB Colonel Igor Girkin (call sign Strelnikov), who were training volunteers, miners and the like, on basic military skills and tasks.
Until this day I thought there was a full Russian brigade inside Lugansk or Donetsk, a contention later --somewhat-- admitted by sympathetic pro Russian war correspondents, that Russian units, company in size, had become involved in the latter stages of the Debaltsevo Defensive Operation in February, 2015.
The head of the Donetsk Ministry of Defense at the time was a man called Vladimir Petrovich Kononov, but the face of that organization was Lt. Col Eduard Basurin, a name which figures prominently in the discussion below. If you read any of my stories from that time, you would recognize the name.
Neither of these gentlemen was trained military, and neither held rank prior to the start of the 2014 Ukrainian Civil War, but both conducted themselves as military would.
Both Gennady Poddubny, a photographer, who is as far as I can tell was working independently, and Aleksandr Sladkov, a correspondent, both of whom have been working the area since 2014 -- have a lot of experience in these matters, and included in that experience is the ability to tell if subtle shifts in military policy are taking place.
According to Sladkov and Russian socialist media, Basurin was dismissed, and so were a number of field grade infantry officers in both the Lugansk and Donetsk military. None of these people were trained Russian military, but learned how to fight the Ukrainians in their own land, as it were.
The issue of ammunition shortages has appeared, now in the wake of these dismissals, which both writers attribute to the dismissals.
The dismissals, in my opinion, come in the wake of the takeover of the Russian Special Military Operation by Col. General Valery Gerasimov.
The first inkling things were about to be shaken up was Gen. Gerasimov's order three weeks ago, that all front line soldiers be clean shaven and maintain personal hygiene. That raised a hue and cry from those affected, even war correspondents such as Sladkov, Poddubny, Aleksandr Kots and others, all of whom wear beards. As I commented at the time, this is the kind of thing that flag officers such as brigade and divisional commanders like to pass down. It is the word of God and there is little indication that that order has been reversed.
I suspect this removal of field officers who are not formally trained is much in the same program of trying to shake things up. All the protests by the Russian correspondents have merit, save for one little detail: The officers and volunteers have been fighting in a static defense, and it took a while for them to set their standards to hold against Ukrainian attacks and to prevent losses in the field.
From that, I can extrapolate that Gen, Gerasimov is planning a massive offensive to finish the war in Russia's favor. And he needs trained Russian officers at the head of these volunteer units to do it. In infantry, good performance is based oftentimes on how you trust your infantry units will behave in a given situation, situations he plans to put them in in an offensive. He needs Russian trained officers to implement the tactics the Russian Army has learned over the past year.
I'm going to digress for a moment. Back in 2008 just after the start of the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia, we were just getting images of the Russian Army. My first gut reaction was: this is a rabble.
What I saw were unshaven men in mismatched military uniforms with useless identification crap painted on the side of armor vehicles. I was not impressed then, and the actions of the Russian military at the time confirmed that.
No doubt that is what Gen Gerasimov saw as well with the Donetsk and Lugansk infantry units. Discipline starts at the top and that shit always rolls downhill.
The Russian military blogger Andrey Chervonets is a Russian blogger whom I trust to give accurate information about the Russian Army. He provided the world with information about just how bad things were then in 2008.
He presents here a sympathetic explication via two experienced military correspondents.
Gennady Poddubny
You know, I perfectly see the level of interaction and the state of the units that are at the forefront already at the VPU or CP. And rarely does the first impression change after one manages to delve into the combat work that is going on on the ground. When I see the frightened eyes of senior officers, who not only float in reports, but also frankly, like schoolchildren, are afraid of generals, when I see a mass desire to quickly hide from the commander’s gaze, when regiment commanders lie about the lines passed, because they don’t know where their battalions are - everything is very bad and on the front. Combat work does not require lies from the side of inflicted and personal obscene insults from the generals, in the style of "hey you ... yet."
War is a collective matter, and a collective does not work without respect. And a high staff culture is not tags, stacks of documents and signs on chairs. I remember the times when, in one very elite special forces, each operator of the machine gun could express his vision to the commander, and the Commander was a filter that swept aside stupid things and helped to realize worthwhile moves, but these times, due to personnel changes, individual swagger, careerism, have long ended. On the contrary, in those units and formations that operate effectively, there is understanding and respect, and most importantly, the ability to hear a comrade-in-arms. Next, we scale.
The situation in which a flash mob appeared in the cart #Give the Shells to the Wagners- ahh. And even the fact that the discussion on the subject of the supply of ammunition for the structure that is successfully operating in the Artemovsk area has gone into the public field suggests that the commander of this structure, an influential person in every sense, has exhausted the apparatus-bureaucratic possibilities.
