This editorial from the Boston Globe is clear evidence that even a blind hog occasionally finds an acorn. Sanctions work? Who knew?
CONCERNS OVER North Korea's steadily advancing nuclear program have often overshadowed the grave human rights situation inside that isolated country. The recent report of a UN commission that spent a year investigating rapes and mass starvation of political prisoners inside North Korea shone an important light on the behavior of this toxic regime.
Unfortunately, the panel's recommendation that North Korean leader Fat Boy Kim Jong Un be held accountable for his actions in an international court is unlikely to be implemented any time soon. China holds veto power on the Security Council, and has already expressed its opposition to taking the North Korean leader to the International Criminal Court.
Which is why the ultimate solution to Pudgy and his evil minions is to make a deal with China. Give them something they want, like control of the northern rim of North Korea with its access to raw materials and to the Sea of Japan. Promise them that US troops won't go above the 38th parallel. Let South Korea have the rest.
Nevertheless, there is much the United States can do unilaterally to step up the pressure on this irresponsible regime. Passing the North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act of 2013 is a logical step that would ensure that bad behavior faces consequences.
Wow. A progressive admitting that sanctions could do some good, and actually did some good against Iran?
Much as Iran was confronted with crippling financial sanctions, the act would punish international financial institutions that do dirty work for North Korea. Under the act, the president of the United States would have the power to take action to deny the regime funds for serious human rights abuses, as well as nuclear proliferation, arms trafficking, kleptocracy, and imports of luxury goods by government officials. Banks that do business with Pyongyang would be faced with a choice: Risk being cut off from the US market, or stop doing business with North Korea. The act also stipulates that cargo that moves through ports that regularly fail to inspect North Korean cargo would face long delays entering the United States.
While no sanctions regime is perfect, Congress already knows that this one works. From 2005 to 2007, the United States imposed similar sanctions on North Korea. The Treasury Department designated Banco Delta Asia, a Macau-based bank, as a "primary money laundering concern" and cut it off from the US financial system. The result was devastating for the North Korean regime. Macau banking authorities froze 50 North Korean accounts worth $24 million, severely hampering the regime's ability to access cash and purchase goods. Foreign businesses and banks shied away from doing business with North Korea -- even from legal business ventures. The effect was so crippling that in 2008, North Korea agreed to destroy some of its nuclear technology and return to international talks. As a reward, President George W. Bush lifted the sanctions.
Unfortunately, North Korea has returned to its bad old ways, reneging on promises and resuming nuclear tests. It is high time for the United States to respond by renewing sanctions.
Posted by: Steve White ||
02/28/2014 00:00 ||
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#1
The usual progressive thing is to write a sharply worded letter. Several times. Then apologies and send them food and money in an aid package.
Call me when Foggy Bottom moves beyond threatening to use harsh language.
What's worth looking at are two maps in the article: a map of the 2010 vote for President of Ukraine and a second map of ethnicity/linguistics. The overlap is, of course, virtually total, as Burg readers know (but go look at the maps, halfway down the article).
Mr. Hannon makes a good point: if partition is coming let's work to make it like the breakup of Czechoslovakia and not Yugoslavia. Sadly, I think it's going to be the latter.
Posted by: Steve White ||
02/28/2014 10:44 ||
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#1
Sadly, I think the age of liberal democracy is over.
#2
E Ukraine and Crimea are majority ethnic Russian in large areas and likely will be carved off and incorporated into Russia in some fashion. The former due to proximity on the border, the latter for the military bases, especially Black Sea naval bases. The rest will probably go west, or else splinter further. Either way, the only thing that matters beyond these is security of the Russian gas pipelines that feed Europe and pass thru the bulk of western Ukraine. That's the major concern for Putin as a money maker, and EU because they need the NatGas. The Ukrainian liberty movement is going to get crushed and ground to bits between those two millstones. In the past, the US and UK might have changed the balance, but not anymore. UK is worn out, and the USA is led ny a narcissistic fool who favors collectivism and elitism of Eurosocialism.
