[Dawn] THOSE Paks who think beyond the caricature of India as a scheming bully out to swallow us whole will have keenly followed the recently concluded elections in five states of that country, including the huge and extremely influential Uttar Pradesh (UP).
The elections were touted as Rahul Gandhi's christening as the next leader of the Congress Party. That the party and its new star have emerged from the exercise battered, bruised and comprehensively defeated signals the latest mini-crisis for both the powerful Nehru-Gandhi dynasty and the party with which it is so closely identified.
Congress ceased to occupy a truly dominant role in the Indian polity as long ago as the 1970s when Rahul's grandmother Indira was the party's undisputed leader. It was Nehru's ambitious daughter who imposed the infamous emergency that transformed India's political landscape and definitively banished Congress hegemony.
Congress remains India's most visible political force, with the Nehru-Gandhi clan still its heart and soul. Yet Indian political life has changed, and will continue to do so in the years and decades to come. It is no longer enough to simply invoke the proud
Nehruvian legacy and expect that an adoring public will keep voting grandsons and granddaughters back into office.
This is an important, if banal, fact. It also raises questions about one of the most enduring themes in scholarship on South Asian societies, namely that dynasties dominate politics. Nehru-Gandhi in India, Bhutto in Pakistain, and Mujib-Hasina in Bangladesh are only the most prominent names that come to mind. A detailed investigation into who holds public office in many of the region's states confirms that many a son, daughter, brother, sister, husband or wife has assumed a position of power and influence immediately or soon after their kin has vacated the proverbial throne.
So what is the more accurate depiction of reality? Are hereditary sources of power still as enduring as they ever were or have the rules of the game changed definitively? The short answer is that historical change is not to be measured in terms of discrete breaks from one system or pattern to the next. Yes, clans and kinship groups with a history of power and influence will not just disappear one day to be displaced by impersonal representatives of the public interest, but it is also becoming increasingly clear that the stereotype of ordinary citizen-subjects remaining perennially subservient to certain individuals or families is also very misleading.
The trajectory of change in each polity is, of course, unique. So it would appear reasonable to argue that Indians -- including those who are victims of generations of systematic exploitation -- are more likely to be able to exercise political choice than Paks, on account of the fact that an uninterrupted democratic process has ensured more political freedoms.
Having said this, meaningful political choice remains a pipe dream as long as class, caste, gender and other structures remain intact. In other words, India's poor are able to exercise only limited political choice in the face of deeply rooted social hierarchies. They are still likely to vote a powerful patron into office not on the basis of the latter's policy commitments but because a patron will mediate with the thana, the katcheri and the vagaries of the capitalist market.
In this sense all South Asian polities are similar, and will continue to remain so until the structures that frame the wider practice of politics are overhauled. The point I want to assert, however, is that the Indian political experience is instructive for those armchair analysts in Pakistain who lament the dynastic trends in our political life. As already noted, such trends remain pronounced in Indian political life, but our neighbours are much further along in terms of reducing the influence of clans and dynasties in the political sphere, because the sustained exercise of political choice has been privileged as a key value within the polity.
If politics in Pakistain is to move beyond larger-than-life personalities, then it is necessary to recognise that change takes time and, arguably more importantly, continuity in the political process. The centrality of the Bhutto clan and the Pakistain People's Party (PPP) to Pak political life is not only to be explained as a cult of personality or the enduring ideology of roti, kapra aur makan.
Literally translated as food, clothing, and shelter, the Hindi phrase refers to the bare necessities of life, a fave topic of dear Indira Ghandi, and was subsequently used as the title of a famous Bollywood film.
Just as important, if not more so, has been the military establishment's refusal to tolerate an uninterrupted political process. Since the PPP has, more often than not, been perceived to suffer grievously at the establishment's hands, the notion that the Bhutto clan and the PPP is the only genuinely anti-establishment political force in Pakistain has been reinforced.
In recent times the relatively pro-establishment historical posture of other parties has appeared to undergo some measure of change, and this has already had an impact on the practice and perception of politics in Pakistain, even if the trends are not irreversible. If even a couple of elected governments complete their terms -- PPP-majority or otherwise -- the change in practice and perception of politics might actually be institutionalised.
In particular dynasties and personalities will become less important, even if not entirely irrelevant. In any case, generations of families have played and will continue to play significant roles in the political life of many countries, which reflects the resilience of the ruling class rather than a society's cultural proclivity. The most obvious and recent example is that of George W. Bush becoming the president of the US only eight years after his father vacated the White House.
