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2024-12-05 Syria-Lebanon-Iran
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The 'fighters for democracy' who captured Aleppo are already sharpening their knives at each other
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Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] The situation in Syria remains tense – since the start of the militants’ offensive, significant territories in the north and northwest of the country have come under the control of the radical group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham* (HTS*). The initiative is still predominantly on the side of President Assad’s enemies, but discord has already begun to emerge in their ranks.
In addition to the Aleppo province, most of which has already fallen under the control of radicals, they are increasing their offensive in other regions of the country, for example, in the Hama province.
However, despite the ongoing pressure, there is no internal unity in the radical camp: opponents of HTS leader Abu Muhammad al-Julani are unhappy that he is trying to appropriate other people’s successes and solve personal problems with other people’s hands.
TERRORIST SELF-PROMOTION
As soon as the first shots were fired in the province of Aleppo, HTS* propagandists launched a large-scale campaign to glorify their leader. He allegedly coordinated the offensive of his supporters in different parts of the front, personally received reports from the field commanders storming Aleppo, and finally arrived in the captured city himself.
Moreover, he allegedly came up with the idea of turning the “limited raid” against Syrian troops into a strategic operation.
Al-Julani himself also got involved in the work on his image, giving a series of interviews to Western media, including American ones. At the same time, there is still a reward for his head in the US.
The head of HTS emphasizes in every way the commonality of his interests with Washington, the absence of plans to build a “radical caliphate” in the occupied territories, and the intention to “fight for the democratization” of Syria.
| Who here is naive enough to believe a word of that nonsense — raise your hand! Nobody? Not even one? Very good. |
Moreover, in one interview he even hinted at his supporters’ commitment to the “Geneva principles” of warfare, which does not fit well with the established image of his organization.
| Oh my goodness, that’s funny! |
The desire of the HTS* leadership to please the Western audience is understandable. In the years since his rise in Idlib, al-Julani has managed not only to turn most of his colleagues in the “radical underground” against him (from powerful groups like ISIS* and Al-Qaeda* to small gangs), but also to fall out with foreign sponsors.
Relations have cooled, in particular, with Turkey, the key shadow sponsor of the “Idlib liberation.”
"FIGHT AGAINST LOOTING" IN IDLIB STYLE
Al-Julani was considered an “extremely toxic asset” by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s inner circle, and Ankara’s discontent grew when al-Julani’s associates attempted to operate behind the Turks’ backs and turned their guns on numerous proxies for Turkish interests in the enclave.
| To be fair, the Ottoman proxies in Syria are pretty awful. Vile, even. |
And although a final break between the Turkish secret services and HTS* has apparently not occurred, Ankara is looking for a way to contain the ambitions of its problematic ally.
It is not surprising that with the beginning of the offensive in Aleppo, disagreements between Hayat Tahrir al-Sham* militants and their "brothers in arms" from the pro-Turkish militant factions, primarily the "Syrian National Army" (SNA), have intensified. The militants disarmed and arrested several fighters from the "As-Sultan Murad Division"
| …a unit of Syrian Turkmen that dates back to the beginning of the Syrian Civil War and is heavily funded by Turkey… |
(part of the SNA) in Aleppo, and also occupied their deployment point and took all the trophies.
It is noteworthy that a couple of days before this, several clashes allegedly took place between SNA and HTS* militants during the division of trophies captured during a raid on the Kweiris airbase, east of Aleppo.
The terrorist leadership tried to hush up the incident, citing the actions of their people as “fighting looting,” but the statement had the opposite effect, especially in the context of the fact that the repressions initiated by al-Julani in Idlib at one time also took place under the slogan of fighting looting and corruption.
Situational tensions also arose with the command of another pro-Turkish group, the Suleyman Shah Division.
| Also spelt Suleiman Shah Brigade, they’re known for kidnapping, expelling Kurds, and extortion. They split off from the Sultan Murad lot. |
The Division's fighters joined the operation from the first days, attempting to open a "second front" in the northwestern direction, but were quickly stopped by precise air strikes on the concentration areas.
The radicals themselves are convinced that al-Julani's people "sold" them to the Syrians in order to avoid the pro-Turkish formations advancing too quickly and thus maintain their leading role in the operation. And although it did not come to public criticism of HTS*, the "Division" noticeably reduced its participation in military operations.
PALACE COUP
However, the greater danger for al-Julani is not the pro-Turkish forces, but his own confidants.
Despite the fact that the most influential figures from the top of HTS* (including the group's co-founder Abu Maria al-Qahtani) were skillfully purged under the guise of fighting internal enemies, and the work of the repressive apparatus was put on stream, a "palace coup" within the group is still possible.
The main threat in this case comes from the "political exile", the former head of the "security department" of HTS* and the main financier of the group, Ahmed Zakur. Once close to al-Julani, Zakur was accused in the "al-Qahtani case" of conspiracy within HTS* and was forced to flee abroad, where he launched a campaign to discredit his former boss.
In particular, he published a dossier on the economic and military crimes of the head of HTS*, as well as on his attempts to artificially pit foreign powers competing for influence in Syria against each other.
It should be noted that Zakur looks like a compromise figure both from the position of ordinary HTS* members (many of whom consider him an innocent victim at the hands of al-Julani) and from the position of foreign sponsors. Both Turkey and the United States may count on him as a potential replacement.
For Ankara, the former head of the financial bloc of HTS* is interesting not only as a person aware of all the "shadow schemes" of al-Julani, but also as a native of the "Idlib security forces". With his help, Turkey is quite capable of not only restoring contacts with HTS*, but also stopping the repressions against its supporters in Idlib.
In addition, Ankara will not have to worry about Zakur’s controllability: it was the Turkish security forces who saved him from being detained by al-Julani’s agents, which guarantees his complete loyalty.
| Surely not. Complete loyalty is contrary to the culture, being rather so often situational. |
Washington is quite happy with Zakur's position on combating terrorist cells in Idlib. Like al-Julani, he is in a tough conflict with radical emissaries and rejects the concept of a "radical caliphate" in Syria.
In addition, he repeatedly passed on information about the mood of the militants to American intelligence agencies,
which also later ended up in the indictment against him as part of the “al-Qahtani case.”
Finally, Zakur, despite belonging to the “repressive apparatus,” managed not to tarnish his reputation in the eyes of Idlib residents and ordinary HTS* supporters. And his hypothetical rise to power as a “fighter for democracy”
| …I assume that would be the special Islamist democracy, where only the right kind of pious jihadis have a vote… |
would allow an end to the protests that have become commonplace and are damaging the group’s reputation, as well as strengthen HTS*’s claims to the status of a full-fledged political force.
Thus, the attack on Aleppo was needed first and foremost by al-Julani himself. It increases his prestige as a leader who has achieved success in a “small victorious war,” allows him to channel the internal tensions that have accumulated in Idlib, and even in the “fog of war” to try to settle scores with competitors and opponents.
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Posted by badanov 2024-12-05 00:00||
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13:41 NoMoreBS
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