#3
OldSpppl. What is Ukraine? It is a ate who inherited the _administrative_ boundaries of the Soviet Republic of Ukraine. There are a lot of people in Ukraine who are not happy at all to be Ukranians. Cossacks for instance are not Ukrranians, are not fond of Ukranian,s and Ukraine has no articular historical rights over Cossack territory. The only claim Ukarine has on their territory is because SDtalin decided to include into Sovoet Republic of Ukraine. In the name of what should they be forced into being citizens of Ukraine?
#4
There are a lot of people in Ukraine who are not happy at all to be Ukranians... In the name of what should they be forced into being citizens of Ukraine?
Something similar happened in the US in the mid 1800s, but I'll be damned if I can recall what it was called....
#5
Every old country could be carved up into a bunch of older, other countries. Western Ukraine was a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire for a long time and so you could argue that pieces/parts of it should go elsewhere. It has a small Hungarian minority at its western edge -- give that to Hungary. Ditto a small Bulgarian minority and so on.
But in the main I think OldSpook (and Hannon, and others) are right: the big split is west/east. Pappy points out that we tried that here once and it didn't work -- the loyalists won. But one might, just might, decide that for the Ukraine, this time, it's better to divide than fight.
Posted by: Steve White ||
02/28/2014 18:19 Comments ||
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I think at this time we can safely say Ukraine is partitioned.
[DAWN] THE strong demands for military action against the TTP have put one party and its position regarding militancy in a tight spot.
The PTI of Mr Imran Khan ... aka Taliban Khan, who is the lightweight's lightweight... , which made a large platform out of opposing action and promoting talks as the only way to deal with the terrorists, is now searching for a way to climb down, at least partially, from that position so as to not appear totally out of step with the mood prevailing in the country.
For instance, the party's senior vice president, Asad Umar, argued recently that the fight against terrorism and extremism is not just a military battle, but "a battle for the soul of Pakistain". In this battle, he said, "[w]e have to go to the root causes of why and where such intolerant behaviour is taking shape and dry up the swamp".
So what are the root causes of terrorist violence in Pakistain? "The state of Pakistain has been getting weaker as the years go by," he argues, before making a list of the areas where weakening state capacity is directly responsible for empowering the faceless myrmidons and their hate-filled narrative. The areas he lists are many, and they include intelligence and law enforcement capacity, growing "injustice and inequality" in society, "elite capture and abuse of state institutions".
These dysfunctions "make disenfranchised youth vulnerable to messages of hate and intolerance" he says, arguing that "the people of the country are in an angry mood".
The narrative that emerges goes something like this: injustice in society and a dysfunctional economy creates anger, and that anger finds a voice in terrorism and the voice exerts a pull on disenfranchised youth who take up arms against an unjust order.
There is something seductive about this analysis. In a sense it says that there is symmetry between the anger you and I feel at the state of affairs in our country and the anger that animates the Taliban.
The truth, unfortunately, is far simpler. Terror groups are thriving in our country for one simple reason: they enjoy protection and patronage from the highest authorities of our land.
And this is the big problem in the narrative that unemployment and poverty are the causes behind terrorism: a quarter century long history of building and funding and protecting terrorist outfits as proxy fighters for demented regional ambitions is totally glided over in this telling of the tale.
The myriad dysfunctions of our economy and society are very real, and they indeed serve as breeding grounds for violent and antisocial behaviour. But every bit of research on this subject leads to the conclusion that an angry and disenfranchised youth is more likely to take up a life of street crime and armed robbery than embrace holy war against the world.
Ideological fighters of the sort found in terrorist outfits have other origins. Ideological fighters always require state support to sustain themselves and carry on their fight. Usually this support comes from outside the country, by neighbours or other great powers that have an interest in overthrowing the regime that runs the country in question. But in our case the support has been internal, since these groups were raised to wage proxy war against neighbouring countries.
The argument that creating smoothly functioning economic and social institutions is the best way to conduct counter-insurgency is in fact an old one.
Early in the 1960s, Walt Rostow, one of the earliest pioneers of development thinking, wrote a short essay titled Development as counter-insurgency in which he had argued that economic growth creates a large demand for labour which deprives Death Eater groups of recruits. Since then, the argument has been repeated in many forms in many forums, most recently in the debates around the Kerry Lugar Bill.