It is important to flag another important point here, one that is almost always underspecified. Many positions of state power in Pakistain, India, or any other society for that matter, are not adjudicated upon by ordinary people. The permanent state apparatus -- which includes the civil service, police, judiciary and the military -- exercises more power, in this country at least, than elected governments have historically exercised.
Surely we should pay more attention to the highly exclusive and personalised manner in which power is concentrated within these unelected institutions of the state. The general, judge and secretary remains hard at work trying to maintain that their powerful dynasties remain unchecked. It is these dynasties of rule -- amongst the most egregious legacies of colonialism -- that remain the primary impediment to the exercise of real political choice.
Posted by: Fred ||
03/10/2012 00:00 ||
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Differing Hamas, always the voice of sweet reason, stances on Iran reflect a power struggle in the organization resulting from the upheavals of the Arab Spring.
This week, leading Gazoo- Hamas activist Salah al-Bardawil told The Guardian newspaper that in the event of a war between Iran and Israel, Hamas would not back Teheran. Hamas Foreign Minister in Gazoo Mahmoud Zahar later appeared to refute Bardawil's stance, saying that Hamas would respond "with utmost power" to any "Zionist war on Iran."
These statements reflect confusion and divisions in the main Paleostinian- Islamist movement. The confusion derives from the variety of options which the Arab upheavals of 2011 have placed before Hamas.
The divisions also reflect the resultant opening of separate and competing power structures in the movement, with the leaders of the Gazoo statelet opposing the overall leadership, and also quarreling among themselves.
The Teheran-led "resistance axis," with which Hamas was aligned, is one of the main victims of the Arab upheavals of the last year. Meanwhile, ...back at the cheese factory, all the pieces finally fell together in Fluffy's mind... the clear winner from the upheavals so far is the ideological trend of which Hamas is a representative -- namely, Sunni Islamism.
Revolt in Iran-aligned Syria has left the Iranians exposed as a narrow, sectarian force. Their claim to represent a general Mohammedan interest against the West and Israel is in disarray. In Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, Sunni Islamist elements are moving to benefit from the fall of authoritarian leaders.
Hamas's close relationship with Iran is of long standing, dating back to the mid 1990s. Iranian help formed a vital factor in turning the Paleostinian Islamist movement into a formidable terrorist force in the second intifada of 2000-2004. Following Hamas's takeover of the Gazoo Strip in 2007, Iranian aid increased in both volume and importance for Hamas.
Yet with all this, the alliance between Iran and Hamas always had the nature of a marriage of convenience. Unlike Hezbullies, the Sunni Hamas was not a creation of the Iranians, and did not subscribe to the Shia-derived Iranian-ruling ideology of Wilayat al-Faqih (leadership of the jurisprudent).
Hamas still has a deep connection to Paleostinian politics. It emerged from the Paleostinian branch of the Moslem Brüderbund, and inherited the extensive social and educational network and the ideological outlook of the Brotherhood.
There are also those within the movement -- particularly within its armed wing -- who adhere to the radically anti-Shia Salafi trend within Sunni Islamism.
Hamas's relationship with Iran derived from the somewhat binary nature of regional politics prior to 2011. The US-led and Iran-led regional blocs were facing off against one another. As Hamas PLC member Musehir al-Masri put it in 2007, Hamas and Iran had their differences, yet alliance with Iran was "a thousand times more preferable than relying on the Americans and Zionists."
Implicitly, there were only two choices, and Hamas's preference was obvious. As a result of the events of 2011, there are no longer only two choices. Hamas is split regarding which path to take.
The situation in Syria was the immediate spark for Hamas's move away from the "resistance axis." The movement was placed in an impossible situation, in which its host, the Assad regime, was engaged in the wholesale slaughter of a largely Sunni-Arab uprising.
The signs of discomfort have been apparent for months.
Hamas's Damascus ...Capital of the last overtly fascist regime in the world... offices are empty and Khaled Masha'al left the Syrian capital for Doha. The movement's key leaders are now in Qatar, Cairo, or its Gazoo fiefdom.
