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2007-10-01 Syria-Lebanon-Iran

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Posted by ed 2007-10-01 15:51|| || Front Page|| [5 views ] Top

#1 Something here doesn't make sense to me.
"Permitted Iran to arm Bosnia,"
"Permitted Russia to arm Iran."
But Russia was on the side of the Serbs, so why would they have been indirectly arming the Bosnians? (And don't tell me they don't have good enough intel to be able to figure out that the stuff they were sending Iran was winding up in Bosnia.}

Posted by Glenmore">Glenmore 2007-10-01 19:05|| 2007-10-01 19:05|| Front Page Top

#2 "Permitted Iran to arm Bosnia,"
Senator Craig January 16, 1997: Clinton-Approved Iranian Arms Transfers Help Turn Bosnia into Militant Islamic Base
1. The Clinton Green Light to Iranian Arms Shipments (page 3): In April 1994, President Clinton gave the government of Croatia what has been described by Congressional committees as a "green light" for shipments of weapons from Iran and other Muslim countries to the Muslim-led government of Bosnia. The policy was approved at the urging of NSC chief Anthony Lake and the U.S. ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith. The CIA and the Departments of State and Defense were kept in the dark until after the decision was made.1. The Clinton Green Light to Iranian Arms Shipments (page 3): In April 1994, President Clinton gave the government of Croatia what has been described by Congressional committees as a "green light" for shipments of weapons from Iran and other Muslim countries to the Muslim-led government of Bosnia. The policy was approved at the urging of NSC chief Anthony Lake and the U.S. ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith. The CIA and the Departments of State and Defense were kept in the dark until after the decision was made.

"Permitted Russia to arm Iran."
Russia-Iran Arms Trade
Between 1995 and 2000, Russia suspended its advanced weapons trade with Iran as part of a voluntary agreement with the United States. The value of arms transfer agreements between the Iran and Russia ballooned from $300 million between 1998 and 2001 to $1.7 billion between 2002 and 2005.

Congressional Record: October 26, 2000, Senator Bond
First, let me call attention to a Wall Street Journal editorial page article, "Gore's Hidden Weakness: Foreign Policy" from Monday, October 23. There Robert Zoellick expresses concern over the supposed foreign policy experience that Vice President Gore would bring to the White House.

In the article he said that in the Chernomyrdin agreement:

. . . he blessed Russian exports to Iran of weapons that could only be targeted against the U.S. Navy, which protects the world's energy lifeline.

He went on to say:

. . . Russian technicians continued to help Iran develop "laser isotope separation technology" used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons.
...

This secret Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement, and the Clinton-Gore administration's promise not to implement U.S. laws requiring sanctions for Russian weapons proliferation to Iran, was first reported in the New York Times on October 13 of this year. It said there that:

In exchange for the Russian promises, the United States pledged not to seek penalties against Russia under a 1992 law that requires sanctions against countries that sell advanced weaponry to countries the State Department classifies as state sponsors of terrorism. Iran is on that list.

The law they are referring to, of course, is the 1992 Iran-Iraq Non-Proliferation Act. That was sponsored by the Senator from Tennessee, Mr. Al Gore, along with Senator McCain.

Posted by ed 2007-10-01 19:29|| 2007-10-01 19:29|| Front Page Top

#3 Russian technicians continued to help Iran develop "laser isotope separation technology" used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons.
...

Okay, we are talking centrifuges in Iran now. What happened to the laser separation tech?

Posted by 3dc 2007-10-01 19:47|| 2007-10-01 19:47|| Front Page Top

#4 Focusing on Irans Laser Enrichment Program (PDF)
Estimate of current Iranian LIS capabilities:
It is difficult to determine Irans LIS capability for a number of reasons. First, although the reported level of success milligram quantities - to enrich uranium at LSL and CSL at the LRC is far below the kilogram amounts needed for nuclear fuel or weapons, there still is a question as to the success of the experiments that were conducted at the pilot plant at Lashkar Abad between October 2002 and January 2003.

Second, Iranian officials do not appear to have provided a full history of Irans LIS programme. According to Irans 2003 declarations, it appears that all the lasers that were used in experiments have been dismantled and placed in storage. Still unknown are the number of lasers that were produced from the various phases of operation of the LRC and their exact locations. It is worth noting that having the proper lasers is not sufficient for a functioning LIS programme. For instance, Iranian scientists and engineers would have to master other technologies, such as electronic-beam guns, vacuum vessels, and control systems. The extent of this activity is also unknown.

However, raising suspicions about continuing laser research, the IAEAs June report states that Iran is continuing research and development on CVLs, and as previously mentioned, the Agency discovered in May 2004 that the LRC is working on Nd:YAG lasers. Both technologies could be useful for AVLIS.

Concerning Irans current LIS capability, three possible scenarios should be considered. Scenario number one would be that the Iranians, as they declared to the IAEA, have disassembled all lasers that have been used in or are readily capable of LIS operations and packed them away to be verified by the IAEA. In this case, there is a latent but not a current LIS capability in Iran. However, this scenario appears unlikely in light of the continuing work on copper vapour and Nd: YAG lasers, which might be adapted to LIS.

The second scenario would involve deception. In that case, Iranian officials may have presented to the IAEA a portion or sample of those lasers and equipment, which they knew would be of interest to the international community. This hypothetical partial revelation may satisfy the IAEAs curiosity regarding Irans LIS programme. The other portion of the programme may have been hidden away with a quantity of uranium metal to be used at a later date to continue LIS experiments.

The third scenario is a variant of the second. It involves continued LIS operations even as we write which means that the Iranians could be enriching uranium using LIS even today. As noted in the box, LIS facilities take up very little room and tend to be significantly smaller than centrifuge enrichment plants. However, this scenario only suggests a continued capability but does not provide a quantitative assessment of how much enriched uranium Iran can produce using LIS methods.

In addition to laser technology and equipment, Iran has developed and maintained a scientific intellectual base that understands LIS technologies. Training in this field may have begun in the 1970s when Eerkens first visited and discussed the transfer of LIS technologies and equipment. Since then, the LRC has trained numerous scientists in the technology. In a 1993 interview, LRC deputy head Fereydun Soltan-Moradi said the centre had undertaken to expand this technology to a national level. So far it has been able to train a large number of experts.

Posted by ed 2007-10-01 20:38|| 2007-10-01 20:38|| Front Page Top

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