The argument was originally directed at the question facing the US early in its career as a superpower: how to demobilise the mass movements that had swept away the European colonial empires in the decades following the Second World War.
But our situation today is very different. We are not looking to demobilise a mass movement. In fact, it's not even a movement that we face, the Taliban are not the careers of a popular grievance. What we're facing is a group of ideologically indoctrinated militias that were raised and trained by our armed forces to perform a certain function -- the clandestine projection of power in the region -- and that have now spun out of the control of their benefactors and patrons.
The economic and social dysfunctions of our society didn't create this monster, in fact if anything the reverse is true: these dysfunctions are a legacy of this policy of cultivating krazed killer militias as tools. No amount of social and economic reform will cause this monster of terrorism to lay down arms, and economic growth is unlikely to deplete it of recruits since unlike a mass mobilisation, it doesn't need recruits on any significant scale.
Let's not drag the economy into this. Let's not change the subject at a critical point in the conversation. Fighting the menace of extremism begins with a simple step: we must dissociate from it.
There is no sense in wagging our finger at the economy using one hand while with the other we hold as partners the very same gunnies and their apologists who have made our lives so difficult for so many years now.
Posted by: Fred ||
02/28/2014 00:00 ||
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#1
What is outrageous is that anyone in D.C. really believes there is any credibility to anything that come out of the Administration's (collective) mouth.
Posted by: Bobby ||
02/28/2014 13:20 Comments ||
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VDH should be our SecState. Problem is he's simply too intelligent to be accepted by the tuxedo crowd in foggy bottom.
#4
decentralized the government has always been one of my pet things I'd like to see happen. For instance put the Secretary of Treasury in New York put trade in Chicago, interior in Denver, energy in Houston, etc. As a test of how dedicated they are, move State to Salt Lake City. Heh
[Al Jazeera] The five-day ultimatum by the leader of Jabaht al-Nusra (al-Nusra front) - Abu Mohammed al-Golani - to the leadership of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant ... the current version of al-Qaeda in Iraq, just as blood-thirsty and well-beloved as the original... (ISIL), and other Islamist factions, to end fighting or be "expelled" from the region is the latest in the troubled affair between the two al-Qaeda affiliates in Syria.
Since early 2014, "Jabhat al-Nusra", a self-declared al-Qaeda affiliate, sided with the more nationalistic and liberal grouping of Free Syrian Army ... the more palatable version of the Syrian insurgency, heavily influenced by the Moslem Brüderbund... (FSA) against the relatively more hardline ISIS.
The feud between the two al-Qaeda affiliates, which turned into firece fighting in the past few weeks, reflected a serious ideological rift among al-Qaeda rank and file organizations. Analysts generally agree that of the eight major armed factions in the Syrian opposition, al-Nusra and the ISIS are by far the most prominent. This is hardly due to their relative strength since there are many groups in the Syrian opposition that are much better armed with many more fighters. al-Nusra has no more than 6,000 active members, while ISIS boasts about 7,000 members, out of which only 4,000 engage in actual fighting.
Rather, the notorious image that both al-Nusra and ISIS have acquired over the last year, in both Arab and Western media, is due to their public affiliation with al-Qaeda, and to their strong links with other foreign Jihadist organizations which supply them with fierce fighters and huge funds.
The "criminal atrocities" committed by ISIS, in particular, including abducting, terrorising and forcing civilians and local Islamic groups to swear allegiance (Baya'a) to the organization have amplified its notoriety.
Wither "Universal Jihad"?
Jabhat al-Nusra fighters, on the other hand, are said to enjoy a reputation for firece fighting, and for storming heavily armed Syrian regime military posts and Intelligence facilities. The group has also become known for its widespread aid programmes supplying food and vital services to the impoverished, war-weary Syrian population.
Although both groups have publicly declared their loyalty to al-Qaeda, the differences between them on the ground, sharp enough to have erupted in a bloody armed conflict in Syria recently, underscore a wider ideological rift.