The move has left Mashaal weakened. A power struggle is consequently under way between the Gazoo-based leaders Ismail Haniyeh ...became Prime Minister after the legislative elections of 2006 which Hamas won. President Mahmoud Abbas dismissed Haniyeh from office on 14 June 2007 at the height of the Fatah-Hamas festivities, but Haniyeh did not acknowledge the decree and continues as the PM of Gazoo while Abbas maintains a separate PM in the West Bank... and Mahmoud Zahar, on the one hand, and Masha'al and the formerly Damascus-based element, on the other. Attitudes toward Iran are one of the elements in this disagreement.
The distancing from Iran appears to imply a move away from a focus on military methods and toward an emphasis on anti- Israel propaganda and popular agitation. But there is no overall agreement regarding the extent of the shift, and attitudes toward it have become enveloped in the larger power struggle under way.
Important elements among the Gazoo leadership do not wish to stray too far from the Iranians. Hamas, to maintain its Gazoo fiefdom, still needs Iran's expertise and its weaponry. There is no obvious Qatari or Saudi substitute for this.
The latest reports suggest that a new terrorist body, the "Aqsa Defenders" is emerging from within Hamas in Gazoo. Like Fatah's Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, this body may be used for deniable paramilitary activity, even as Hamas pursues other avenues of activity.
Haniyeh's visit to Iran and Zahar's latest statement suggest that in the period ahead, Hamas will seek to maintain some level of Iranian support, while at the same time developing relations with the authorities in Egypt and Qatar. Being in the midst of an internal contest, Hamas lacks the consensus necessary for a hard "either-or" decision with regard to its alliances.
Therefore Hamas's move away from the resistance axis should not be seen in terms of a clean break, and a clean break with political violence is equally unlikely.
Still, the distancing by Hamas from the Iran-led bloc, and its move back in the direction of the Sunni-Arabs, is reason for some quiet satisfaction in Israel. It represents a considerable setback for the regional alliance, which still constitutes by far the most serious strategic threat to Jerusalem.
A Hamas aligned more closely with Qatar would be equally politically intransigent, and if the Qatar and Egypt-sponsored reconciliation with Fatah succeeds, this will end any realistic hopes for a diplomatic process between Israelis and Paleostinians in the foreseeable future. Nor will Hamas entirely eschew violence.
The Qataris and their ilk deal in a politics of gesture and propaganda vis-a-vis Israel, but remain dependent on the West for protection against the real menace of Iran. They lack the genuine ideological fervor, seriousness and readiness for real war of the Iran-led regional alliance.
Hamas's move in the direction of Doha and Cairo, and subsequent internal squabbling, means the weakening of the most important alliance arrayed against Israel -- and the beginning of a period of flux and division for the main Paleostinian Islamist movement.
Continued on Page 49
A monumental wooden chair erected in Ramallah to symbolize the Paleostinians' sought-after United Nations ...a lucrative dumping ground for the relatives of dictators and party hacks... seat collapsed this week after months of wind and rain. Bulldozers quietly took away the shattered remains by night. Honest, we don't make this stuff up...
It's collapse and stealthy removal could well serve as an emblem of Paleostinian hopes for statehood. ... or as an ode to inshallah maintenance...
For the first time in years, meetings this week between US and Israeli leaders were largely silent on the long-stalled grinding of the peace processor. Debate between Israel and Washington over a military strike on Iran knocked Israel-Paleostinian peace talks to the bottom of Barack Obama Republicans can come along for the ride, but they've got to sit in the back... and Benjamin Netanyahu's agenda.
"The Israeli government has a strategy: to maintain the status quo... We say that we won't accept the rules of this game," said chief Paleostinian negotiator Saeb Erekat ...negotiated the Oslo Accords with Israel. He has been chief Paleostinian negotiator since 1995. He is currently negotiating with Israel to establish a de jure Paleostinian state... But to the frustration of many ordinary Paleostinians, there is no other game. Riven by internal quarrels, the Paleostinians are struggling to make their voice heard. World attention has shifted to the US presidential elections, the escalating violence in Syria and Iran's nuclear program.
PLO officials have said for weeks they are drafting a formal ultimatum to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, stating longstanding grievances and repeating demands for a halt to all Jewish settlement building in the occupied West Bank as a precondition for a resumption of talks that broke down in 2010.
The Israelis will certainly reject the demands, if they ever arrive, and will face no international pressure to back down, with world attention fixed firmly on the Iranian nuclear row.
Facing this eventuality, the Paleostinians have suggested reviving a 2011 campaign to transcend direct negotiations and again petition the United Nations for statehood recognition.