In a situation where the SVO has become a people's operation, such problems should be resolved quickly and quietly. And I assumed that a year of hardest fights, successes and defeats, mistakes and conclusions would change the situation. But no. We work with paratroopers, motorized riflemen, special forces, we work with Wagners. These are all our fighters and it does not matter in which department they receive a salary.
What matters is the victory. And here we return to the healthy atmosphere of combat work. From the scale, tendencies often do not change. I'm not trying to oppose the Army PMCs. I again draw attention to the absurd situation, in which there is a shortage of ammunition for assault units, which categorically cannot be stopped. If such a situation had developed in an army unit, it would have been the same absurdity. On the one hand, the task is to go on the offensive, on the other hand, the offensive is not provided with ammunition.
Tynts: https://t.me/chervonec_001/19448
Alexander Sladkov
The Fate of the Officers of the LNDR in the Russian Ministry of Defense
To begin with, it is worth explaining who we are talking about and what the problem is. During the 8 years of the war in the Donbass, its own army was formed, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (plus the Internal Troops) and the State Security. Accordingly, over the long years of hostilities, a large number of officers were brought up, not by education and diplomas, but by the ability to command and fight in extremely harsh conditions.
Even now they lead magnificent, combat-ready brigades and regiments.
It must be taken into account that all these officers began to command the detachments of the volunteer militia of the Russian Spring, and they earned their authority in this armed mass of real daredevils.
In February 2022, full mobilization began in the Donbass, during which, already on the first day of the SVO, rifle regiments from the men of the DPR were assembled, and their officers were also appointed there. I emphasize that the regiments of the mobilized were not formed at the training grounds, but immediately on the front line, after 3 days they already went into battle.
For a year now, they have been successfully fighting with the NATO proxy army. Without rotations and departures for reorganization after heavy losses. These are the Donbas commanders of the second wave.
So what's the problem? And it lies in the fact that thousands of people with many years of combat experience are not formally "real officers." Because they do not have a military education, they often do not meet the requirements for age and health, they do not know how to march, they have never led conscripts in their lives, and in general they do not know many important things that are familiar to a career Russian officer in peacetime. It turns out that the situation born of war is not suitable for peacetime. But there is no peace. Who will fight?
I think that everyone who is now actually in officer positions and ranks should be retained. Yesterday, a "fake" Donetsk officer from the reserve led his "fake" soldiers to the Ukrainian fortifications, giving real results, and this suited everyone, now his seemingly battle-earned career is in jeopardy.
And that sucks, but that goes straight to Gen. Gerasimov's command style.
Someone will be weeded out by future commissions, someone has already been thrown out into the civilian world, as if alcoholics and violators, like the same Basurin (he was fired and it’s too late to drink Borzhom) and many other war-hardened officers. By the way, Basurin is a symbol of the DPR army, he is the voice of the 1st Corps, he is a brand, if you like. And how many more will be fired “due to inappropriate position”, or demoted from commanders to deputies.
Borzhom is a reference is Borzhom bottled water, made in Georgia, probably Basurin's homeland.
The reason is not age or lack of education. Many officers of the DPR have become real literate commanders who know all the requirements of the Russian Federation for the war.
The point is something else. Here they can stand up and say to the newly arrived Russian general in the eyes: “Petr Petrovich, everything you are telling us here does not correspond to Russian laws, or the Charters of the RF Armed Forces, or combat logic.” And this can often turn out to be a bitter truth, and the authorities do not like the truth. And truth-tellers too. Only. And I, privately, can name a dozen more such combat commanders-nuggets who have already been “asked” from the army of Donbass. To scatter them, especially in such a bloody time, is a crime.
Responsible comrades read these lines and may think about it. And I am writing this because I have already defended this position at a high level. Was not heard.We are throwing people at civilians, followed by thousands of subordinates into battle. For what?
Tynts: https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7215
Gennady Poddubny
I support Alexander Valerievich. In our Donbass, for eight years of hostilities, "uneducated" officers have grown up who have been taught to command by war. They earned their authority at the forefront, they learned to work under pressure, without enough BC, equipment, convince subordinates by their own example, cunning on the front line to outmaneuver the enemy. They have learned to take care of technology.
A year ago, these officers proved that they often see the situation better and manage their units than some colleagues from the mainland. And if they are squeezed out of the RF Armed Forces, this will certainly have a negative impact on the situation at the forefront. In addition, I know for sure that the country's leadership has an unequivocal position - to protect the Donbass combat personnel.
https://t.me/chervonec_001/19450 
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