The very concept of al-Qaeda - of the universal Jihad - is crumbling. More precisely, what's coming to an end is the co-existence - within this concept - between the classic model set by the late Osama bin Laden ... who used to be alive but now he's not... on the one hand, and on the other, the decentralised model defended by Ayman al-Zawahiri ... Formerly second in command of al-Qaeda, now the head cheese, occasionally described as the real brains of the outfit. Formerly the Mister Big of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Bumped off Abdullah Azzam with a car boom in the course of one of their little disputes. Is thought to have composed bin Laden's fatwa entitled World Islamic Front Against Jews and Crusaders. Currently residing in the North Wazoo area. That is not a horn growing from the middle of his forehead, but a prayer bump, attesting to how devout he is... and, more significantly in the Syrian case, Abu Mus'ab Al-Suri.
In fact, the theories of Zawahiri and Abu Mus'ab in this field, which sanction every country to have its own version of al-Qaeda, and which encourage the local culture to generate its own convenient al-Qaeda structures and fighting tactics and strategies, is hitting hard at the ideological heart of al-Qaeda itself. This might even hamper al-Qaeda's ability to function on the ground.
Al-Qaeda's successive generations
"The World Front for Fighting Jews and Crusaders" was formed in 1988. In the same year, the first generation of fighters inaugurated al-Qaeda's massive operations by staging the Nairobi and Dar al-Salam bombings. These early years were characterised by al-Qaeda's emphasis on the global dimension of Jihad (targeting the distant enemy). Most Bin Laden speeches - in this era - focused on fomenting Moslem enmity towards the United States. In fact, analysts noted that 70 percent of his speeches targeted the West. Equally importantly, the era was characterised by the stable central command structures al-Qaeda had in Afghanistan where it supervised several Jihadist training centres.
The second al-Qaeda generation came to the scene in 2003, following the US-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. That phase was marked by effective US action to tighten the noose on al-Qaeda leadership and central command structures in Afghanistan and Pakistain, which resulted in the mushrooming of al-Qaeda-linked Jihadist networks with independent regional command centres in Iraq, Yemen and the Islamic Maghreb. Abu Mus'ab al-Suri was one of the most vociferous supporters of a decentralised al-Qaeda command structure, as his book The Call for Islamic Resistance (2004) clearly shows.
The al-Qaeda central command did not disapprove of the emergence of new sub-branches and regional commands. Much more so than Bin Laden, Zawahiri was inclined to focus on the regional struggle in the Arab world (the nearby enemy) rather than the West (the distant enemy). He was also keen that "each country has its own version of al-Qaeda".
This second al-Qaeda generation was more ferocious and krazed killer. It developed new operational techniques in which attacks were carried out by small groups or - in some cases - even individuals. It established regional "emirates" through which it directed Jihadists fighting closer to their native conflict zones. It also legitimised the killing of civilians, in Iraq but also in the bombing waves that targeted Riyadh residential compounds, Amman hotels, and Morocco cafes. Hence, the increased hostility towards al-Qaeda shown by Arab and Islamic nations, and al-Qaeda's failure to gain grassroot support in many regions. No wonder Bin Laden wrote his famous "Message on the Iraqi Issue" (2007), in which he apologised for al-Qaeda extremism in Iraq and condemned "the ease with which it killed people".
Al-Qaeda's third generation
Al-Qaeda went through its worst period ever in the years 2009-2011. The beginning of the Arab Spring shook the organization's fundamental ideological belief in violence as the means to topple dictatorial regimes. The subsequent momentum generated by the Arab Spring, driving people en masse to the ballot boxes and thus effecting political change by moderately peaceful means, was a further setback to al-Qaeda's bloody revolutionary ideology. In the same period, the sudden death of Osama bin Laden was a severe blow both to the organization's regional networks and central command.
The course charted by the Arab Spring, however, yielded some tragic results in Libya, Yemen and Syria. Al-Qaeda was quick to profit from the ensuing power vacuum. The new conflict zones gave al-Qaeda enough room to regroup, reform and reclaim centre stage.
In the Syrian case, the Jihadist movements were not interested in the uprising when it first broke out, since it opted for what al-Qaeda dismissively called "the same peaceful course of the Arab revolutions... and the same democratic ends."
The gradual militarisation of the Syrian Uprising in early 2012 encouraged Jihadist movements to engage in the fighting on religious grounds. The subsequent brutality of the Syrian regime, and the absence of any international measures or intervention to deter it or reign in its violence, prompted the Syrian people to turn a blind eye to the "Jihadist project", which has only one thing in common with the objectives of the uprising: Opposing the regime of Bashir al-Assad.