"We will go to the General Assembly at a time the Paleostinian leadership chooses, in coordination with the Arab League ...an organization of Arabic-speaking states with 22 member countries and four observers. The League tries to achieve Arab consensus on issues, which usually leaves them doing nothing but a bit of grimacing and mustache cursing... . This is just one of the options," said Nabil Abu Rudaineh, front man to President the ineffectual Mahmoud Abbas ... a graduate of the prestigious unaccredited Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow with a doctorate in Holocaust Denial... Aimless strategy
A growing number of Paleostinian commentators have criticized such a strategy as aimless. Full statehood status can only come from the UN Security Council and the United States has made clear on numerous occasions that it will veto any such move.
Citing the repeated delays in issuing what he has derided as the "mother of all letters" former cabinet minister Hassan Asfour wrote in the Amad online journal this week that Paleostinian leaders were unwilling to push the issue for fear of upsetting long-standing security and economic ties with Israel.
Further taxing Paleostinian efforts for international recognition, Abbas has invested heavily in reconciliation talks with Hamas, always the voice of sweet reason,, a rival faction that seized control of the Gazoo Strip in 2007 and does not recognize Israel.
After almost a year of negotiations, brokered by both Egypt and Qatar, Abbas, who is also known as Abu Mazen, has got little to show for his efforts, drawing more fire from the Paleostinian public, which sees him as a remote and indecisive leader.
"The Paleostinian strategy has been hampered by the rather limited diplomatic capacity of Abu Mazen and those around him," said Rami Khouri, a researcher at the American University of Beirut. "In the absence of a more effective leadership, these internal problems have made the Paleostinians vulnerable to being sidelined," he said.
Hamas also faces unprecedented internal divisions over the listless push for reconciliation, shrouding the entire Paleostinian political class in gloom.
"We're now hearing of a reconciliation 'process'," said Hany al-Masri, a Paleostinian political analyst. "There's more process than actual progress in ending the divisions. It's becoming just like the 'grinding of the peace processor.'"
Popular discontent
Financial woes may further dim the appetite of West Bank officials to disturb the status quo, as eroding support from international donors wreaks a punishing slowdown on the economy and stokes popular frustration.
In retaliation for the Paleostinian's UN drive, the United States froze $150 million in aid last year, while payments from wealthy Arab nations have also fallen far short of expectations.
The reversals, coupled with the global downturn, have driven growth rates from 9 percent in 2010 to under six percent last year, according to unofficial projections.
In an effort to plug a growing budget deficit, Ramallah-based Prime Minister Salam Fayyad ...Fayyad's political agenda holds that neither violence nor peaceful negotiations have brought the Paleostinians any closer to an independent state. The alternative to both, violent negotiations, doesn't seem to be working too well, either... tried to introduce tax hikes at the start of 2012, but had to backtrack in the face of public anger.
Israeli politicians show little concern but army officers, tasked with patrolling the West Bank, fear violence may fill the vacuum.
"Without a viable grinding of the peace processor, the situation here risks getting progressively frayed," said one Israeli officer, not authorized to speak on the record about security concerns.
Stone-throwing youths and Israeli security forces have repeatedly clashed on the outskirts of Jerusalem and in West Bank towns this year, killing one Paleostinian last month. The violence has come and gone, but tensions are edging higher.
The government in Ramallah, lacking any democratic mandate since 2006, appears stuck in a rut. But it looks unwilling to provoke any profound crisis with the Israelis - such as dissolving their administration - for fear of the backlash.
"There is a lack of legitimacy, but they can continue on this path if they want to," said analyst al-Masri. "They don't want to pay the price to their status, their powers and authority."
#3
Hey, paleos - you're just expendable tools in Iran's/Syria's/pick-any-other-islamic-nation's personal "let's kill the Joooz" agenda.
Are you having fun yet?
Posted by: Barbara ||
03/10/2012 15:35 Comments ||
Top||
#4
While all their brothers are beating each other up, it provides a fine opportunity to your neighbors to render on to you what you've been rendering on to them for so long without much a peep from the usual suspects crowd. Should make you nervous.
h/t Gates of Vienna
Six U.S. military men have been murdered by Afghan security forces seized by what may be labeled Quran-Burning Rage.
These murders are an outrage in and of themselves, but it's crucial we don't see them as isolated. They fit into a pattern that above all spreads "dhimmitude",
#1
Accusations of blasphemy, heresy, apostasy, of being the wrong kind of Muslim and/or of being an uppity woman are all tools of JIHAD & have been for many centuries.
#4
Islamic rage is of extremely short range, only affecting the nearest Christians, Jews, and Americans. Further out, it is totally impotent.
It gets its power in the West from the Alinsky Amplification Effect: it is the "crisis" not allowed to be wasted by politicians and activists. They rush in as the "Peacemakers" who demand concessions as a precondition of them going to mollify The Offended and The Enraged.
At all other times, these intermediates treat these people like children, so would regard any rage against any policy of theirs as being a temper tantrum that deserves being ignored. No world-destroying crisis ensues from doing so.
Perhaps us ignoring the tantrums would equally result in no similar crises arising.
#5
The topic is Russian expansionism and British response in the mid 19th century stretching theatres from Egypt to India, into the Caucasus and Khanates (including Afghanistan). Many locations are in the news today, such as Kabul and Khandahar.
It has the accounts of both Russians and British men of action and keen eye as they scout and survey, and report as some of the first westerners to enter these areas as the two empires attempt to outmaneuver each other. Their observations and opinions are (not going to spoil) interesting.
In my opinion, it is a history book which reads like a spy novel, and the author does a fantastic job keeping reigns on so many characters and events, with gentle reminders and forshadowing without spoiling.
#6
Mr. Hopkirk has ten books offered by amazon.com, swksvolFF. Unfortunately, The Great Game is not one of those offered on Kindle, which means I can't download a free sample? Do you have thoughts on any of his others, or should I just go mad and download samples of all available?
#7
I wish I had an answer, The Great Game is my first experience with Mr. Hopkirk; this particular book has been passed across my family and is usually read within a couple days, it just does not sit down easily.
I looked at the list, and unfamiliar with kindle is this link an offer for kindle Great Game? Also, I am told Trespassers on the Roof of the World is a good one.
Mark Steyn at his best. From TFA:
All of us are born with the unalienable right to life, liberty, and a lifetime supply of premium ribbed silky-smooth ultrasensitive spermicidal lubricant condoms. No taxation without rubberization, as the Minutemen said. The shot heard round the world, and all that. RTWT
#11
That depends Zorba: are you male? Because, for all her talk about contraception, Ms. Fluke honestly looks like the kind of gal who likes other gals.
#12
So true, Secret Master. But chicks like that actually have boyfriends. One told me he couldn't understand how any woman could be a Republican. I told him he'd probably get more blow jobs if he wasn't such a bigot.
A multi-volume chronology and reference guide set detailing three years of the Mexican Drug War between 2010 and 2012.
Rantburg.com and borderlandbeat.com correspondent and author Chris Covert presents his first non-fiction work detailing
the drug and gang related violence in Mexico.
Chris gives us Mexican press dispatches of drug and gang war violence
over three years, presented in a multi volume set intended to chronicle the death, violence and mayhem which has
dominated Mexico for six years.
Rantburg was assembled from recycled algorithms in the United States of America. No
trees were destroyed in the production of this weblog. We did hurt some, though. Sorry.
[Dawn] THOSE Paks who think beyond the caricature of India as a scheming bully out to swallow us whole will have keenly followed the recently concluded elections in five states of that country, including the huge and extremely influential Uttar Pradesh (UP).
This is an important, if banal, fact. It also raises questions about one of the most enduring themes in scholarship on South Asian societies, namely that dynasties dominate politics. Nehru-Gandhi in India, Bhutto in Pakistain, and Mujib-Hasina in Bangladesh are only the most prominent names that come to mind. A detailed investigation into who holds public office in many of the region's states confirms that many a son, daughter, brother, sister, husband or wife has assumed a position of power and influence immediately or soon after their kin has vacated the proverbial throne.
The trajectory of change in each polity is, of course, unique. So it would appear reasonable to argue that Indians -- including those who are victims of generations of systematic exploitation -- are more likely to be able to exercise political choice than Paks, on account of the fact that an uninterrupted democratic process has ensured more political freedoms.
If politics in Pakistain is to move beyond larger-than-life personalities, then it is necessary to recognise that change takes time and, arguably more importantly, continuity in the political process. The centrality of the Bhutto clan and the Pakistain People's Party (PPP) to Pak political life is not only to be explained as a cult of personality or the enduring ideology of roti, kapra aur makan. 
A monumental wooden chair erected in Ramallah to symbolize the Paleostinians' sought-after 