In due course, the Jihadist movement turned from an "unwanted party" in the initial stages to an "active" and even "welcomed" partner in the fight against the regime. It is worth noting here that the Jihadist movements were not alien to the Syrian environment. Its proximity to US-occupied Iraq made Syria "a terrorist attraction spot". The Syrian regime itself, intent on keeping US forces busy fighting al-Qaeda so as not to consider invading Syria, had in fact provided a safe passageway for Jihadists into Iraq.
The rise of al-Nusra Front
In June 2011, in the course of the Syrian uprising, Jihadists showed up openly for the first time in Aleppo. In January 2012, the formation of al-Nusra Front was publicly announced by its top official, Abu Mohammed Al-Golani. al-Nusra was not similar to other Jihadist movements in its structure, sources of funding or fighting techniques. It can be seen as the practical application of what might be called the "renewal" of Jihadist thinking propagated by Abu Mus'ab Al-Suri in his book "The Call for Islamic Resistance".
Golani did not announce the formation of an Islamic Emirate or "state" as did other Jihadist movements in Iraq and North Mali. Rather, he set up a broad front for Jihadists to fight the Syrian regime. Other major differences from traditional Jihadist movements include the emphasis al-Nusra laid on "deterring the oppressor and resisting the aggressor", whereas other Jihadist movements sought to overthrow incumbent governments then establish the Islamic Caliphate.
For instance, ISIS used to demand that residents and groups in the areas under its control swear allegiance (Baya'a) to its Emir, Abu Baker al-Baghdadi. Conversely, Golani never called himself Emir and went by the title "General Official of the (al-Nusra) Front".
Jabhat al-Nusra also provided widespread relief aid and services to civilians, maintained good relations with the local community, and avoided any provocations. It further cooperated with the majority of Syrian fighting groups, without demanding their allegiance or asking them to join the group. This enabled al-Nusra front to make inroads and spread its influence to the local community. It avoided military confrontations with other groups in the opposition (with very few exceptions, as in the limited confrontation with Al-Farouq Brigade).
Thus, in a short period of time, al-Nusra Front was able to spread its influence across Syria so much so that it became the most prominent fighting force against the regime. Such public acceptance explains the opposition many factions in the Syrian uprising have shown to the December 2012 decision by the US to put Al-Nusra on the list of terrorist organizations.
However, some men learn by reading. A few learn by observation. The rest have to pee on the electric fence for themselves... this should not be taken to mean that al-Nusra did not commit crimes and human rights ...which are often intentionally defined so widely as to be meaningless... violations. In fact, it committed various violations, like executing prisoners from the official army (May, June, and September, 2012). Also, al-Nusra detained activists in some incidents for the simple reason of raising the flag of the Syrian revolution instead of al-Nusra's.
Posted by: Fred ||
02/28/2014 00:00 ||
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#2
this al Jazeera article is very Al Nusra friendly
it is certainly true that al Nusra has allied itself with other anti Assad forces on numerous occasions; notwithstanding that, al Nusra has executed other anti Assad personnel, killed non combatants in suicide bomb and car bomb attacks and otherwise engaged in repression of some of the territory they control(some al Nusra commanders are more civilian friendly than others)
Posted by: lord garth ||
02/28/2014 5:32 Comments ||
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#3
You know one of those headbanger bruise(?) callus(?) Would make a damn fine temporary tatto0. Luz would abound when you hit the ground with yur New Mekka Seeker.
A multi-volume chronology and reference guide set detailing three years of the Mexican Drug War between 2010 and 2012.
Rantburg.com and borderlandbeat.com correspondent and author Chris Covert presents his first non-fiction work detailing
the drug and gang related violence in Mexico.
Chris gives us Mexican press dispatches of drug and gang war violence
over three years, presented in a multi volume set intended to chronicle the death, violence and mayhem which has
dominated Mexico for six years.
Rantburg was assembled from recycled algorithms in the United States of America. No
trees were destroyed in the production of this weblog. We did hurt some, though. Sorry.
Zawahiri
